University of Wisconsin Milwaukee

UWM Digital Commons
Theses and Dissertations
May 2020

A Nation Rated? School Segregation and the Distribution of a
School Resource: the Role of Accountability Ratings in
Metropolitan Public Schools
Michael A. Miner
University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee

Follow this and additional works at: https://dc.uwm.edu/etd
Part of the Sociology Commons

Recommended Citation
Miner, Michael A., "A Nation Rated? School Segregation and the Distribution of a School Resource: the
Role of Accountability Ratings in Metropolitan Public Schools" (2020). Theses and Dissertations. 2406.
https://dc.uwm.edu/etd/2406

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by UWM Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of UWM Digital Commons. For more
information, please contact open-access@uwm.edu.

A NATION RATED?
SCHOOL SEGREGATION AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF A SCHOOL RESOURCE: THE
ROLE OF ACCOUNTABILITY RATINGS IN METROPOLITAN PUBLIC SCHOOLS

by

Michael A. Miner

A Dissertation Submitted in
Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy
in Sociology

at
The University of Wisconsin—Milwaukee

May 2020

ABSTRACT
A NATION RATED?
SCHOOL SEGREGATION AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF A SCHOOL RESOURCE: THE
ROLE OF ACCOUNTABILITY RATINGS IN METROPOLITAN PUBLIC SCHOOLS
by
Michael A. Miner
The University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee, 2020
Under the Supervision of Professor Marcus L. Britton

Overview. This dissertation examines how school accountability ratings are associated
with school segregation, how they shape public perceptions of school quality and how they
influence parents’ enrollment decisions. In theory, school ratings were developed to raise
achievement for all students by identifying poor performing schools and intervening to improve
them. Across the United States, school segregation concentrates Black, Latinx and lower income
students in schools with low average test scores. As such, school ratings may both reflect and
even reinforce educational inequalities associated with school segregation because a component
of the rating relies on performance on standardized exams. To the extent that ratings reflect
which groups of students attend which schools rather than how effectively schools serve their
student populations, the system may be problematic. Scholars have yet to understand the
association of school ratings and school segregation. This is an important consideration, not only
because ratings may reflect broader patterns of inequality, but also because they may serve as a
resource for stakeholders, including public officials and parents who may rely on ratings as an
indication of school quality. Internationally, the publication of school ratings has led to lower
enrollment and school closures, but it is unclear how ratings are associated with segregation or
how they impact parent’s perceptions and attitudes within the United States. This dissertation
addresses three key questions: Are school ratings associated with school segregation? If so, by
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what metric (i.e. within- or between-district segregation)? Do ratings influence parent’s
perceptions and attitudes? I answer these by examining school report cards and school
segregation across 112 metropolitan regions. By using original data from a survey experiment, I
am also able to examine causal effects of school ratings on parents’ perceptions and attitudes.
Findings show that in more segregated metropolitan regions, schools with higher proportions of
Black students have higher probabilities of receiving a lower school rating relative to a higher
one. Moreover, I show that parents’ perceptions of school quality are significantly less favorable
when shown a school profile with a lower school rating and that parents’ are less likely to enroll
their children in a hypothetical school with a lower rating (C-F).
Intellectual Merit. Segregation researchers argue that the distribution of resources and
their effect on students’ educational outcomes is poorly understood (Reardon and Owens 2014).
This project contributes to the scholarly literature in two ways. First, I conceptualize school
ratings as a resource vital to the educational experience of students which impacts students,
families and schools differently in patterns that are reflective of existing social inequality.
Second, I contribute to sociological understanding of the relationships among race/ethnicity,
class, schools, variations in accountability policies in general, and perceptions of school quality
and enrollment decisions. These are significant contributions because they have the potential to
transform future school segregation research as well as the design and dissemination of
educational accountability metrics.
Broader Impacts. Findings from this research provide benefits to scholars across multiple
disciplines allowing sociologists, educational researchers, methodologists and policy makers to
effectively collaborate. The scientific contributions of this research include the expansion of
theory and the treatment of accountability policies as a resource that plays a key role in parental
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decision making, which, in turn, may influence school segregation patterns. Methodologists
likely gain a richer understanding of how perceptions vary and depend on conditions of school
quality indicators. Results from this study offer empirical evidence for the implementation and
dissemination of alternative accountability metrics that are reliable and accurate estimates of how
well schools and districts serve their students. This should prove informative to educational
researchers and policy makers. The scope of this research has the potential to impact anyone
conducting research on the association of school segregation and educational policy as well as
those studying housing and public perceptions.
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A NATION RATED? SCHOOL SEGREGATION AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF A SCHOOL
RESOURCE: THE ROLE OF ACCOUNTABILITY RATINGS IN METROPOLITAN PUBLIC
SCHOOLS
In 2007, the United States Supreme Court limited the use of voluntary racial classifications by
school districts in determining student assignments to schools in an effort to lessen the effects of
de facto segregation (Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1
2007) (hereinafter, Seattle). De facto segregation has long been distinguished by the Court from
de jure segregation, segregation in Southern and border states along with the District of
Columbia that historically adopted explicit state laws requiring or permitting segregation by race
(Clotfelter 1999; Clotfelter 2004; Reardon and Owens 2014). While de facto segregation at the
local level is often a result of overt and covert actions to maintain high levels of segregation (e.g.
redlining and housing discrimination, see Rothstein 2015), the plurality of Justices in Seattle
viewed educational segregation in the case not as a product of governmental policies, but of
individual choices. The dissenting voice of Justice Breyer however, offered a third possibility,
arguing that,
““state action” that is not explicitly racially segregative may nonetheless lead to greater
levels of residential segregation. If legal decisions and government policy actually cause
residential segregation by changing the structure of incentives that drive private choices,
then evidence of segregation resulting from state action might necessitate judicial
remedy.” (Liebowitz and Page 2014: 672; Mickelson et al. 2017: Chapter 7; Parents
Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1 2007).
At minimum Justice Breyer’s dissent from Seattle suggests that if educational policy causes
segregation by influencing private decisions then there may be evidence of segregation resulting
from state action. Below I provide a historical overview of educational policy and school
segregation trends in the United States. I argue that contemporary accountability ratings are
likely unevenly distributed across schools and districts in a manner that reflects broader
inequalities in metropolitan America. At the same time, school ratings may be serving as a signal
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of school quality to key stakeholders, whether or not they are an accurate indication of how well
students are able to learn within their school. To test these claims, I assess (1) the association of
school accountability ratings and school segregation and (2) the causal effects of school ratings
on parents’ perceptions of schools and attitudes toward enrollment decisions.
In 1983, the United States Department of Education published A Nation at Risk,
effectively positioning education in America as an economic and national policy concern. This
new perspective garnered the interest of legislative leaders across the entire political spectrum.
As a result, there was a culmination of individual state efforts to hold schools accountable for
meeting academic standards, which in turn, directly contributed to federal efforts aimed at
making accountability a requirement of federal aid (Mehta 2013). In 2015, President Obama
signed the Every Student Succeeds Act (ESSA) into law which reauthorized the original 1965
Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) signed by President Johnson. The
immediately prior reauthorization of the law was the 2002 implementation of the No Child Left
Behind Act (NCLB) under the Bush administration (U.S. Department of Education 2019). While
the current law (ESSA) provides states with more authority over their accountability system in
regard to setting their own goals for student achievement, the previous law (NCLB) was the first
to mandate that all states publish accountability report cards based, in part, on individual student
test scores that reflect the overall school as a whole (No Child Left Behind Act of 2002).
Currently, each state has flexibility in developing a unique report card or rating system
(e.g., A-F; 0-100; 1-5; etc.; see Appendix B), as well as determining its own measurement of
student variables (Education Commission of the States 2018). By the 2013-2014 school year, all
states constructed their accountability categories by employing some variation of an index that
measured “essential indicators.” During that time, Mikulecky and Christie (2014) note that all
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states measured student achievement and graduation rates, most accounted for the academic
growth (42 states), and many accounted for the reduction of achievement gaps between different
student group populations (36 states), while less than half included postsecondary readiness (20
states).
In theory, school ratings were developed to raise achievement for all students by
identifying poor performing schools and implementing varying degrees of intervention (No
Child Left Behind Act of 2002). In discussions of accountability policy however, controversy
has primarily centered around standardized exams, as research consistently shows that
performance differs by student demographics (Huntington-Klein and Ackert 2018; von Hippel,
Workman and Downey 2018). Across the United States, school segregation concentrates Black,
Latinx and lower income students in schools with low average test scores (Logan 2010; Logan,
Minca and Adar 2012). To this point, school ratings may both reflect and even reinforce
educational inequalities associated with school segregation if a primary component of the rating
relies on performance on standardized exams. Segregation researchers have argued that the
distribution of resources and their effect on students’ educational outcomes is poorly understood
(Reardon and Owens 2014). I contribute to this theoretical discussion by conceptualizing school
ratings as a resource vital to (1) the educational experience of students and (2) parents’
perceptions of schools and attitudes toward enrollment decisions.
A contemporary mechanism of school segregation may be the ratings schools receive
from their respective states, such that they are unequally distributed across schools and school
districts. The evidence shows that families in search of housing tend to develop opinions of
neighborhoods and school districts that are driven by schools’ performance (Frankenberg 2013),
but if ratings primarily reflect which groups of students attend which schools rather than how
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effectively schools are able to serve their student populations, this system may be problematic.1
Even more, if school ratings can be predicted ex ante based on easily observable measures of
student demographics, the design itself (Ehlert, Koedel, Parsons and Podgursky 2016: 478) may
provide a structure of incentives that drive private choices, potentially reinforcing segregation.
As other evidence has shown, White families tend to avoid schools with high proportions of nonWhite and especially Black students (Kozol 2005; Billingham and Hunt 2016). If ratings divert
attention away from the disparities in other resources associated with school segregation, there is
reason to suspect that school ratings may further perpetuate White and middle class families’
avoidance of neighborhoods where these schools are located.
In the subsequent sections, this dissertation addresses the following five questions:
1. To what extent do levels of racial/ethnic segregation within school districts predict school
accountability ratings in the United States?
2. To what extent do levels of racial/ethnic segregation between school districts predict
school accountability ratings in the United States?
3. Is there an interaction effect between school demographic characteristics and levels of
racial/ethnic segregation that predict school accountability ratings in the United States?
4. Do school ratings impact parents’ perceptions of schools?
5. If school ratings impact parents’ perceptions of schools, how do they impact parents’
attitudes toward enrollment decisions?

1

While school ratings may overlap with the plethora of online school rating systems (e.g. GreatSchools.org, an
embedded feature on prominent home search websites such as Zillow.com and Trulia.com; see also Niche.com),
state ratings are distinct in their measurement and weighting criteria. Even if private actors are producing their own
quality indicators of schools, they may be weighted or influenced by external variables outside of the control of
schools. For instance, some also account for perception surveys and display school ratings next to various
neighborhood factors such as, crime and safety and diversity (https://www.niche.com/about/data/).
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Together, these questions fill a significant lacuna in the literature. Scholars have yet to
understand the distribution of school ratings and the possible association with school
segregation. This is an important consideration, not only because student achievement is
stratified within the student population, but also because school ratings may reflect broader
inequalities in families and communities rather than how effective schools are at educating their
student populations. Internationally, the publication of school ratings, in particular, has led to
lower student enrollment and school closures (Koning and Van der Wiel 2013; Nunes, Reis and
Seabra 2015). It is less clear within the United States, however, if school ratings are unequally
distributed and if they are associated with school segregation levels or if they impact parent’s
decision-making.
The ultimate intention of this project is to inform best practices for designing,
disseminating and interpreting measures of school quality by school authorities, elected officials
and parents. This research accomplishes the overall objective by pursuing the following specific
aims. Aim #1: Assess the association of school report cards and levels of within- and betweendistrict school segregation. This aim is completed by analyzing school ratings that are
disseminated through state report cards along with student demographic data available through
the National Center for Education Statistics: Common Core of Data. Aim#2: Offer new evidence
and discovery on the potential impacts of school ratings on perceptions of school quality and
enrollment decisions. Building on knowledge gained from the empirical analyses described
above, I collected new survey data using an experimental design. The between-subjects
experimental design investigates how parents respond to school accountability ratings (A-F), net
of varying school quality measures such as achievement on standardized exams and student
growth. The primary objectives of the second aim are to assess the degree to which
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accountability policies influence parents’ perceptions of school quality and impact the likelihood
that parents will choose to enroll their child in a hypothetical school.
Findings reveal a significant interaction effect between school demographic
characteristics and levels of between-district segregation that predict school accountability
ratings. In more segregated metropolitan regions, these data show that schools with higher
proportions of Black students have higher probabilities of receiving a lower school rating relative
to a higher one. This association raises serious questions about the equitability of the report card
system implemented across the United States, not only because it appears to be penalizing an
already disadvantaged group of students and schools, but also because it may be reinforcing
patterns of segregation by deterring potential families from moving into certain school districts.
The second part of this dissertation examines part of this latter claim, about perceptions of the
school quality as well as the extent to which these policies influence parents’ decision-making to
enroll their children in schools. Experimental findings show that net of adequate yearly progress
across school performance metrics, parents’ perceptions of school quality is significantly less
favorable when shown a school profile with a lower school rating. Similarly, parents indicate that
they are less likely to enroll their children in a hypothetical school with a lower rating (C-F).
Considered together, the results presented in this dissertation provide comprehensive
benefits to scholars and practitioners across multiple disciplines allowing sociologists,
educational researchers, methodologists and policy makers to effectively collaborate. The
scientific contributions of this research include the expansion of theory and the treatment of
educational accountability policies as a resource that plays a key role in parental decisionmaking, which, in turn, may influence school segregation patterns. Methodologists should gain a
richer understanding of what school accountability ratings measure and how perceptions vary
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and depend on conditions of school quality indicators. Results from this study offer empirical
evidence for the implementation and dissemination of alternative accountability metrics that are
reliable and accurate estimates of how well schools and school districts serve their students. This
should prove informative to social scientists and policy makers. The scope of this project has the
potential to impact anyone conducting research on the association of school segregation and
educational policy as well as those studying housing and public perceptions.

LITERATURE REVIEW
Educational policy and the implementation of accountability ratings
Historically, the role of the federal government in education was quite limited through the
middle of the twentieth century. Following the Second World War however, the role of the
federal government in education grew substantially beginning with Sputnik and through the
passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the passage of ESEA in 1965, the findings of the
Coleman Report (1966), and the development of the United States Department of Education in
1979. Together, these efforts broadened the scope of the federal government in education (Mehta
2013; Superfine 2005).
Since the publication of A Nation at Risk in 1983, there have also been increased efforts
to hold schools more accountable. The emphasis on “excellence” and “high standards” in the
report represents a rhetorical and practical shift in the educational landscape from the childcentered view of education that characterized the 1960’s to the current standards-based emphasis
on material to be mastered by all students. At the core of A Nation at Risk was the move toward
emphasizing accountability based on quantifiable results (Mehta 2013; Oakes 1985).
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There are three important laws that followed the culmination of individual state efforts to
hold schools accountable for meeting academic standards. First, in 1994, President Clinton
signed Goals 2000 into law. This represented the first federal attempt to promote educational
reform on a national scale. Goals 2000 provided financial aid to states and districts in exchange
for submitting accountability measures to the federal government (Superfine 2005). Second, in
2002, President Bush further extended Goals 2000 and signed into law the No Child Left Behind
Act. This was the first federal law that mandated annual testing for all students in mathematics
and reading each year for grades third through eighth and once in grades tenth through twelfth.
To be sure, similar test-based systems existed in 49 states prior to NCLB (Mehta 2013). NCLB
however, required states to bring all students up to levels of proficiency through adequate yearly
progress (AYP) and produce a detailed timeline for how every student group would reach 100
percent proficiency by the year 2014 (No Child Left Behind Act 2002). Schools and districts that
repeatedly failed to meet goals set by AYP faced loss of funding, conversion of the
administration or school, and even closure.
In theory, NCLB was intended to improve education for all students. Part of NCLB
focused on holding schools accountable for student subgroup populations as a way to guarantee
that schools did not ignore certain groups of students. Under the law, failure of any group was
defined as failure of the entire school (Gaddis and Lauen 2014; No Child Left Behind Act of
2002; Sims 2013). In practice, however, critics of quantification have shown the law to be
especially consequential for disproportionate numbers of students of color, those in poverty and
residents of rural and urban communities (Caven 2019; Darling-Hammond 2007; Gay 2007;
Ravitch 2010; Ravitch 2013). In sum, NCLB is noted as limiting the educational curriculum and
unfairly holding schools accountable for circumstances such as limited resources and events such
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family and neighborhood poverty that are outside of schools control (Kozol 2005; Gay 2007;
Mehta 2013; Ravitch 2010).
By 2012, the United States Department of Education recognized that most schools would
not meet the proficiency mandate set under NCLB – to have all students 100 percent proficient
by 2014. As such, the Obama administration began granting releases to states and districts that
designed comprehensive plans to close achievement gaps and increase academic outcomes.
These efforts led to the third and current federal law. In 2015, President Obama signed Every
Student Succeeds Act into law. Essentially ESSA reauthorizes NCLB and provides states with
more authority over their accountability measures (e.g., the law allows states to include
weighting metrics and various school culture measures of their own choosing—see Appendix B).
Nevertheless, ESSA continues the mandate that all states publish accountability report
cards that are based, in part, on student achievement. According to the Department of Education,
ESSA “[e]nsures that vital information is provided to educators, families, students, and
communities through annual statewide assessments that measure students' progress toward those
high standards” (U.S. Department of Education 2019). While the new law certainly allows
greater flexibility among states in their development of their rating system (e.g., A-F; 0-100; 1-5;
etc.; see Appendix B), all states must comply or risk losing federal funding, and construct their
accountability categories by employing some variation of an index that measures “essential
indicators.” In the United States, all states account for student achievement in the construction of
their school ratings, but research consistently shows that performance differs by student
demographics (Huntington-Klein and Ackert 2018; von Hippel et al. 2018). Because school
segregation concentrates Black, Latinx and lower income students in schools with low average
test scores (Logan et al. 2012), school ratings may be more of an indication of broader
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racial/ethnic and socioeconomic inequality rather than the extent to which schools are able to
provide quality education to their students. Less is known however, about how school ratings are
distributed across schools and districts.

Assessing the unequal distribution of a school resource
Since the Coleman Report (1966), scholars have emphasized that schools and districts have
various resources that are beneficial to their students. The existing literature documents that the
distribution of resources differs by student groups and schools. These resources include: school
funding in the form of property tax revenue, the social and cultural capital of parents and
enrolled students, advanced curriculums, skills and credentials of teachers as well as the physical
facilities in schools (Carter 2005; Duncan and Murnane 2014; Kozol 1991; Hochschild and
Scovronick 2003; Lareau 2003; Lareau 2011; Logan et al. 2012; Reardon and Owens 2014;
Oakes 1985). Sociologists have argued that the distribution of resources and their effect on
students’ educational outcomes is poorly understood (Clotfelter et al. 2003; Reardon and Owens
2014). I contribute to this scholarship by conceptualizing school ratings as an additional
contemporary school resource that may affect students, families and schools differently if ratings
and students are distributed unevenly across schools and districts in patterns that reflect existing
social inequality. In addition to the distribution of resources discussed above, existing inequality
includes, but is not limited to differences in funding as well as neighborhood and metropolitan
housing segregation.
For instance, the evidence shows that both neighborhood and school segregation are
intertwined in complex ways and that their association has strengthened over time (Frankenberg
2013; Ong and Rickles 2004; Owens 2020). Indeed, across the nation most students attend their
10

neighborhood school, and this is especially the case at the primary level (Goldsmith 2016;
Richards and Stroub 2013). While school and neighborhood segregation are associated, it is
useful to conceptualize the two as partially distinct phenomena for at least two reasons. First,
the research shows that wealthier children are more likely to withdraw from neighborhood
schools (Saporito and Sohoni 2007). Secondly, school attendance boundaries have been
gerrymandered over time (Clotfelter 2004; Frankenberg 2013; Richards and Stroub 2015). Both
of these trends exacerbate school segregation to an extent over and above what might be
expected based on neighborhood segregation measures alone. These trends also lead to a
concentration of poverty in neighborhood schools among predominantly minority students and
additionally zone students in and out based on demographics. School segregation has the
strongest impact on determining educational achievement. In fact, in estimating annual test
gains, school factors are most critical (Carlson and Cowen 2015), but the long-term effects of
neighborhood segregation have been shown to predict educational attainment later in life. Owens
(2010) shows that living in a poor neighborhood decreases the chance of completing high
school and that having high achieving neighbors increases the odds of completing a bachelor’s
degree. Similarly, Goldsmith (2009) demonstrates that students concentrated in predominately
Black and Latinx schools are less likely to earn a high school degree or bachelor’s, relative to
similar students in predominately White schools. The prevailing argument is that school
segregation still largely exists because of the inaction to enforce antidiscrimination in housing
policy and the failure to attempt to integrate neighborhoods (Frankenberg 2013; Ong and Rickles
2004; Owens 2010). With that said, throughout this dissertation, I argue that if school ratings are
unevenly distributed across schools and districts, they likely reflect and potentially reinforce
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patterns of existing social inequality in the broader metropolitan landscape (e.g.
neighborhood/housing segregation; see also Reardon, Fox and Townsend 2015).

School ratings and school segregation
School segregation affects students by both shaping the total quantity of resources available in
the system and by the allocation of those resources in schools and districts (Reardon and Owens
2014). Accordingly, if school and school district racial/ethnic and socioeconomic composition
affects the allocation of ratings among schools, then it is expected that segregation will lead to
disparities in student outcomes that will be reflected in assigned ratings. Despite previous
characterizations of “the end of segregation” (Glaeser and Vigdor 2012) or of the time period of
1968-71 through 1990 as one of a “regime of desegregation” (see Logan, Oakey and Stowell
2008), scholars have recently argued these terms might be dated when considering rulings made
by the Supreme Court which have largely limited local efforts to reduce school segregation
(Logan, Zhang and Oakley 2017; Miliken v. Bradley 1974; Parents Involved in Community
Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1 2007). To shed light on what scholars are now calling the
era of “post desegregation,” I briefly discuss the historical legal landscape and its effects on
changes in levels of school segregation (see Appendix A for a complete list of pertinent opinions
and rulings).
Changes in levels of school segregation over the past 65 years have been inconsistent
across time and place in pace and direction (Reardon and Owens 2014), and these trends begin
with legal declarations throughout modern history. In 1954, the Supreme Court of the United
States unanimously agreed in Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka Kansas (hereinafter,
Brown) that separate was inherently unequal overturning precedent set in Plessy v. Ferguson
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1896 that maintained separate and equal spaces. The Court however, largely left enforcement of
the ruling untouched with its infamous timeline of “all deliberate speed,” declared the following
year in Brown II. As a result, the evidence suggests that school segregation remained largely
unchanged in the immediate years after Brown (Clotfelter 2004; Orfield and Eaton 1996).
It wasn’t until the following two decades that serious action was taken by Congress and
the Supreme Court. In 1964, the United States Congress passed the Civil Rights Act, which
entailed two key aspects pertaining to schools and desegregation efforts. In it, Congress
authorized the Attorney General of the United States to initiate class actions against school
districts failing to comply with Brown. It additionally provided the Secretary of Education (est.
1979; at the time, Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare) to withhold federal funding if
schools excluded on the basis of race. Fourteen years after the Supreme Court ruled in Brown,
they issued a clear directive that schools must desegregate “root and branch.” The ruling in
Green v. New Kent County emphasized that schools must make every effort to not only
desegregate their students, but their teachers, transportation and facilities as well. The Court
further extended the efforts to desegregate with the ruling in Swann requiring school districts to
racially balance to the extent possible, even if that required bussing. As evident in time-series
analyses, sociologists focused on historic change in school segregation show significant declines
in Southern states’ within-district segregation rates between 1970 and 1980. This trend was
observed throughout the United States, but especially pronounced in the South (Logan et al.
2017).2

Using the Dissimilarity Index, sociologists show that Southern states’ within-district segregation in 1970 was 83.8,
but , by the beginning of the following decade (1980), segregation had fallen to 47.3. Similarly, within-district
segregation for non-Southern states decreased from 74.5 in 1970 to 56.1 by 1980 (Logan et al. 2017: 1068, Table 8).
2
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In large part, the first two decades of Supreme Court rulings after Brown applied to the
19 Southern and border states along with the District of Columbia that had explicit laws
permitting or requiring segregation on the basis of race. This is noted by the Court as de jure
segregation. While it is certainly the case that segregation in the Southern United States at the
time far exceeded the levels observed in any other region, the evidence does show that
segregation existed throughout the country. These trends were recognized by the Court in 1973.
The final decision that marked school desegregation efforts declared in Keyes v. Denver was, if
segregation resulted from the actions taken by local authorities or school officials, that the
district must desegregate. This ruling was the first to apply to other regions of the United States
that did not have de jure segregation (Clotfelter 2004; Orfield and Eaton 1996; Wells and Crain
1997).3 Without contest, the social scientific literature demonstrates that the 1954 to 1968
period after Brown maintained high levels of school segregation and the post-Green era, from
1968 to 1974 showed declining rates of school segregation. While these trends were especially
pronounced in de jure states, the decline was evident throughout the nation (Clotfelter 2004;
Hochschild and Scovronick 2003; Reardon et al. 2012; Reardon and Owens 2014; Wells and
Crain 1994).
Key issues did arise, however. While the within-district segregation rates were declining
during the period, the between-district segregation rates were on the rise based on factors that
contributed to between-district segregation such as housing loans available to Whites, covert
discrimination, strategic location of low-income projects, increased suburbanization, as well as

3

Some scholars argue that de facto segregation at the local level is often a result of overt and covert public actions
to maintain high levels of segregation and should be viewed as form of de jure segregation (Rothstein 2015).
Scholars point to a number of factors such as housing loans available to Whites, covert discrimination, strategic
location of low-income projects, increased suburbanization, as well as White flight (Massey and Denton 1993;
Rothstein 2015).
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White flight (Massey and Denton 1993; Rothstein 2015). This trend was particularly evident in
non-Southern states in which school districts are plentiful and often small relative to the much
larger school districts in the South. As a result, for non-de jure states, those not in Southern and
border states, the declines of within-district segregation were offset by the increase of
segregation between school districts (Clotfelter 1999; Clotfelter 2004; Reardon and Owens
2014). For instance, in non-Southern states, measures of segregation between-districts steadily
increased while measures of segregation within-districts decreased (Logan et al. 2017). This
trend is often noted as de facto segregation.
Efforts to desegregate across school district boundaries were however largely blocked as
part of the Milliken v. Bradley ruling in 1974 (Hereinafter Milliken). In Milliken, the Court
declared that school districts were not responsible to participate in interdistrict efforts unless
plaintiffs could prove discriminatory acts by the state or district (Clotfelter 1999; Clotfelter 2004;
Reardon and Owens 2014). Consequently, the school segregation literature since the 1980s has
been less clear.
On the one hand, some scholars have characterized the epoch as one of resegregation
(e.g. Orfield and Eaton 1996; Orfield and Lee 2004; Orfield and Lee 2005; Orfield and Lee
2007). To them, Milliken and subsequent rulings in the 1990s (e.g. Board of Education v. Dowell
1991; Freeman v. Pitts 1992 and Missouri v. Jenkins 1995) that allowed schools to be removed
from Court-ordered oversight have resulted in an increase in school segregation. On the other
hand, other scholars have made the argument that school segregation throughout the 1990s and
up through 2010 has changed very little. In fact, Logan et al. (2017) show that school
segregation, both within- and between-districts, has remained relatively flat or declined slightly
in and outside of the South (see also Stroub and Richards 2013). At the core of the disagreement
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is how one measures school segregation. For those that tend to see school segregation as
increasing, they rely on measures of exposure and isolation indices to support their argument.
Others that show only modest increases in the early 90s and declines in the 1998 to 2009 period
rely on measures of evenness (Stroub and Richards 2013). While scholars contend that the
measures are correlated, they argue that the two are conceptually distinct (Reardon et al. 2012;
Reardon and Owens 2014). Exposure measures necessarily reflect the relative size of the group
populations, whereas evenness measures do not. That is, exposure and isolation measures are
sensitive to the overall racial composition of the school district and metropolitan area. This is a
significant difference, as the demographics in the United States have changed over time with
large increases in non-White and non-Black populations (Clotfelter 2004). Evenness measures
capture changes in distribution of students in schools. For instance, if a school district is 80
percent Black and if all schools are 80 percent Black, there would be low unevenness, but high
isolation or Black-Black exposure.
Most scholars are in agreement that the school segregation levels in the United States
today are far lower as a result of Brown and the subsequent rulings. For those that use measures
of evenness, the current emphasis is on between-district segregation, as recent evidence shows
that relative to within-district segregation, this measure remains remarkably high, especially in
non-Southern states. The evidence also shows however, that once school districts are released
from Court oversight as a result of achieving “unitary” status (a status declared by the Court that
recognizes a district as serving all students, rather than as maintaining separate systems by race,
Board of Education v. Dowell 1991: Appendix A) or recognized as not liable for undoing de
facto segregation (Freeman v. Pitts 1992) that the district does not maintain the same levels of
integration it achieved under supervision (Reardon et al. 2012). In sum, the sociological literature
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maintains that school segregation has declined significantly since 1954, but that the trends varied
by region and across time. Today, the largest difference in school segregation is betweendistricts. According to Clotfelter (2004) “… Brown started the engine and Green and Swann
stepped on the accelerator, Milliken and Dowell applied the brakes (Pp 196).”

Assessing why school segregation is predictive of school ratings
There are a number of reasons to suspect that school ratings may be unevenly distributed across
schools and districts in a manner that reflects broader inequalities in American society associated
with residential and school segregation. Given their reliance on performance on standardized
exams, school ratings likely reflect existing patterns of racial/ethnic and socioeconomic
disparities in achievement. While the Black-White (Quinn 2015; Yeung and Pfeiffer 2009), and
Latinx-White (Reardon and Galindo 2009) test score gaps have slightly narrowed in recent
decades, they have persisted since Brown and remain significantly wide, with Black children on
the lowest slope of achievement. Reardon and Galindo (2009) indicate that, at the start of
Kindergarten, there exist large gaps in reading and mathematics among Black and Latinx
students relative to White students. More specifically, as students’ progress through education,
the Latinx-White gap narrows and the Black-White gap widens (Quinn
2015; Reardon and Galindo 2009). In terms of socioeconomic disparities, findings from the
seasonal effects literature demonstrate that net of race/ethnicity, socioeconomic gaps in
achievement widen throughout the summer months but remain steady throughout the school year
(Condron 2009; Downey 2008; Downey et al. 2004; Downey et al. 2008; Hippel et al. 2018).
These early gaps are shown to set off wider gaps in subsequent years (Yeung and Pfiffer 2009).
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This literature suggests that racial/ethnic background tends to influence individual
academic outcomes (Hogrebe and Tate 2010; Quinn 2015; Reardon and Galindo 2009; Sirin
2005; Stiefel, Schwartz and Chellman 2007; Yeung and Pfeifer 2009) and that the racial/ethnic
composition of schools tends to influence overall academic achievement (Caldas and
Bankston1997; Crosnoe 2005; Hanushek and Rivkin 2009; Helig and Holme 2013; Logan 2010;
Logan et al. 2012). In addition, the concentration of students by race/ethnicity and income has
been shown to exacerbate inequality in academic outcomes due to the unequal distribution of
resources among schools as well as the stratification of resources deriving from factors outside of
schools that students bring with them (e.g., differences in family educational attainment,
poverty/wealth and neighborhood characteristics). For instance, schools with large shares of
White children provide students with greater access to learning opportunities, while schools with
larger proportions of non-White children provide students with more limited opportunities.
Predominantly non-White schools are more likely to be overcrowded and are more likely to be
staffed by inexperienced and less effective teachers because they are less able to attract and
retain teachers with greater experience (Kozol 1991; Kucsera, Siegel-Hawley and Orfield 2015;
Mickelson 2001; Musu-Gillette et al. 2016). By creating resource-rich school environments for
White students and resource-poor environments for Black students, school segregation
intensifies stratification between racial/ethnic groups. When White and Black children attend
racially segregated schools, the evidence shows that on average, White students are surrounded
by peers that possess more resources (i.e., concentrated advantage), while Black students are
concentrated in environments that possess fewer (i.e., concentrated disadvantage) (Coleman
1966; Condron et al. 2013). Together these factors exacerbate racial/ethnic gaps in academic
achievement (Logan et al. 2012). As Goldsmith (2011: 509) noted, “…in terms of educational
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outcomes, the students typically enrolled in minority-concentrated schools are a liability for each
other, and the students typically enrolled in White-concentrated schools are an asset for each
other.” In short, school segregation is an impediment to equal educational opportunities and a
key contributor to the racial/ethnic achievement gaps (Card and Rothstein 2009; Condron et al.
2013; Logan et al. 2012). While achievement scores are one component of state accountability
rating systems, the association of school segregation and overall school ratings remains
unexamined.
Combining the discussion above on educational policy and school ratings with the
segregation literature, it is expected that school ratings will be differentially distributed across
schools and school districts serving different groups of students in patterns that reflect existing
inequalities in academic achievement. First, given the evidence that suggests that segregation
affects the total quantity and allocation of resources in schools and districts, and the fact that in
the era of accountability schools are rated and held accountable, in part, for individual student
achievement on standardized exams, the expectation is that schools will have lower ratings when
they are located in (a) more segregated districts (within-district segregation) and (b) more
segregated metropolitan areas (between-district segregation). Specifically,

Hypothesis 1: Schools’ categorical rating will decrease as the racial/ethnic segregation
within school districts increase.
Hypothesis 2: Schools’ categorical rating will decrease as the racial/ethnic segregation
between school districts increase.

Second, because the school segregation literature largely shows that relative to withindistrict segregation, between-district segregation remains especially pronounced, it is reasonable
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to assume that the distribution of vital resources between school districts is more unequal than
within school districts. If this is the case, it is anticipated that between-district segregation will
have a larger negative effect on school ratings relative to within-district segregation. This
association reflects broader patterns of inequality in the allocation of resources between-districts
being more unequal than within-districts. In other words, it suggests that forces producing
educational inequality between racial/ethnic groups primarily operate between school districts,
rather than within school districts (Reardon et al. 2019). Accordingly,

Hypothesis 3: Racial /ethnic segregation within school districts will be less important in
accounting for the association with school ratings than the racial/ethnic segregation
between school districts.

In addition to the unequal distribution of resources, some scholars have focused on the
role of racial/ethnic concentration in the perpetuation of inequality. As discussed above, this
stream of research finds that across the United States, non-White groups of students are
concentrated in schools with lower average test scores (Logan et al. 2012), which is a key
measure contributing to the overall rating a school receives from its respective state. The
evidence suggests two specific patterns. First, higher shares of Black student enrollment, rather
than variations in general minority enrollment (e.g. percent of Latinx student enrollment)
primarily impact the achievement of non-Latinx Blacks and Whites (Hanushek, Kain and Rivkin
2009; Goldsmith 2011). Second, the evidence shows that the impact of the concentration of
Black students operates at multiple levels. At the school-level, previous research finds that high
levels of the concentration of Black students has a negative effect on student achievement
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(Caldas and Bankston 1998).4 At the metropolitan-level, scholars have shown that regions with
larger concentrations of Black students produces larger gaps in achievement between White and
Black students, net of other characteristics (Reardon et al. 2019). Together, the disparities in
achievement gaps appear to be jointly shaped by the distribution of resources and students at
both the school- and metropolitan-level. If school ratings primarily reflect existing inequalities
and higher levels of segregation indicates a more unequal distribution of essential resources, it is
expected that the association of lower school ratings in (a) more segregated districts (withindistrict segregation) and (b) more segregated metropolitan areas (between-district segregation)
will depend on schools’ Black student population (see also, Hanushek and Rivkin 2009). Stated
differently, the negative association of school ratings and measures of segregation will be
strengthened by schools’ Black student enrollment in more segregated metropolitan regions.
Thus,
Hypothesis 4: The negative association between schools’ Black population and overall
rating will be stronger in metropolitan areas with higher levels of between-district BlackWhite segregation (i.e., there will be an interaction between the school composition and
levels of metropolitan segregation).

To the extent that the accountability ratings are associated with the demographic composition of
schools and school districts, the rating system itself may ultimately undermine the ability of
schools to raise achievement for their students.

4

See also, Condron et al. 2013. At the state-and school-level, these scholars find that increases in Black–White
dissimilarity and Black isolation contribute to widening Black-White gaps in both math and reading. Notably,
Condron et al. (2013) find that increases in the exposure of Black to White students are associated with reductions in
achievement gaps.
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Ratings shaping perceptions of school quality
While school ratings may reflect racial/ethnic segregation and broader patterns of inequality,
they also serve as an important resource to key stakeholders, including public officials, school
administrators, and especially parents who may perceive ratings as an indication of school
quality. To the extent that school ratings actually measure the quality of education students
receive by incorporating various measures of student growth over time (e.g. Ehlert et al. 2016),
then there may be less concern about the possibility that school ratings affect perceptions of
school quality. If this is the case, school ratings should affect perceptions of quality, because
they provide stakeholders with an accurate depiction of the degree to which schools are making
efficient and effective use of various kinds of resources, including state funding and, most
importantly, student enrollment. However, to the extent that school ratings merely reflect
inequalities in the broader society and misrepresent the consequences of these inequalities as if
they are valid indicators of school quality, their potential effect on perceptions of school quality
and stakeholders’ decision-making about which schools to invest in becomes much more
concerning.
Accountability systems were developed to hold educational institutions responsible for
student outcomes using various mechanisms of performance report cards connected with explicit
rewards and sanctions (Deming and Figlio 2016). Within higher education, ratings have been
shown to be a powerful force in shaping decision-making, enrollment patterns and influencing
perceptions of organizational prestige (Bowman and Bastedo 2009; Bastedo and Bowman 2010;
DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Epseland and Sauder 2007; Scott 2013). Within this literature,
sociologists and educational researchers alike find that ratings influence future assessments of
reputation and have a significant effect on college choice. For instance, the evidence shows that
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ranking as a top-tier institution on the front page of the U.S. News Rankings provides a
substantial increase in admissions the following year (Bowman and Bastedo 2009). Similarly, an
increase in the performance ratings of hospitals has been shown to attract more patients (Pope
2009).
Within primary and secondary education, international studies have shown that
publicizing school quality indicators in newspapers affects enrollment patterns in the
Netherlands (Koning and Van der Wiel 2013) and in Portugal (Nunes et al. 2014). In the United
States, previous qualitative evidence suggested that parents rely on their personal networks to
determine the quality of a school (Holme 2002). However, more recent experimental work
during the era of NCLB shows that parents are more likely to choose high scoring schools for
their children when provided information from standardized exams (Hastings and Weinstein
2008; Hastings, VanWeelden and Weinstein 2007). Taken together, school ratings may be
serving as a signal of school quality, whether or not they are an accurate and appropriate
indicator of how well schools are able to serve their students net of differences in resources.
This literature largely suggests that ratings not only influence future assessments but also
future enrollment patterns because they are seen by the public as legitimate, which may impact
perceptions of school quality. Considered in this vein, one can conceptualize elementary school
ratings as a vital resource that may shape parents’ perceptions of schools and attitudes toward
enrollment decisions. To the extent that the accountability ratings influence perceptions and
attitudes net of satisfactory progress on academic indicators of school quality, the system itself
may ultimately undermine the ability of lower rated schools to attract and retain high performing
students. Because previous evidence shows that people perceive a greater difference among
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school ratings based on the format (e.g., letter grade relative to performance index; Jacobsen,
Snyder and Saultz 2014), the expectations are that:

Hypothesis 5: Lower school ratings (letter grades) will be associated with lower
perceptions of school quality.

Hypothesis 6: Lower school ratings (letter grades) will be associated with lower
perceptions of likely enrolling.

METHODS
Secondary data utilizing a unique data set
Specific aim #1: To assess the association of school report cards and levels of within-district
and between-district school segregation. To evaluate this aim, I draw primarily on two kinds of
data: school accountability report cards distributed by individual states and data on the
demographic composition of schools. Data for the dependent variable, school rating, come from
school report cards for public schools across 14 states that utilize similar rating scales (e.g. 1-5,
A-F; see Appendix C for details). I compiled this unique dataset and it includes school ratings
from the following states: Alabama, Arkansas, Arizona, Florida, Indiana, Louisiana, Mississippi,
New Mexico, North Carolina, South Carolina, Ohio, Texas, Utah and Wisconsin. Data on
student demographic information come from The National Center for Education Statistics
(NCES) Common Core (CCD) which annually reports school-level characteristics for individual
public schools and districts. The focus on the metropolitan regions located within these 14 states
limits the generalizability of the findings. That is, I am unable to make national claims with these
data. I discuss more limitations in the discussion and sections below.
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Dependent Variable: Measurement of School Ratings
The outcome of principal interest in these analyses is an ordinal indicator of school rating. In the
2017- 2018 school year, these 14 states rated schools within their state on an ordered scale that
consisted of five distinct categories. Whereas, Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, Indiana,
Louisiana, Mississippi, New Mexico, North Carolina, Texas and Ohio utilized an A-F system,
South Carolina, Utah, and Wisconsin employed an alternative 1-5 scale.5 For each state, each
category has a range in which the accountability score can fall and are based on annual goals set
by statewide data. The overall accountability score is the result of the accountability index,
which is a combination of several different measurements and components for which there is
sufficient data (Education Commission for the States 2018). Appendix B demonstrates the
variation across different state indicators in the United States, and Appendix C shows the precise
measurements by each of the 14 states in which data was available and is included in this
dissertation. The outcome pools the states’ school ratings for the 2017-2018 school year. To
examine the outcome, school ratings are treated as an ordered variable on a 5-point scale.
Hereafter, I refer to all ratings in the ensuing sections as being on the comparable 5-category
scale and report all findings as the distribution of A, B, C, D and F ratings.
The analysis includes public schools located in the metropolitan regions of these 14 states
and is limited to elementary students attending nonvirtual schools. Schools that received
alternative ratings are also excluded from the analysis.6 Following others (Logan et al. 2004;

South Carolina descriptively rated their schools on a five-point scale from “unsatisfactory” to “excellent.”
Similarly, Utah descriptively rated their schools on a five-point scale from “critical needs” to “exemplary.”
Wisconsin used a five-star system and rated their schools as 1-star: “fails to meet expectations” and 5-stars:
“significantly exceeds expectations.”
6
At the state-level, NCES indicated 3,905 virtual or supplementary virtual schools. Alternatively rated schools
included online academies (e.g. e-learning centers), technical/vocational academies, and corrections. The category
often includes schools with few students tested in the grades and schools without tested grades. May also include
new schools and schools that serve 100 percent “at-risk” populations.
5
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Logan 2012; Logan et al. 2012; Logan et al. 2017), I limit these data to include elementary
grades, Pre-Kindergarten thru sixth to reduce bias from segregation effects of students in higher
grades that are drawn from a larger catchment area and those that choose to attend specialized
high schools outside of their zoned school.7 The final sample includes 10,369 schools. For the
outcome variable, Figure 1 provides descriptive statistics for the overall sample. Roughly 51
percent of the schools included in this sample received an A (20.2 percent) or B rating (31.1
percent). Nearly one third of the sample received a C rating (31.7 percent) and about 17 percent
of the schools received the lowest state ratings (D: 11.9 percent; F: 5.0 percent).

[Insert Figure 1 here]

Focal Independent Variables
Within-District School Segregation. The focal independent variables in the analysis are the
levels of 1) within-district segregation as well as 2) between-district segregation. Data for these
measures come from the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES) Common Core (CCD)
which reports school-level characteristics for individual public schools and districts. These data
include information regarding the total number of students eligible for free/reduced lunch, grade
specific characteristics such as the racial/ethnic composition as well as characteristics on
personnel (e.g. student/teacher ratio). This dissertation uses the most recent full version of data
compiled by NCES for the 2016-2017 school year. To construct the first key independent

7

Compliance with NCES reporting is voluntary. As such, there may be gaps in statewide reports of student
composition.
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variable, within-district school segregation, I aggregate the grade specific characteristics from
NCES up to the school-level. Following others (Logan et al. 2017), only schools with five or
more Black, Latinx and White students are included in the analysis. I operationalize the evenness
dimension using the dissimilarity index, focusing on the dissimilarity from non-Latinx whites,
xDw

𝑛

1
𝑥1 𝑤𝑖
= 100 ( ∑ | − |)
2
𝑋 𝑊
𝑖=0

where xDw is the dissimilarity between the distribution of group x (Black, Latinx) across n
schools in the school district and corresponding distribution of non-Latinx Whites, wi is the nonLatinx White student population of the school and W is the non-Latinx White student population
of the school district. The final analysis includes 885 school districts.
Between-District School Segregation. To construct the second focal independent variable,
between-district school segregation, I aggregate the school specific characteristics discussed
above to the district-level. Only school districts with two or more elementary schools are
included in the analysis (Logan et al. 2017; see also Appendix S for sensitivity analyses). Here
too, I utilize the dissimilarity index to operationalize evenness between school districts at the
metropolitan-level. Based on the above equation, xDw is the dissimilarity between the distribution
of group x across n school districts in the metropolis and corresponding distribution of nonLatinx Whites, wi is the non-Latinx White student population of the school district and W is the
non-Latinx White student population of the metropolis. Because educational policy differs by
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state, the final analysis excludes metropolitan regions that cross state boundaries. The final
analysis includes 112 metropolitan regions with at least 100 Black and 100 Latinx students. 8, 9
Measuring segregation with the dissimilarity approach that I have described here
provides a measure of school segregation that is standardized across different levels of analysis
where the relative group sizes are different. For within-district measures, the index is based on
relative shares of students belonging to each racial group in each school for each district. For
between-district measures, the dissimilarity index is based on information about the relative
shares of each group in each school district in the metropolis. In total, I calculate four
dissimilarity index measures for Black-White and Latinx-White students at both the district- and
metropolis-level. Because I multiplied each of these four measures by 100, the overall index can
be interpreted as the percentage of the population of group x who would have to either move to
another school district (e.g. between-district segregation) or switch schools (e.g. within-district
segregation) in order to achieve complete school integration. Values range from 0 to 100, with
100 indicating total separation.

[ Insert Table 1 here]

8

I include Charlotte/Gastonia/Rock Hill, NC/SC and Texarkana, TX/Texarkana in the analysis however because
they encompass states contained in the analysis. Eau Claire, WI; Brownsville/Harlingen/San Benito,
TX; McAllen/Edinburg/Mission, TX; Santa Fe, NM; and Prescott, AZ were removed from the final analysis based
on metropolitan demographic considerations. 13 MSAs were removed because they crossed state boundaries. This
includes: Augusta/Aiken, GA/SC, Duluth/Superior, MN/WI, Evansville/Henderson, IN/KY, Fort Smith, AR/OK,
Huntington/Ashland, WV/KY/OH, La Crosse, WI/MN, Louisville, KY/IN, Memphis TN/AR/MS, Minneapolis/St.
Paul, MN/WI, Norfolk/Virginia Beach/Newport News, VA/NC, Parkersburg/Marietta, WV/OH,
Steubenville/Weirton, OH/WV, Texarkana, TX/Texarkana, AR, Flagstaff, AZ/UT.
9
I conduct several additional sensitivity analyses to assess the extent to which results presented below are robust to
different criteria to including specific schools in the analysis sample. Appendix U includes a series of models with
more restrictive inclusion criteria. The table includes a restriction to these data for metropolitan regions with at least
1) 500 Black students, 2) 1,000 Black students, 3) 5,000 Black students, and 4) 10,000 Black students. The primary
associations remain substantively the same, including the key interaction association, suggesting that the findings
presented below are not dependent on the inclusion criteria described above.
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As shown in Table 1, the average total metropolitan-level segregation between Black and White
children is highest in the Midwest at 62.8 percent. Conventional standards for classifying
segregation using dissimilarity values indicate that values above 60 are high, values between 30
and 60 are moderate and values below 30 are low (Denton and Massey 1989; Kantrowitz 1973;
Massey and Denton 1988; Massey and Denton 1993; Reardon and Owens 2014). Table 1 also
shows that school segregation is nominally higher within school districts, relative to between
school districts, but that this varies by region. Specifically, the average segregation indices across
groups in Southern states shows that within-district segregation is higher than between-district
segregation, while the opposite trend is evident in the West and Midwest regions of the United
States. This pattern has been documented elsewhere (Clotfelter 2004: 63) and is described above
as an outcome of district size and Supreme Court mandates. These variables are used to test
Hypotheses 1 through 4. Figure 2 and Figure 3 provide a visual of the spatial density for both
Black-White and Latinx-White metropolitan segregation within the metropolitan regions of the
14 states included in this analysis. For an account of segregation indices by each metropolis
included in the sample, please reference Appendix D.

[ Insert Figure 2 here]

[ Insert Figure 3 here]

29

Additional independent measures. I include several school- and district-level controls in the
models that may be associated with school segregation and school ratings, including charter
status, specific type of rating system used in each state (e.g., A-F or 1-5), poverty,
demographics, geographic region, local funding, racial/ethnic composition and the percent White
population
School-level controls. At the elementary-level, most children in the United States still attend
traditional public schools (Goldsmith 2016; Richards and Stroub 2013). However, in recent
decades, there has been a growth in charter schools, and findings on their effects on achievement
have been mixed across context, space and among different groups of students (Logan and
Burdick-Will 2015; Zimmer et al. 2019) with some scholars indicating that enrollment in charter
schools is a function of school and district segregation (Bifulco and Ladd 2006; Renzulli 2006).
As such, all analyses control for schools with charter designation to assess the association of
traditional public schools’ demographics and accountability ratings. Charter status is a binary
variable reported by NCES, with charter equal to one and non-charter equal to zero. I control for
charter status across all models. While the 14 states included in these data follow a similar 5point scale, they do vary in specific type. I address this difference across all models by including
a binary control variable for states that employ an A-F system set equal to one and states that use
an alternative 5-point scale equal to zero. Additionally, I control for different proportions of
student race and ethnicity at the school-level. Exploratory analyses for race and ethnicity
revealed that categorical specifications rather than continuous accounts provide a better fit to
these data. For both Black and Latinx student populations, categories were constructed using
their respective standard deviations resulting in four distinct categories for Latinx and five
categories for Black students. The result suggests that different proportions and specifically,
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schools’ with larger portions of Black and Latinx students are more predictive of school ratings
relative to schools with relatively fewer Black and Latinx students. According to Table 2, ratings
and racial composition categories appear to follow a distinct pattern, such that lower rated
schools have higher proportions of Black students relative to higher rated schools. According to
these data, 10 percent (7.78 percent + 2.22 percent) of schools receiving F ratings have Black
student populations that make up 62 percent or more of the schools’ total enrollment. In contrast,
only about 5 percent (3.43 percent + 1.19 percent) of schools receiving A ratings have a Black
student population that comprises more than 62 percent of total enrollment. Thus, predominantly
Black schools were about twice as likely to receive an F as opposed to an A rating. More
generally, schools that received higher ratings had proportionally fewer Black students on
average than those with lower ratings.
Combining the two highest categories of percent Latinx, Table 2 shows that roughly 15
percent (9.54 percent + 5.34 percent) of schools receiving an A rating have Latinx student
populations that are 55 percent or more of total enrollment, while nearly 23 percent (13.78
percent + 8.67 percent) of the schools receiving an F rating have a Latinx student population
above 55 percent. Accordingly, predominantly Latinx schools appear more likely to receive an F
as opposed to an A rating. The pattern is similar to Black student composition and school ratings,
but Latinx student composition and school ratings is a weaker, non-monotonic relationship
across the five categories. Other contextual factors in schools such as poverty have been shown
to impact student performance (Hogrebe and Tate 2010). Thus, it is reasonable to expect that
such factors may also impact the extent to which school segregation is associated with school
ratings. I control for poverty in two ways. First, using data from NCES, I control for school
poverty by combining the total count of children eligible for free lunch and the total count of
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children eligible for free or reduced lunch (FRL) and dividing by the total school population.
Because I multiplied this measure by 100, the overall school poverty rate can be interpreted as a
percentage. To address the potential of overcontrol bias, I estimate models with and without
controls for school and district poverty. These models are presented in the appendix.10

[Insert Table 2 here]

District- and metropolitan-level controls. Second, I account for district-level poverty using the
EDGE School Neighborhood Poverty Estimates.11 This survey relies on household economic
data based on income data from families with children ages five to 18 who were surveyed over a
five-year period as part of the U.S. Census Bureau’s American Community Survey and public
school point locations. It is an estimate of the income-to-poverty ratio for the neighborhood
around public school locations and provides an indicator of local economic conditions in
neighborhoods where students live (Geverdt and Nixon 2018). The original estimates reflect the
percentage of family income that is above or below poverty, ranging from zero to a top codedvalue of 999. I reverse code this variable so that higher values correspond to a higher degree of
neighborhood poverty. I then aggregate these measures to the district-level.

10

Including these variables slightly increase the negative association of the focal relationship (.01). Nonetheless, the
substantive associations observed and discussed in the final models remain and are discussed below.
11
This measure is moderately (r = 0.53; p<.01) and positively associated with school poverty estimates based on
FRL estimates.
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[Insert Table 3 here]

Because racial and ethnic demographics are unevenly distributed across the country and because
court ordered mandates to desegregate schools and districts have been primarily in the Southern
United States, I control for the region in which the metropolis is located. Following others
(Clotfelter 1999; Clotfelter 2004; Logan et al. 2004; Orfield and Monfort 1992), region for these
data is a categorical variable for South (74 percent), Midwest (18 percent) and West (8 percent).
Restricting the analysis to metropolitan regions in states with 5-category rating scales limits the
generalizability of these findings. In particular, Southern states are overrepresented in these data
(74 percent), while Midwestern and Western states are underrepresented, and states located in
Northeast region are not represented at all.

[Insert Table 4 here]

Previous literature has demonstrated that school funding is differentially distributed among
school districts. Because a significant and growing portion of school funding comes from local
taxes, districts with more expensive housing have higher rates of taxes and subsequently higher
revenues from school taxes. This contributes to the trend that some districts have more money to
spend per year on each student relative to other schools. Moreover, differential access to school
funding provides some districts with greater ability to attract and retain a high quality teaching
staff (Hochschild and Scovronick 2003; Ostrander 2015), which has the potential to impact
individual school ratings. Using data from the Public Elementary-Secondary Education Finance
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Data Survey of School System Finances from the Census of Governments, I estimate models
with and without a control for the revenue from property taxes in total dollars. According to the
descriptive statistics, district funding from property taxes ranges between zero and 1.2 million
dollars. I normalize the distribution of funding by employing the natural log transformation of
property taxes. There is a notable trend in the descriptive statistics. Specifically, there is a fairly
strong relationship and a distinct trend with school funding and school ratings. In these data,
schools with lower school ratings receive less funding on average relative to schools with higher
ratings.
Sociologists and educational researchers alike have argued that exposure to students from
different racial and ethnic backgrounds has long-term effects in challenging the tendency for
segregation to be perpetuated across institutions and throughout students’ lives (Braddock and
McPartland 1989; Orfield and Eaton 1996; Wells and Crain 19976). If racial/ethnic group
members are a minority of a metropolitan region, they tend to experience high levels of exposure
to the majority regardless of the pattern of evenness (Massey and Denton 1988: 287). To account
for the extent to which children of different racial/ethnic backgrounds within school districts are
surrounded by other children from other racial/ethnic backgrounds, I control for the percent of
White children at one of two levels in all models, at the district- and at the metropolitan-level. 12
For models of within-district segregation I control for the percent of White children at the
district-level by aggregating school demographic variables in NCES up to the district, dividing
by the total student population within the district and multiplying by 100. For models of

12

After calculating exposure indices with these data, I find that Black-White and Latinx-White segregation within
school districts is negatively associated with Black-White exposure (-0.55*) and Latinx-White exposure (-.52*).
Black-White and Latinx-White segregation between school districts is positively associated with Black-White
exposure (.30*) and Latinx-White exposure (.15*). Accordingly, exposure indices are not included in the subsequent
models.
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between-district segregation, I control for the percent of White children at the metropolitan-level
using the method just described, aggregated to the metropolis.13
Lastly, I generate two dichotomous variables based on court case data compiled by the
American Communities Project at Brown
University(https://s4.ad.brown.edu/Projects/USSchools/). These data include 358 court cases that
resulted in desegregation plans in 850 school districts. It also includes 207 school districts that
implemented desegregation plans under pressure from the Department of Health, Education and
Welfare (HEW) since 1978. Like others (Logan et al. 2017), I treat HEW actions as equivalent to
mandates to desegregate. The two variables I generate include “prior mandate” which is equal to
one if a school district was under a mandate to desegregate between the years of 1980 and 1989
or zero if not, and “recent mandate” which is equal to one if a school district was under a
mandate to desegregate since 1990 and zero if not. After restricting these districts to the states in
this analysis, the descriptive statistics show that 767 schools are located in districts with
mandates to desegregate since 1990 and that 297 schools are in districts that were under mandate
prior to 1990.

ANALYTIC STRATEGY
Within-District School Segregation
The focus of aim#1 is to assess the relationship between school ratings and school segregation.
Given the ordered character of the dependent variable for school ratings, I first examine the

13

In addition, I effectively control for the percent non-Black, non-Latinx students, by controlling for the focal group
(e.g. Percent Black categories in the models estimating the effects of B-W (D) segregation) and the other group (e.g.
Percent Latinx in the models that estimate the “effect” of B-W (D) school segregation)).
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relationship among school ratings and within-district school segregation using a two-level
mixed-effects ordered logistic regression model and Stata 15’s meologit commands with
several postestimations.
This model contains both fixed and random effects and allows for levels of nested
clusters of random effects. In terms of a latent linear response, observed ordinal ratings yij can be
expressed as:
y*ij = x ij β +z ij u ij +ɛ ij
and
y𝑖𝑗∗ ≤ k1

1 𝑖𝑓

𝑘1 < y∗𝑖𝑗 ≤ k2

2 𝑖𝑓
y*ij = .
.
{ 𝐾 𝑖𝑓

𝑘𝐾 −1 < y∗𝑖𝑗

where latent variable y*ij represents the underlying continuous measure on which the school
rating is based in school i in district j, xij are the covariates, β is the regression coefficients for the
fixed effects and zij are the covariates corresponding to the random effects, u ij (StataCorp 2013).
Regressing school ratings on the independent variables produces the fixed effects, the estimated
cutpoints and the estimated variance components. The fixed effects are interpreted in the same
manner as output produced from an ordered logistic regression. That is, this model predicts the
natural log of the odds of being in a category less than or equal to k, as a function of a vector of
independent variables, k – 1 cutpoints. Since the ratings implemented by these states assigns
each school to one of five distinct categories, k is equal to 5 and thus, there are k-1 = 4
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thresholds, k1 through k4. This is the most parsimonious approach, given the hypotheses and
these data (Heeringa, West and Berglund 2010; Long and Freese, 2014).14

Between-District School Segregation
Second, I examine the relationship among school ratings and between-district school segregation
with a three-level mixed-effects ordered logistic regression model. Similar to the assessment of
within-district school segregation, this model contains both fixed and random effects and allows
for levels of nested clusters of random effects. Following the above equation, the observed
ordinal ratings are similarly expressed, but they are clustered within an additional level. Here one
can note y*ijm as the school rating of school i in district j in metropolitan region m. The covariates
for the fixed effects with regression coefficients are given by β, while zijm are the covariates
corresponding to the random effects, u ijm (StataCorp 2013; Raman and Hedeker 2005).
Below I present the results in several ways. First, I present smoothed values from a
kernel-weighted local polynomial regression of schools’ racial/ethnic composition on levels of
within- and between-district segregation. Second, I employ a series of mixed-effects ordered
logistic regression models which includes interactions between school racial/ethnic composition
and levels of within- and between-district segregation. Third, I present the average marginal
effects associated with changes in schools’ student population demographics and the broader

14

Ordered logistic regression relies on the proportional odds assumption, such that the parameters do not change for
different categories (Long and Freese, 2014). To test the parallel line assumption in a single-level ordered logit
model one can use Stata 15’s brant and oparrallel command options. However, no such test exists in Stata for multilevel ordered regressions. While the LR test for the multi-level models suggest that the proportional odds
assumption is not violated, additional informal indications using alternative models (e.g. gologit2 with robust
clusters) that relax the assumption produces similar results (Fullerton and Xu 2016). I include figures produced from
gologit2 in the appendix.
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metropolitan region. Fourth, I present the regression results as predicted probabilities using tests
of significance based on delta-method standard errors followed by the marginal differences in
these predicted probabilities (Long and Mustillo forthcoming; Mood 2010; Mustillo, Lizardo and
McVeigh 2018; Williams 2009).

RESULTS
Are school ratings associated with school segregation? If so, by what metric (i.e. within- or
between-district segregation)?

[Insert Figure 4 here]

[Insert Figure 5 here]

Figure 4 shows smoothed values from a kernel-weighted local polynomial regression of BlackWhite within-district segregation on the percent Black student population by school rating.
Figure 5 shows similar values of Black-White between-district segregation on the percent Black
student population by school rating. While all five school ratings, from A through F, follow
broadly similar trends in Figure 4, Figure 5 shows a divergence among schools based on their
levels of Black-White between-district segregation and Black student population. Specifically,
Figure 5 shows that as levels of between-district segregation increase, schools with Black
populations that exceed 50 percent are shown to align more strongly with the failing category
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(F). Contrastingly, schools that receive an A correspond more strongly with lower levels of
between-district segregation.

[Insert Figure 6 here]

[Insert Figure 7 here]

Figure 6 and Figure 7 present similar values for Latinx children and Latinx-White within- and
between-district segregation. The trendlines shown in Figure 6 are indistinguishable. At few
thresholds of between-district segregation and Latinx student population, depicted in Figure 7,
there is a divergence among the school ratings, such as around 50 and near 90 percent Latinx
student population. For instance, these thresholds suggest that schools that receive an A appear to
correspond more strongly with lower levels of between-district segregation. Relative to the
trends shown with Black-White between-district segregation and Black student composition
however, the pattern of these trendlines are less clear. Figure 8 and Figure 9 present values for
White children and Black-White between-district segregation. Here too, the trendlines for both
measures are relatively indistinguishable. There appears to be a notable exception, however. For
schools that receive an A rating with relatively low levels of White student composition (i.e.,
below 35 percent) in metropolitan regions with low levels of Black-White segregation (i.e. D <
30). Collectively, these findings suggest that the association between school ratings and
segregation may be most pronounced for measures of between-district segregation and that it
depends on schools’ racial makeup.
39

[Insert Figure 8 here]

[Insert Figure 9 here]

Figures 5 through 9 suggest that school ratings may be unevenly distributed across schools, but
that this association differs by student demographics and measures of school segregation.
Nevertheless, are these differences significant? If so, by what metric (i.e. within- or betweendistrict segregation)?

[Insert Table 5 here]

Within-District School Segregation
Table 5 and Table 6 present results from the multi-level ordered logistic regressions of withindistrict segregation with covariates, including school- and district-level controls. Across both
models in Table 5, there is evidence that relative to schools with low proportions of Black
student populations (i.e. 0-19 percent), schools with high proportions of Black student
populations (i.e. 42-62 percent) have lower odds of being in a higher rated category relative to a
lower one, net of additional covariates. Specifically, Model 2 predicts that the odds of a higher
rating relative to a lower one decreased by about 75 percent for predominantly Black schools
(i.e. 83-100 percent Black) when compared to schools in which less than one-fifth of the students
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(i.e. 0-19 percent) were Black (100*(e (-.1.37) -1) = -74.59). Table 5 shows that relative to schools
without a recent mandate to desegregate, schools located in districts with a recent mandate (i.e.
1990-2003) have higher odds of being in a higher rated category relative to a lower one. Model 2
in Table 5 accounts for school funding in the form of district-level property taxes. The
coefficient for property taxes is positive and significant, suggesting that schools located in
districts with higher levels of property taxes have higher odds of being in a higher rated category
relative to a lower one. This finding is significantly noteworthy from a policy perspective and
warrants future research. For just a five percent increase in property taxes, the odds of a higher
school rating versus a lower one are increased by approximately 73 percent (100*(e (.11*5) -1) =
73.33), controlling for other variables. According to the coefficients in Table 5, the interaction
between varying proportions of Black students and within-district Black-White segregation is not
significant.

[Insert Table 6 here]

Table 6 assesses similar associations for schools’ percentage of Latinx students and withindistrict Latinx-White segregation. Across both models in Table 6, there is evidence that,
compared to schools with low proportions of Latinx student populations (i.e., 0-4 percent),
schools with higher proportions of Latinx student populations (i.e., 56-80 percent) have lower
odds of being in a higher rated category relative to a lower one, net of additional covariates.15
More precisely, Model 2 predicts that the odds of a higher rating relative to a lower one

15

The coefficient for schools with high proportions of Latinx student populations (i.e. 81-100 percent) is marginally
significant under a one-tailed test (i.e. 0.1) in Model 2, but not Model 1.
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decreased by about 56 percent for schools with 56-80 percent Latinx student composition when
compared to schools with 0-4 percent Latinx student composition (100*(e (-.83) -1) = -56.40).
Like in Table 5, the coefficients for segregation and the interaction effect between the two do not
produce statistically significant associations. In sum, these data appear to fail to support
Hypothesis 1, that schools’ categorical rating will decrease as the racial/ethnic segregation within
school districts increase.

Between-District School Segregation
Table 7 and Table 8 present results from the multi-level ordered logistic regressions of betweendistrict segregation with covariates, including school-, district- and metropolitan-level controls.
Across models in Table 7, there are statistically significant negative interaction effects between
higher proportions of Black students and between-district Black-White segregation. Specifically,
as segregation levels increase, schools with higher proportions of Black student populations (i.e.,
20-41 percent through 83-100 percent) relative to schools with lower proportions of Black
student populations (i.e. 0-19 percent) show lower odds of being in a higher rated category
compared to a lower one, net of additional covariates. The interaction variables show notable
patterns. The coefficient for B-W Between (D) * 83-100 percent Black, show that given a
moderate level of metropolitan segregation, schools with higher concentrations of Black students
receive lower ratings relative to higher ratings, and this is increasingly the case as metropolitan
segregation increases. For instance, in metropolitan regions with average levels of segregation in
these data (D = 36), the predicted odds of a higher rating relative to a lower rating decrease for
schools with higher proportions of Black students (i.e. 83-100 percent Black) by about 55
percent (100*(e (.27-.03*36) -1) = -55.5). For moderately segregated regions (D = 45), the predicted
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odds of a higher rating relative to a lower rating decrease for schools with higher proportions of
Black students (i.e. 83-100 percent Black) by 66 percent
(100*(e (.27-.03*45) -1) = -66.04). Similarly, for highly segregated metropolitan regions (D = 65),
the predicted odds of a higher rating relative to a lower rating decrease for schools with higher
portions of Black students (i.e. 83-100 percent Black) by nearly 81 percent (100*(e (.27-.03*65) -1) =
-81.36).

[Insert Table 7 here]

Model 2 in Table 7 accounts for property tax revenue at the district-level and slightly reduces the
total number of schools and districts observed in Model 1 (e.g. from 10,369 schools and 112
districts to 9,138 schools and 102 districts). Again, the coefficient is positive and significant,
suggesting that schools located in districts with higher levels of property taxes have higher odds
of being in a higher rated category relative to a lower one. As the percent of students who qualify
to receive free and reduced lunches (FRL) increase, the odds of a higher rating compared to a
lower rating decrease. Consequently, for a 10 percent increase in FRL, the odds of a higher
school rating versus a lower one is decreased by approximately 9.5 percent
(100*(e (-.01*10) -1) = -9.52), net of other variables. Relative to schools located on the West coast
of the United States, schools in the Southern region show lower odds of a higher rating relative
to a lower one.
Notably, there is a positive association with the percent of White students at the
metropolitan-level. In fact, as the percent of White students in the metropolis increase, the odds

43

of a higher rating compared to a lower rating increase, net of additional covariates. This finding
is likely important for policy makers and merits additional research. For just a one percent
increase of White students in the metropolis, the odds of a higher school rating versus a lower
one increases by approximately 43 percent (100*(e (.36*1) -1) = 43.34), controlling for other
covariates. Compared to traditional public schools, charter schools in these data show higher
odds of receiving a higher rating compared to a lower rating.16 More precisely, the odds of a
higher ratings relative to lower one are increased by about 36 percent for charter schools when
compared to traditional public schools (100*(e (0.31) -1) = 36.34).

[Insert Table 8 here]

Table 8 assesses similar associations for Latinx students and between-district LatinxWhite segregation. Like Table 6, Table 8 shows significant negative coefficients for schools with
higher proportions of Latinx students. Compared to schools with low proportions of Latinx
student populations (i.e. 0-4 percent), schools with higher proportions of Latinx student
populations (i.e. 56-80 percent and 81-100 percent), have lower odds of being in a higher rated
category relative to a lower one, net of additional covariates. In Model 2, the odds of a higher
rating relative to lower one are decreased by about 44 percent for schools with 56-80 percent
Latinx student composition when compared to schools with 0-4 percent Latinx student
composition (100*(e-.59 -1) = -44.57) and decreased by 71 percent for schools with 83-100
percent Latinx population (100*(e-1.24 -1) = -71.06). Like in Table 5, the coefficients for

16

Across Model 1 and Model 2 in Table 7, there is no evidence that the type of rating a school receives (e.g. A-F
relative to 1-5) is driving the observed associations.
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segregation and the interaction effect between the two do not produce statistically significant
associations.
Model 2 in Table 8 accounts for property tax revenue at the district-level and slightly
reduces the total number of schools and districts observed in Model 1 (e.g. from 10,369 schools
and 112 districts to 9,138 schools and 102 districts). The property tax revenue coefficient is
again positive and significant. Like in Table 7, this suggests that schools located in districts that
receive greater amounts of property taxes have higher odds of being in a higher rated category
relative to a lower one. For a five percent increase in property taxes, the odds of a higher school
rating versus a lower one is increases by approximately 92 percent (100*(e (.13*5) -1) = 91.55).
The effect of school poverty is negative and significant. In fact, as the percent of students who
qualify to receive free and reduced lunches (FRL) increase, the odds of a higher rating compared
to a lower rating decrease. Relative to schools located in the Western part of the United States,
schools in the Midwest show higher odds of a lower rating relative to a higher one. For schools
in the Midwest, the odds of a higher rating relative to lower one are decreased by about 45
percent compared to schools in the West (100*(e-.59 -1) = -44.57). Again, there is a positive
association with the percent of White students at the metropolitan-level. Similar to findings in
Table 7, Model 2 in Table 8 shows that as the percent of White students in the metropolis
increase, the odds of a higher rating compared to a lower rating increase, controlling for
additional variables. Compared to traditional public schools, charter schools show higher odds of
receiving a higher rating compared to a lower one.17

17

Across Model 1 and Model 2 in Table 8, there is no evidence that the type of rating a school receives (e.g. A-F
relative to 1-5) is driving the observed associations.
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Considered together, findings from Table 5, Table 6, Table 7 and Table 8 provide
evidence that school ratings are unevenly distributed across schools and districts. While there
appears to be a lack of support for Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2, there is support for
Hypothesis 3 and Hypothesis 4. Specifically, racial /ethnic segregation within school districts
appear to be less important in accounting for the association with school ratings than the
racial/ethnic segregation between school districts. Indeed, the negative association between
schools’ Black student population and overall rating is stronger in metropolitan areas with higher
levels of between-district segregation. The significant interactions in Table 7 between
race/ethnicity and segregation suggests that the distribution of school ratings depend on the
various concentrations of Black students. Relative to the racial/ethnic composition and
segregation interaction at the district-level (within-district segregation), the coefficients at the
metropolitan-level (between-district segregation) suggest that the distribution of vital resources
between school districts is more unequal than within school districts. That is, Table 7 suggests
that the effect of school racial composition on the overall school rating depends on the broader
segregation levels.
In recent years, scholars have cautioned against using the coefficient from an interaction
term in nonlinear models to draw conclusions (Long and Mustillo forthcoming; Mood 2010;
Mustillo, Lizardo and McVeigh 2018; Williams 2009). Below I show the average marginal
effects associated with differences in schools’ student composition categories.18 Then I present
the regression results from Table 7 and Table 8 as predicted probabilities using tests of

18

In the Appendix, I show Table 9 and Table 10 with a continuous measure of Black student and Latinx
composition, respectively. Appendix Q and Appendix R show the average marginal effects associated with a one
standard deviation increase in percent Black by Black-White between-district segregation and a one standard
deviation increase in percent Latinx by Latinx-White between-district segregation. It is generated using the same
covariates shown in Table 7 and Table 8, but in order to show a standard deviation change, I replace the categorical
variable for student composition with the linear formations. This replacement shows substantively similar
associations to models using the categorical version of this variable.
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significance based on the delta-method for calculating standard errors (Long 2009; Xu and Long
2005).

[Insert Table 9]

Table 9 shows the average marginal effects associated with categorical comparisons of
schools’ Black student composition by various levels of metropolitan-level Black-White
segregation. Across all metropolitan regions included in the analyses, schools with larger shares
of Black students decreases the probability of receiving an A or B rating and increases the
probability of receiving a D or F rating. For instance, compared to schools with 0-19 percent
Black students, schools with 20-41 percent Black students decrease the probability of receiving
an A rating by .034 (-.034; p < 0.01) and increase the probability of receiving an F rating by .012
(p < 0.01). Similarly, compared to schools with 0-19 percent Black students, schools with 83-100
percent Black students decrease the probability of receiving an A rating by .089 (-.089; p < 0.01)
and increase the probability of receiving a D rating by .066 (p < 0.01) and an F rating by .057 ( p
< 0.01). This trend remains throughout the table when comparing schools with high proportions
of Black students relative to low proportions. For schools with majority Black students, there are
no significant differences between the highest thresholds (i.e. schools with 83-100 percent Black
relative to schools with 63-82 percent Black).
For metropolitan regions with medium to high levels of segregation (i.e. D > 30), the
associations described above are strengthened. For example, relative to schools with 0-19 percent
Black students, schools with 20-41 percent Black students decrease the probability of receiving
an A rating by .054 (-.054; p < 0.01) and increase the probability of receiving an F rating by .021
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(p < 0.01). This suggests that in more highly segregated metropolitan regions, schools with
relatively moderate levels of Black students (e.g. 20-41 percent) have an increased probability of
receiving an F which is nearly double the probability of receiving an F rating when all
metropolitan regions are considered. This trend remains throughout the table. Consider schools
with 0-19 percent Black students compared to schools with 83-100 percent Black students. Here,
there is a decrease in the probability of receiving an A rating by .145 (-.145; p < 0.01) and an
increase in the probability of receiving an F rating by .108 ( p < 0.01). In more segregated
regions, Table 9 suggests that as schools’ Black student composition increases, the probability of
receiving a higher school rating decreases and the probability of receiving a lower school rating
increases (see also Appendix Q for linear form). In metropolitan regions with low levels of
Black-White segregation, there is no evidence that changes in schools’ Black student population
impacts the probability of a higher or lower school rating. This indicates that variations in
schools’ Black student populations in and of themselves do not produce significant differences.
Instead, Table 9 suggests that the association between school demographic characteristics and
overall school rating depends on the broader levels of metropolitan segregation.

[Insert Table 10]

Table 10 shows the average marginal effects associated with categorical comparisons of
schools’ Latinx student composition by various levels of metropolitan-level Latinx-White
segregation. The first section of the table shows all metropolitan regions included in the analyses.
Like Table 9, Table 10 shows that schools with larger shares of Latinx students decreases the
probability of receiving an A or B rating and increases the probability of receiving a C, D or F
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rating. Relative to schools with 0-4 percent Latinx students, schools with 56-80 percent Latinx
students decrease the probability of receiving an A rating by .114 (-.114; p < 0.01) and increase
the probability of receiving an F rating by .039 (p < 0.01). Likewise, compared to schools with 04 percent Latinx students, schools with 81-100 percent Latinx students decrease the probability
of receiving an A rating by .126 (-.126; p < 0.01) and increase the probability of receiving a D
rating by .068 (p < 0.01) and an F rating by .045 ( p < 0.01). This trend remains throughout the
table when comparing schools with high proportions of Latinx students relative to low
proportions (see also Appendix R for linear form). Similar to Table 9, Table 10 shows no
significant differences between the highest thresholds (i.e. schools with 81-100 percent Latinx
relative to schools with 56-80 percent Latinx).
Considering regions with medium to high levels of segregation (i.e. D > 30), the
associations described above are similar though less pronounced for some categories. For
instance, compared to schools with 0-4 percent Latinx students, schools with 56-80 percent
Latinx students decrease the probability of receiving an A rating by .116 (-.116; p < 0.01) and
increase the probability of receiving an F rating by .051 (p < 0.01). The difference between these
categories is slightly strengthened in relation to considering all metropolitan regions. However,
the difference between schools with the highest proportions of Latinx students and schools with
the lowest proportions is slightly decreased. Specifically, relative to schools with 0-4 percent
Latinx students, schools with 81-100 percent Latinx students decrease the probability of
receiving an A rating by .104 (-.104; p < 0.01) and increase the probability of receiving a D
rating by .055 (p < 0.01) and an F rating by .042 ( p < 0.01). This may suggest that in more
segregated metropolitan regions, schools with relatively high levels of Latinx students (e.g. 81100 percent) have a less negative impact on the probability of a higher rating relative to a lower
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rating. This is distinct from the trends shown above for schools with higher proportions of Black
students. In fact, the final portion of Table 10 may provide some insight. In metropolitan regions
with low levels of segregation, the vast difference appears to be between schools with the highest
levels of Latinx student populations (e.g. 81-100 percent) relative to schools with lower
proportions of Latinx students. For instance, relative to schools with 0-4 percent Latinx students,
schools with 81-100 percent Latinx students decrease the probability of receiving an A rating by
.108 (-.108; p < 0.01) and increase the probability of receiving a D rating by .056 (p < 0.01) and
an F rating by .032 ( p < 0.01). This indicates that variations in schools’ Latinx student
populations in and of themselves may produce significant differences that does not depend on the
broader levels of metropolitan segregation. In less segregated metropolitan regions, schools with
larger portions of Latinx students appear to have a lower probability of receiving a higher rating.
I expand on these findings below, but caution the reader on their generalizability given that no
metropolitan regions in these data include areas that meet conventionally high values of
segregation for Latinx-White (e.g. D >60; Denton and Massey 1989; Kantrowitz 1973; Massey
and Denton 1988; Massey and Denton 1993; Reardon and Owens 2014).

[Insert Figure 10]

Figure 10 graphs the unequal distribution of school ratings. It shows how the predicted
probability of school ratings (A-F) varies by Black student concentration and between-district
Black-White segregation (i.e., the interaction effects from Table 7). These predictions are
computed from the regression results in Table 7 when control variables are held at their mean
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values (Long and Freese 2014). The X-axis represents the predicted probabilities of the different
school ratings on the Y-axis (A-F).
Figure 10 shows a six-panel graph of schools with categorical thresholds for Black
student concentration and two continuous measures of between-district Black-White segregation
(i.e., the interaction effects from Table 7). The top left graph in Figure 10, panel 1, shows the
predicted probabilities of school ratings for schools with 0-19 percent Black students located in a
metropolis with a segregation index equal to 0.19 Here, the predicted probability (pp = .246, ub =
.293, lb = .206) of a school receiving an A rating is substantially higher than the predicted
probability of a school receiving a D (pp =.101, ub = .121, lb = .081) or F (pp =.045, ub = .057,
lb = .033) rating, where "ub" is the upper bound of the confidence interval and "lb" is the lower
bound. In other words, the probability of schools with 0-19 percent Black students in
metropolitan regions with no segregation in receiving an A rating is more than twice as high as
the probability of receiving a D rating. This trend remains similar for the following two panels on
the top half of the six-panel display. Regardless of the level of metropolitan segregation, schools
with low shares of Black students do well (i.e., most receive a B or C letter rating, and many also
receive A ratings). This is evident in the top left and top middle panel, panel 1 and panel 2. This
suggests that, in and of themselves, high levels of segregation do not produce substantial
differences. Similarly, comparing the top left panel (panel 1) l to the top right panel (panel 3)
shows that having a larger share of Black students also doesn’t make much difference either,
given low levels of metropolitan segregation.

19

In the appendix, I present the cross-tabulations of the data by selected points to demonstrate the total amount of
schools in these data that meet the fixed covariates. I use STATA 15.1’s margin commands and specify values for
covariates to be fixed with the at(atspec) option. Appendix also includes additional at(atspec) options representing
similar patterns shown in Figures 10-13.
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Notably, the bottom left graph in Figure 10, panel 4, shows the predicted probabilities of
school ratings for schools with 40-62 percent Black students located in a metropolis with a
segregation index equal to 70. Here, the predicted probability of a school receiving an A (pp
=.120) rating has decreased and the predicted probability of a school receiving an F (pp =.106)
rating has increased, relative to the previous three-panels. While the predicted probability of a
school receiving an A rating appears to be substantially different than the predicted probability of
a school receiving a B or C rating, the probability is indistinguishable from a school receiving a
D or F rating. The final panel, panel 6, in the bottom right corner presents the predicted
probabilities of school ratings for schools with 83-100 percent Black student concentration
located in a metropolis with a segregation index equal to 70. This graph shows that the predicted
probability of receiving an A (pp =.061, ub =.093, lb = .029) rating has decreased and differs
substantially from the chance of receiving a C (pp =.335, ub = .369, lb = .299) or D (pp =.249, ub
= .293, lb = .206) rating. Most notably, the predicted probability of a school with these
characteristics receiving an F rating is .195, which is more than two times greater than the
predicted probability of receiving an A (pp =.061) rating. Relative to the top middle panel (panel
2), the bottom right (panel 6) and bottom left panel (panel 4) show clearly that schools with more
Black students have higher predicted probabilities of receiving a lower rating, given higher levels
of metropolitan segregation. Conversely, consider the top left (panel 1), top right (panel 3) and
bottom middle panels (panel 5), collectively these demonstrate that changes in schools’ Black
student composition does not have a significant impact on overall school rating, given low levels
of segregation.

[Insert Figure 11 here]
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Figure 11 shows a six-panel graph of schools with categorical thresholds for Latinx
student concentration and two continuous measures of between-district Latinx-White segregation
(e.g. the interaction effects from Table 8). The top left panel in Figure 11, panel 1, shows the
predicted probabilities of school ratings for schools with 0-4 percent Latinx students located in a
metropolis with a segregation index equal to 0.20 Figure 11 shows that the predicted probability
of a school with these characteristics receiving an A (pp =.278, ub = .305, lb = .203) rating is
higher than the predicted probability of a school receiving a D (pp =.089 ub = .116, lb = .061) or
F (pp =.039, ub = .054, lb = .023) rating. Put differently, the probability of schools with 0-4
percent Latinx students in metropolitan regions with no segregation in receiving an A rating is
more than three times as high as the probability of receiving a D rating. This trend remains
similar for the following two panels on the top half of the six-panel display.
The bottom middle panel of Figure 11, panel 5, shows the predicted probabilities of
school ratings for schools with 81-100 percent Latinx students located in a metropolis with a
segregation index equal to 0. Here, the predicted probability of a school receiving an A (pp
=.113) rating has decreased, and the predicted probability of a school receiving an F (pp =.114)
rating has increased, relative to the previous four-panels. The final panel in the bottom right
corner, panel 6, presents the predicted probabilities of school ratings for schools with 81-100
percent Latinx student concentration located in a metropolis with a segregation index equal to
50. This graph shows that the predicted probability of receiving an A (pp =.177, ub = .225, lb =

20

See Appendices for the cross-tabulations of the data by selected points to demonstrate the total amount of schools
in these data that satisfy the fixed covariates. I use STATA 15.1’s margin commands and specify values for
covariates to be fixed with the at(atspec) option.
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.130) differs substantially from the likelihood of receiving a C (pp =.327, ub = .354, lb = .300), D
(pp =.138, ub = . 170, lb = .108) or F (pp =.070, ub = .093, lb = .048) rating.
Below I provide four additional figures that contain the marginal differences in the
predicted probability of school ratings for schools that receive an A and schools that receive an F
rating for both Black student concentration and Latinx student concentration and their respective
between-district segregation indices.

[Insert Figure 12 here]

Figure 12 presents the predicted probabilities of schools for each categorical threshold for Black
student concentration and two levels of between-district Black-White segregation. Figure 12
shows two trendlines. The solid line represents metropolitan regions with a segregation index of
.5, while the dashed line represents metropolitan regions with a segregation index of 71.5. Figure
14 shows a significant and widening gap in the predicted probability of receiving an A rating as
both measures increase. Specifically, the likelihood of receiving an A rating decreases rapidly as
the Black student composition increases in metropolitan regions with high rates of segregation
(i.e. D = 71.5). For schools with 83-100 percent Black students located in highly segregated
metropolitan regions, the predicted probability of receiving an A is .059, which is substantially
lower than the likelihood of schools in similarly segregated metropolitan regions with 0-19
percent Black students (pp =.237) and schools with 20-41 percent Black students (pp =.170).
This is a distinct trend relative to schools with varying levels of Black student populations
located in metropolitans with low segregation levels (i.e. D =. 5). In fact, for the latter trendline,
the predicted probabilities of receiving an A rating are indistinguishable.
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[Insert Figure 13 here]

Figure 13 presents similar trendlines for schools’ predicted probability of receiving an F
rating. Like Figure 12, Figure 13 shows two trendlines. The dashed line represents metropolitan
regions with a segregation index of .5, and the solid line represents metropolitan regions with a
segregation index of 71.5. Figure 13 shows a substantial and widening gap in the predicted
probability of receiving an F rating as both measures increase. In fact, the probability of
receiving an F rating increases as the Black student concentration increases in metropolitans with
high rates of segregation (i.e. D = 71.5). For schools with 83-100 percent Black students located
in highly segregated metropolitan regions, the predicted probability of receiving an F is .201,
which is statistically substantially higher than the likelihood of schools with 0-19 percent Black
students (pp =.048) and schools with 20-41 percent Black students (pp =.072). In other words,
the difference in receiving an F is more than four times greater for schools with higher Black
student compositions relative to schools with lower proportions (pp=.048*4) = .019). Similar to
Figure 12, Figure 13 represents a notable trend relative to schools with varying levels of Black
student populations located in metropolitans with low segregation levels (i.e. D = .5). Here too,
the trendline representing low levels of segregation shows that the predicted probabilities of
receiving an F rating are indistinguishable. I expand on these findings below.

[Insert Figure 14 here]
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Figure 14 presents the predicted probabilities of schools with each categorical threshold
of Latinx student concentration and two-levels of between-district Latinx-White segregation.
There are two trendlines. The solid line represents metropolitan regions with a segregation index
of 0, and the dashed line represents metropolitan regions with a segregation index of 55.
Because of the confidence interval overlap on each level, Figure 14 shows indistinguishable
trendlines representing the predicted probability of receiving an A rating across various Latinx
student compositions for both high and low metropolitan segregation. In other words, the
evidence shows that, unlike Figure 12, the interaction of schools’ proportion of Latinx students
with broader metropolitan segregation does not produce substantially different predictions.

[Insert Figure 15 here]

Figure 15 shows the predicted probabilities of schools with each category of Latinx student
composition along with measures of between-district Latinx-White segregation. The two
trendlines represent metropolitan regions with a segregation index of 0 and with a segregation
index of 55. Like Figure 14, Figure 15 shows indistinguishable trendlines among the segregation
indices, representing the predicted probability of receiving an F rating across each category of
Latinx student composition. Here too, the evidence shows that unlike Figure 13, the interaction
of schools’ proportion of Latinx students with broader metropolitan segregation does not
demonstrate substantial differences.
To summarize, the findings from aim#1 provide answers to several questions posed at the
beginning of this dissertation. First, the results show that neither measures of within- or betweendistrict segregation predict school ratings when considered solely as a focal independent
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variable. In other words, the findings show no support for Hypothesis 1 or Hypothesis 2.
However, there is evidence of an interaction effect between school demographic characteristics
and levels of racial/ethnic segregation that predict school accountability ratings. To be clear, the
findings show that school ratings are associated with schools’ Black student composition and
that this association strengthened depending on levels of between-district Black-White and the
broader metropolitan landscape. In more segregated metropolitan regions, the data show that
schools with higher proportions of Black students have higher probabilities of receiving a lower
school rating relative to a higher one. Figure 12 and Figure 13 capture the most extreme
outcomes of the accountability system – receiving an A and receiving an F overall letter grade.
Here, there is a distinct pattern which documents the importance of the interaction of school
demographics and metropolitan segregation. The findings do not show the same association for
schools’ Latinx student populations or between-district Latinx-White segregation. It is important
to note however, that between-district Latinx-White segregation does not exceed a dissimilarity
index of 55 (e.g. Table 1) in these data, whereas between-district Black-White segregation
reaches a maximum of 72.3 in some regions. This suggests that between-district Latinx-White
segregation in these data do not meet the criteria indicative of high segregation (e.g. values
above 60) (Denton and Massey 1989; Kantrowitz 1973; Massey and Denton 1988; Massey and
Denton 1993; Reardon and Owens 2014). With that said, within-district Latinx-White
segregation does exceed a dissimilarity value of 60, but the evidence does not suggest similar
associations when considered at the district-level (e.g. Table 6; Figure 6). Notably, this finding
must be considered within the limits of these data. These data are a subsample of the United
States and while research primarily finds stable trends in Latinx-White segregation, there is
evidence from other metropolitan regions not included in this analysis (e.g. including but not
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limited to, Los Angeles-Long Beach-Glendale, CA; Salinas, CA; Minneapolis-St. PaulBloomington, MN; Portland-Vancouver-Hillsboro, OR-WA) that show increasing rates of
Latinx-White segregation (Logan and Stults 2011: Table 4: 12-13).
Due to the lack of evidence shown by using measures of within-district segregation, these
results suggest that patterns of inequality in the allocation of resources are more unequal between
school districts, rather than within (Reardon et al. 2019). School demographics in isolation do
not appear to be driving association. Instead, the divergence among the trendlines reflects a
jointly shaped unequal distribution of resources and students at both the school- and
metropolitan-level. This association raises serious questions about the equitability of the report
card system implemented across the United States, not only because it appears to be penalizing
an already disadvantaged group of students and schools, but also because it may be reinforcing
patterns of segregation by deterring potential families from moving into certain schools and
districts. The second part of this dissertation examines part of this latter claim, about perceptions
of the school quality as well as the extent to which these policies influence parents’ decisionmaking to enroll their children in schools.

METHODS
Primary data utilizing an experimental design
Specific aim #2: To offer new evidence and discovery on the potential impacts of school ratings
on perceptions of school quality and enrollment decisions. The second major component of the
dissertation is designed to assess how different overall school ratings influence (a) parents’
perceptions of school quality and (b) their attitudes toward enrolling their child or children in a
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hypothetical school. Data for this study rely on primary data collection utilizing the online
survey platform, Qualtrics, and the solicitation of respondents via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk
(MTurk), a mechanism similar to the solicitation of a traditional panel.21 Qualtrics was ideal for
survey development because it has a built-in feature that allows for the randomization of
exposure groups and can simultaneously fix the question order and hold constant the school
performance metrics. Qualtrics also has a random number generator that was used to maintain
confidentiality and to ensure that respondents from MTurk received payment. Following the
completion of the survey, respondents received a random code that they could copy and paste
into MTurk for payment. Based on previous compensation rates and online discussion boards,
the recommended rate of paying a survey respondent was between $6.00 and $7.25 an hour
which translates to between $0.10 and $0.12 a minute (https://www.mturk.com/pricing). Because
the Federal minimum wage in the United States is $7.25 an hour and the expectation was that the
survey would take between 3 and 5 minutes to complete, I paid a compensation rate of $0.60 per
respondent.22, 23
Because this study focuses on the extent to which ratings impact parents’ perceptions of
school quality and enrollment decisions, respondents were limited to adult parents in the United
States with children under the age of 21. I assessed if respondents fit this criterion in three ways.
First, the consent form included two eligibility requirements that respondents agreed to – I am at

21

A blind proposal was submitted to the Time-Sharing Experiments for the Social Sciences Short Studies Program
(SSP) (Druckman and Freese 2012; Quadlin 2019). Unfortunately, the study was not accepted due, in part, to the
population parameters of identifying parents in the United States.
22
Additional Amazon fees ($0.24 for each respondent).
23
Prior to launching the survey, I conducted 9 cognitive pre-tests to investigate the reliability and validity of the
experiment. This process confirmed that overall school rating may impact decisions of enrollment, a finding that is
consistent with international research (Koning and Van der Wiel 2013; Friesen et al. 2012). Put differently, net of
neutral indicators of “School and District Performances” such as “Adequate Yearly Progress” in closing the
achievement gap, overall rating appeared to drive decision-making on this sample.
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least 18 years old and I am a parent of a child/children between the ages of 0 and 21 years old.
Second, through a parameter identification built into Amazon’s qualification criterions, I was
able to restrict the panel of respondents to parents located in the United States.24 Third, the first
question on the survey asked respondents Are you a parent [Please select one]. Respondents that
selected “No” in response to this question were sent to the end of the survey and excluded from
the data. A power analysis revealed that 385 parents provides a 95 percent confidence interval
and 5 percent margin of error.25 In early 2020, 461 respondents self-selected to participate in the
experiment, and of those who opted-in, 414 fully completed the study. The completion rate is
89.8 percent. Descriptive statistics for the sample are reported below.
While this sample is indeed limited in its generalizability (i.e. does not maintain a
nationally representative panel of respondents), employing an experimental design provides
internally valid causal inferences of how ratings influence parents’ perceptions of school quality
and attitudes toward enrollment decisions (Pedulla 2016; Quadlin 2018). Moreover, MTurk is
becoming a widely used tool by social scientists to recruit panel participants and to provide
empirical evidence to stimulate future research in their respected areas of expertise (Buhrmester,
Kwang and Gosling 2011; Cusatis and Garbarski 2018).

24

Qualification criterions include many variables including but not limited to, parental status, location, finances,
employment, political ideology, marriage status, device-types. In combination with criterion types, requesters are
able to select sub-categories such as gender or online purchase types
https://www.mturk.com/help#how_use_premium_qualifications).
25
I use the following equation to calculate the sample size needed for a 95 percent confidence interval with a 5
percent margin of error (e):

𝑧2 𝑝(1−𝑝)
𝑒2
𝑧2 𝑝(1−𝑝)
𝑒2 𝑁

I substitute z with the z-score 1.96, and N with the United States parent

population estimate: 33,552,189 (U.S. Census Bureau. 2013-2017). After calculation, I find that I must recruit
384.15 parents. I round to the nearest whole number and find that the minimum sample size needed is 385 parents.
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[Insert Table 11 here]

EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
I collected new survey data using a between-subject experimental design to investigate how
parents respond to school ratings (A-F), net of school performance measures. Respondents were
randomly assigned to be exposed to one of five school ratings (i.e. A-F) that described a
hypothetical school profile. To optimize the analysis using this design, participants were
presented the same questions in the same order (Charness, Gneezy and Kuhn 2012). While the
overall school rating was experimentally manipulated, each participant viewed the same four
“School and District Measures of Performance” (Student Achievement on Standardized Tests,
Growth in Student Achievement Over Time, Closing Achievement Gaps With Other Students
and On-Track to Graduation) and corresponding “Adequate Yearly Progress” notation (see
Appendix X for Survey Instrument). To be clear, the between-subject experimental design
exposed respondents to only one treatment (i.e.,. one school rating). This is distinct from a
within-subject experimental design in which respondents are exposed to more than one of the
treatments. In general, scholars have noted between-subject designs as more conservative in their
estimations and have cautioned against carry-over and spurious effects from within-subject
designs (Charness et al. 2012). Prior to viewing a random school profile of Cedar Elementary
each respondent was provided with the following statement:
“School. The following page shows report card data for Cedar Elementary School.
Cedar Elementary is a public school. The performance of Cedar Elementary has been
measured by the school's performance index scores and is listed for each area. Each
category is rated as below, adequate or exceeds yearly progress. The overall rating is a
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weighted combination of these measures. The overall rating scale is A-F. With the
provided data, please answer the following questions.”

For each participant, the hypothetical school was given the name Cedar Elementary School.
Figure 16 indicates that the distribution of respondents by exposure group is similar. That is,
roughly a fifth of the total sample were exposed to each possible school rating (i.e. A-F).

[Insert Figure 16 here]

OUTCOME MEASURES
After they had read the profile for Cedar Elementary, respondents were asked two key questions
of interest. First, participants were asked: Imagine the ideal overall school rating for you and
your household. How well do you think Cedar Elementary compared with your ideal? Second,
participants were asked: Imagine Cedar Elementary was your local neighborhood school. If cost
were not an issue, how likely do you think you and your household would be to decide to enroll
your child in Cedar Elementary School versus an Alternative School (such as a private school,
voucher or charter)? To examine these outcomes as continuous variables on a 6-point scale,
responses were coded so that higher scores mean closer to ones’ ideal and more likely to enroll
in Cedar Elementary.

.[Insert Figure 17 here]
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Perceptions of school quality
For the first outcome variable, perceptions of school quality, Figure 17 provides the unweighted
means and corresponding confidence intervals of the distribution of respondents by exposure
group. Relative to those that viewed a lower rated school profile (e.g. C, D or F), those that
randomly viewed a higher rated profile (e.g. A or B) show, on average, higher rates of indicating
that Cedar Elementary more closely aligned with their ideal school type. As shown in Figure 17,
the average differences between those who viewed A or B rated schools relative to C, D or F
schools appear to be distinct from one another (i.e. the confidence intervals for higher ratings do
not overlap with lower ratings). Based on tests for independence, the distribution of participant
responses and school rating appear to be completely independent (χ2 (20) = 65.01 ; p < 0.01).

[Insert Figure 18 here]

Likelihood of enrollment
For the second outcome variable, likelihood to enroll, Figure 18 shows the unweighted means
and corresponding confidence intervals of the distribution of participants by school rating. The
pattern of distribution is similar to perceptions of school quality. Here too, tests for independence
show that the distribution of participant responses and school rating appear to be completely
independent (χ2 (20) = 133.41; p < 0.01). Relative to those that viewed a lower rated school
profile (e.g. C, D or F), those that randomly viewed a higher rated profile (e.g. A or B) reported,
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on average, a higher average likelihood of enrolling their children in Cedar Elementary. As
shown in Figure 18, these differences are significantly different from one another.

Independent Variables
While the effects of school report card ratings should be relatively similar across various
sociodemographic characteristics because of the random assignment of participants into exposure
groups (Mutz 2011), I include additional independent variables to assess if there are relationships
between controls and participant’s responses (i.e. whether responses vary by race/ethnicity,
gender or number of children). In addition to the experiment, the survey included several
questions to obtain pertinent demographic information.
Political views are measured on a six-point scale, from extremely liberal (1) to extremely
conservative (6), and were coded so that the responses with higher values correspond to stronger
conservative identification.26 Education is measured on a six-point scale and was coded so that
the responses with higher values correspond to higher levels of education. Age is measured in
years and gender is a binary variable, with female equal to one and male equal to zero.
Race/ethnicity is measured with categories for Black, White, Latinx, Asian and Other. Total
number of children is measured with categories from 1 (1) to more than 5 (6). To examine these
responses as a binary variable, responses were collapsed to create a dichotomous variable, with
one equal to 1 or 2 children and 3 or more children equal to zero. The type of school that the
respondent sent or send their child/ren to is measured with categories for Public, Private, Charter,
Voucher and Other.27 Lastly, I capture geographic location based on the state location provided

26

I utilized similar language to how this question is asked on the General Social Surveys (Smith et al. 1972-2018).
For those that selected other, there was an option for a write in response. 6 respondents indicated that they
homeschooled their child.
27
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by the participants. Similar to the first study above, I collapse states into regions of the United
States and treat region as a four-item categorical variable.
Table 11 shows descriptive statistics for the 414 participants in the survey experiment.
The average age of the sample is 35, the majority are White (66 percent) or Black (23 percent)
and most have 1 or 2 children (79 percent). A majority of respondents identify as male (62
percent), and most indicate that they send/sent their child/ren to a public school (63 percent). 28

ANALYTIC STRATEGY
Perceptions of school quality
To understand how parents’ think about the quality of Cedar Elementary, results are shown
using continuous forms of the outcome. Perceptions of school quality are recorded on a 6-point
scale and responses were coded so that higher scores mean Cedar Elementary is closer to ones’
ideal school. First, I show the average percentage of perceptions and use chi-square tests of
independence to determine if cross-tabulations are independent. Second, I employ a series of
ordinary linear regression models which includes sociodemographic covariates. Third, I present
the regression results as predicted values.

Likelihood of enrollment

28

Males appear to be overrepresented in these data. This is not necessarily typical of data collected using MTurk
(see Antoun et al. 2016; Cusatis and Garbarski 2018 for data with female overrepresentation) but it is also not
uncommon and is consistent with several other research (see Boas, Christenson and Glick 2018; Krupnikov and
Levine 2014; Levay, Freese, and Druckman 2016; for data with male overrepresentation).
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To assess how the profile of Cedar Elementary impacts parents’ decisions to enroll in the
hypothetical school, results are shown using continuous forms of the outcome. Enrollment
decisions are recorded on a 6-point scale and responses were coded so that higher scores indicate
a greater likelihood likely to enroll in Cedar Elementary. I present the results in the same manner
described above for perceptions of school quality.

RESULTS
Perceptions of school quality

[Insert Table 12 here]

Do school ratings impact parents’ perceptions of schools? Model 1 in Table 12 presents the
coefficients from a linear regression. The model establishes that overall school rating statistically
significantly predicts parents’ perceptions of schools (F(4, 416) = 22.80, p < 0.01), and that
overall rating accounted for 18 percent of the explained variability in parents’ perceptions.
Model 1 in Table 12 presents the regression coefficients for school ratings that predict parents’
chances of indicating Cedar Elementary is closer to their ideal school. This base model shows
that compared to parents’ that viewed an overall school rating of an A, those that viewed lower
ratings were less likely to indicate that the school profile aligns with their ideal school.
Specifically, the coefficients for those that viewed a C rating indicate a difference of 1.03 points
in school quality compared to those that viewed an A rating. That is, parents’ who viewed a C
school rating report 1.03 points less than those who viewed an A school. For those that viewed a
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D school rating, the difference between those that viewed an A school rating is 1.67 less in
perceptions of school quality. Lastly, parents’ who viewed an F school rating, report 1.59 points
less than parents’ who viewed an A school rating. These findings suggest that parents’ reactions
to schools that received a D rating and schools that received an F rating are essentially similar.
Model 2 accounts for additional covariates reported by parents’ who participated in the
survey experiment. Here, the coefficients for school ratings remain negative and statistically
significant in predicting perceptions of school quality. While those that viewed a C rating
relative to those that viewed an A rating slightly decreased from Model 1 (e.g. -1.03; -1.01) after
accounting for sociodemographic characteristics, those that viewed a D and an F compared to
those that viewed an A rating is strengthened (e.g. D rating: -1.69; -1.71; F rating: -1.59; -1.63).
Model 2 shows one additional covariate that is statistically significant. Specifically, the
coefficients for those that enroll/ed their child/ren in other forms of schooling (e.g. homeschool)
indicate a difference of 1.33 points in school quality compared to those that selected public
school enrollment.

[Insert Figure 19 here]
Figure 19 graphs the impact of school ratings on parents’ perceptions of schools. It
contains the linear predictions of school quality (1-6) by exposure group (A-F). These
predictions are computed from the regression results in Table 12 when control variables are held
at their mean values (Long and Freese 2014). The X-axis represents the linear predictions of
parents’ perceptions of Cedar Elementary by exposure group, represented on the Y-axis (A-F).
Accordingly, those who were exposed to an A rating have a predicted response of 4.16
which is statistically significantly different than the those exposed to the lowest school ratings
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(p<.001). While there is no difference between those exposed to an A rating relative to a B rating
(see Appendix V for differences in linear predictions), there are statistically significant
differences between those exposed to an A or B rating relative to a C rating, D rating and F
rating. Parents’ who viewed a D rating have a predicted response of 2.45 compared to a
predictive response of 3.82 for those that viewed a B rating for Cedar Elementary. Notably, the
predicted response of parents’ who viewed an F rating is 2.53 which is less than two thirds of the
predicted response of parents’ who viewed an A rating.

[Insert Table 13 here]

Likelihood of enrollment
The results from Table 12, Figure 19 suggests that school ratings impact parents’ perceptions of
schools. But, how do they impact parents’ attitudes toward enrollment decisions? Model 1 in
Table 13 presents the coefficients from a linear regression. The model establishes that overall
school rating statistically significantly predicts parents’ attitudes toward enrollment (F(4, 414) =
12.44, p < 0.01), and that overall rating accounted for 11 percent of the explained variability in
parents’ attitudes. Model 1 in Table 13 presents the regression coefficients for school ratings that
predict parents’ attitudes toward enrolling their child in Cedar Elementary. This base model
shows that compared to parents’ that viewed an overall school rating of an A, those that viewed
lower ratings were less likely to indicate that they would enroll their child in the hypothetical
school. In particular, the coefficients for those that viewed a C rating indicate a difference of .93
points in likelihood to enroll compared to those that viewed an A rating. Parents’ who viewed a
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D school rating report 1.07 points less than those who viewed an A school and parents’ who
viewed an F school rating, report 1.08 points less than parents’ who viewed an A rating.
Model 2 accounts for additional covariates. The coefficients for school ratings remain
negative and statistically significant in predicting perceptions the likelihood to enroll in Cedar
Elementary. Whereas those that viewed a C and F rating relative to those that viewed an A rating
slightly decreased from Model 1 (e.g. C rating: -.933; -.90; F rating: -1.08; -1.06) after
accounting for sociodemographic characteristics, those that viewed a D rating relative to parents’
who viewed an A rating is again marginally strengthened (e.g. D rating: -1.07; -1.15). Model 2
includes additional covariates that are statistically significant. There is a difference in gender,
and school type. Compared to male parents that participated in the survey, female parents are
less likely to indicate a greater likelihood to enroll in Cedar Elementary. Moreover, those that
enroll/ed their child/ren in charter schools (.75) or vouchers (1.07), compared to traditional
public schools show a higher likelihood to enroll in Cedar Elementary. Below I present these
results as linear predictions using tests of significance based on delta-method standard errors
(Long 2009; Xu and Long 2005).

[Insert Figure 20 here]

Figure 20 graphs the impact of school ratings on parents’ attitudes toward enrollment
decisions. It contains the linear predictions of likelihood to enroll (1-6) by exposure group (A-F).
These predictions are computed from the regression results in Table 12 when covariates are held
at their mean values (Long and Freese 2014). The X-axis represents the linear predictions of
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parents’ likelihood to enroll in Cedar Elementary by exposure group, represented on the Y-axis
(A-F).
Those who were exposed to an A rating have a predicted response of 4.05, which is
statistically significantly different than the those exposed to the lowest school ratings (p < .001;
see Appendix V for differences in linear predictions). Again, there is no evidence of a difference
between those exposed to an A rating relative to a B rating. However, there are statistically
significant differences between those exposed to an A or B rating relative to a C rating, D rating
and F rating. Parents’ who viewed a C rating have a predicted response of 3.15 compared to a
predictive response of 4.19 for those that viewed a B rating for Cedar Elementary. The predicted
response of parents’ who viewed a D rating is 2.91 compared to a predictive response of 4.05 for
those that viewed an A rating.
To summarize, the findings from aim#2 provide answers to the final questions posed in
the introduction of this dissertation. In particular, the experimental findings show that net of
adequate yearly progress across school performance metrics, parents’ perceptions of school
quality is significantly less favorable when shown a school profile with a lower school rating.
Similarly, parents indicate that they are less likely to enroll their children in a hypothetical lower
rated school. In other words, these findings suggest that regardless of how well schools may be
educating their students (i.e., showing adequate yearly progress by performance metric), the
overall school rating seems to be driving parents’ perceptions of quality and influencing their
enrollment decisions. To be clear, these results do not show significant differences among higher
overall school ratings (A and B) and among lower school ratings (C, D, and F), but they do show
significant differences when comparing the differences between higher school ratings (A/B)
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relative to lower school ratings (C/D/F). Figure 19 and Figure 20 provide compelling visuals of
these differences.
The findings presented from aim#2 compliment the findings reported from aim#1 and
raise serious questions about the equitability of the report card system implemented across the
United States. I discuss the implications below.

DISCUSSION
The ultimate intention of this project is to inform best practices for designing, disseminating and
interpreting measures of school quality by school authorities, elected officials and parents. I
began this dissertation with the 2007 United States Supreme Court ruling that limited the use of
voluntary racial classifications by school districts (Parents Involved in Community Schools v.
Seattle School District 2007). In so doing, I drew attention to the dissenting voice of Justice
Breyer who argued that if educational policy causes segregation by influencing private decisions
then there may be evidence of segregation resulting from state action. Above, I provide empirical
evidence that contemporary accountability ratings are unevenly distributed across schools and
districts. The distribution of this resource is patterned such that ratings appear to be reflecting
mechanisms that produce achievement disparities outside schools, such as racial/ethnic
inequality in financial, cultural, and social capital, more than the extent to which ratings are
providing an accurate depiction of how schools are making efficient use of their resources to
provide the best learning opportunities possible. In a similar vein, I show that school ratings are
serving as a signal of school quality to key stakeholders and that school ratings impact and
influence parents’ attitudes toward enrollment decisions. Considered together, I assert that the
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current accountability rating system is diverting attention away from the disparities in resources
associated with school segregation. Moreover, this system appears to be providing a structure of
incentives that influence stakeholders’ decision-making and ultimately undermines the ability of
schools to raise achievement for their students.
To be clear, findings from aim#1 show that school ratings are associated schools’
demographic composition and that this association depends on the broader metropolitan
landscape. In more highly segregated metropolitan regions, schools with higher proportions of
Black students show greater odds of receiving a lower rating relative to a higher one, net of
additional covariates at the school-, district- and metropolitan-levels. Critics of these findings
may suggest that the associations documented in aim#1 do not produce a causal direction. That
is, one could reasonably ask if segregation causes lower school ratings or if lower ratings lead to
an increase in metropolitan segregation. As I note above, the fact that any association exists
between school demographics and school ratings is problematic and it raises serious questions
about the equitability of the report card system implemented across the United States. Indeed,
the theoretical goals of such systems were to raise achievement for all students, while
eliminating gaps in achievement, attainment and career readiness between different student
subgroups (No Child Left Behind Act 2002; Hess 2003), not to identify which group of students
attend which schools. The findings presented for aim#1 are worrisome. Schools assigned to
lower categories are often targeted for supports, reforms and occasionally even closure by state
education officials (Brummet 2014; Logan et al. 2012; Darling-Hammond 2010; Gaddis and
Lauen 2014; Ravitch 2010). The report card system appears to be penalizing an already
disadvantaged group of students and schools. That is, the system is likely unfairly blaming
schools for relatively poor achievement and obscuring the extent to which some schools serving
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disadvantaged students outperform others. Moreover, the overall school rating may be
reinforcing patterns of segregation by deterring potential families from moving into certain
schools and school districts.
The second part of this research examined part of this latter assertion, about perceptions
of school quality as well as the extent to which these policies influence parents’ decision-making
to enroll their children in schools. The experimental findings from aim#2 show that parents’
perceptions of school quality is significantly less favorable when shown a school profile with a
lower school rating, net of adequate yearly progress across school performance metrics.
Moreover, parents in the experiment indicated that they were less likely to enroll their children in
a hypothetical school with a lower rating. These findings are noteworthy. The significant
differences documented in the experiment provide empirical evidence of the importance of
school ratings. Indeed, school ratings are a resource that influence private decisions.
Considering both aims, this research expands the sociological scholarships’
understanding of the distribution of resources and their effect on students’ education (Reardon
and Owens 2014). I argue that educational accountability ratings are an additional resource that
impacts students, families and schools differently in patterns that are reflective of existing
inequality and that they play a pivotal role in parental decision-making which may contribute to
school segregation. While the findings from aim#1 show that this resource is unevenly
distributed among schools and districts and findings from aim#2 show that this resource
influences decision-making, I am unable to assert that parents’ decisions directly contribute to an
increase in segregation. Undeniably, both studies include limitations.
Data analyzed to assess aim#1 is limited by the 14 states and the subsequent metropolitan
regions included in the analysis. As I show in the appendix and discuss at length above, school
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accountability ratings differ across state lines, making a nationwide study not only difficult, but
potentially, biased and inaccurate. States that employ alternative metrics for the report card, such
as “tiers of support” or “accreditation” make it difficult to collapse the overall rating on a
meaningful and interpretable continuous or categorical scale. This should be a concern for
methodologists and policy makers when discussing national trends of school performance
metrics based on annual school report cards. Furthermore, in the 14 states included in this
research, there is variation in the amount of weight given to the components that contribute to the
overall school rating. I show this difference by state in the appendix, but it is worth noting the
concerns that this difference raises here. For instance, states vary in the extent to which they
emphasize performance on standardized exams. This difference is related to the current law
(ESSA) which provides states with more authority over their accountability system. The issue
remains however, that it continues the NCLB mandate that accountability report cards are based,
in part, on student achievement in spite of the consistent research showing that performance
differs by student demographics and school composition. In this sense, school ratings appear to
be merely repackaging and reflecting inequalities in academic achievement into overall school
ratings. Depending on the states’ weight on academic achievement in calculating school ratings,
this may be more or less pronounced in certain states.
Data analyzed to assess aim#2 is also limited in its’ generalizability. While the
experimental nature of these data provide evidence of their internal validity, the concern of how
this sentiment extends beyond these data is reasonable. These data were from parents across the
United States and collected online. It remains less clear how parents who do not use Amazon’s
MTurk or those who chose not to participate may differ. Even more, while these data represent a
breadth of individuals across the United States, it is also likely that parents in this sample lived in
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a state with a different display of the school report card and may not have been exposed to the
same 5-point letter system previously. At minimum, these data suggest that when parents are
provided a hypothetical option in this scenario however, school letter ratings have a substantial
impact on their decision-making and attitudes toward school quality. While they remain distinct
in many regards, this sentiment may also be formed by exposure to a growing online school
rating environment (e.g. GreatSchools.org, an embedded feature on prominent home search
websites such as Zillow.com and Trulia.com, see also Niche.com – see footnote 1). Additional
research on how ratings impact parents’ decision-making is needed. Future research should
employ nationally representative data and account for segregation levels within the respondent’s
local school, district and metropolitan context.
Throughout this dissertation, I have conceptualized school ratings as a resource vital to
the educational experience of students which impacts students, families and schools differently
in patterns that are reflective of existing social inequality. I’ve used empirical data to contribute
to the sociological understanding of the relationships among race/ethnicity, schools, variations in
accountability policies in general, and perceptions of school quality and enrollment decisions. In
doing so, this research should prove valuable to scholars across multiple disciplines allowing
sociologists, educational researchers, methodologists and policy makers to effectively
collaborate. The empirical evidence presented here makes the case for the implementation and
dissemination of alternative accountability metrics that are reliable and accurate estimates of how
well schools and districts serve their students. To promote the spirit of raising achievement for
all students, states may consider adjusting their educational policies more broadly and changing
the construction of their report cards more specifically. Opponents of standardized testing and
performance driven accountability may favor the elimination of the overall rating system
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deployed by state departments. Such systems however, have considerable appeal across
ideological lines – for conservatives determined to increase accountability for public spending on
education (Moe 2003) and for progressives as an effective means to enhance educational
opportunities for economically disadvantaged students and those belonging to racial/ethnic
groups (Mehta 2013). Ratings offer seemingly transparent indicators of school quality that are
supposed to be readily interpretable by legislators, state education officials, school
administrators, educators and, perhaps most importantly, parents (Education Commission of the
States 2016; Nunes, et al. 2015). Proponents of such systems could argue that ratings provide
stakeholders with more choice. But unlike charter and various choice schools, public schools are
less able to recruit and choose their respective student attendees to influence their overall rating
(e.g. Jennings 2010). Advocates of choice policy tend to argue that market forces will produce
more efficient and high achieving schools because students can “vote with their feet,” (Chubb
and Moe 1988), but the result of such policies are trending toward increasing racial/ethnic and
socioeconomic segregation in schools and districts. This trend holds in research on perceptions
of schools as well as in enrollment patterns in charter schools. Using an experimental design,
Billingham and Hunt (2016) show that White parents become less likely to enroll their children
in schools as the Black population increases, net of school quality and school characteristics.
Nationwide, school districts that are more segregated show increased rates of Black enrollment
in predominantly Black charter schools (Renzulli 2006). Because school ratings primarily reflect
who attends what school, the design itself likely reinforces school segregation. By categorizing
schools on the annual report card, schools’ ability to attract high quality teachers is limited and
has been shown to influence parents’ decisions about where to move or where to purchase a
home (see also Ehlert et al. 2016; Figlio and Lucas 2004).
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The evidence presented here suggests that school ratings may not be transparent or
accurate indicators of school quality. Like others, these data support the argument that focusing
on indicators of school quality for accountability purposes essentially holds schools responsible
for achievement gaps that are largely the result of inequalities in families and neighborhoods
(García and Weiss 2017). This suggests that reforms focused on schools are at best insufficient
and perhaps even harmful if the goal is to close achievement and attainment gaps between and
among students because ratings largely reflect inequalities outside the schools themselves rather
than providing a clear indication of the extent to which schools effectively serve their students.
An elimination of the rating system however, may leave social scientists and policy makers
without data to ensure that achievement is in fact raised for all students. An alternative solution
may be to not only reconsider the weights on standardized testing but to increase the emphasis on
growth over time after accounting for differences outside of the schools’ control (e.g. summer
and the seasonal effects; Condron 2009; Downey 2008; Downey et al. 2004; Hippel et al. 2018).
It would be additionally useful for states to implement, or scholars to develop, metrics of the
report card that make cross-state comparisons much more possible.
The evidence suggests that school accountability systems may be effectively penalizing
relatively integrated schools while giving predominantly White, relatively affluent schools too
much credit for closing racial/ethnic and socioeconomic gaps in achievement. Given high levels
of school segregation, large schools in urban districts are more likely to be evaluated on their
contribution to closing such gaps than smaller schools in suburban or rural districts (Stiefel, et al.
2007). Conversely, predominantly White schools with students from relatively affluent families
may be more likely to get credit for closing gaps because they enroll small and highly selective
groups of students who belong to racial/ethnic minorities (e.g. upper middle class Asian
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students), while schools that primarily serve economically disadvantaged Black and Latinx
students may be less likely to get credit for whatever success they do achieve with students
despite contending with challenges that arise outside the schools themselves.
Schools and school districts should make every effort to provide students with a diverse
environment to the extent possible, given their broader metropolitan landscape. Schools should
be held accountable for ensuring integrated spaces. For instance, in metropolitan areas where the
student age population presents a large share of lower socioeconomic and non-White students,
schools could receive points on their report card, similar to the absenteeism deduction. This
credit could be noted as a diversity metric. If a metropolitan region is relatively diverse, schools
and districts should have representative student bodies that are within the margins of the broader
landscape. This would be a significant change to the current system.
School segregation has significant implications for experiences in primary and secondary
education, along with race relations and efforts to eliminate disparities in achievement. It
remains important that students of all racial/ethnic and socioeconomic backgrounds are exposed
to one another. As Orfield has maintained, in large part because of the peer effect findings issued
in the Coleman Report (1966), that while there is nothing magic about sitting next to a White
child in a classroom, there are significant advantages to doing so (Hill 2017; Orfield and Lee
2004; Orfield and Eaton 1996). That is, an integrated classroom, school and school district has
the potential to provide Black and Latinx students with access to social capital that may
otherwise be outside of their network, primarily because of the history of discrimination and the
tight linkage of minority status with poverty. For instance, high income students perform better
in highly segregated metropolitan regions relative to low income students (Owens 2018). Access
to these networks are significant because they effect the creation of capital in the next generation
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(Coleman 1988) and well-connected parental networks have been shown to buffer the
disadvantages of school and neighborhood disadvantages (Li and Fischer 2017). Additionally,
interracial contact is crucial, though insufficient on its own, to reducing prejudice and enhancing
racial tolerance throughout the lifespan (Clotfelter 2004). This contact proves especially valuable
at the primary-level (Buck 2010). At minimum, integration challenges the theory of perpetuation
which maintains that those who experience segregation will experience it across various life
stages and throughout institutions (Wells and Crain 1994).
Since 1995, the Supreme Court has remained largely silent on school segregation (aside
from Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1 2007) and have
treated the issue as resolved of past wrongdoings. But, school segregation was built on the
structure of racial inequality and liberals and conservatives alike continue to reinforce the “color
line” in their decisions on where to live and where to send their children to school (Wells and
Crain 1997). Today, additional mechanisms to maintain separate schools and districts seem to be
evident with the deployment of school accountability ratings. The distribution of this new school
resource is unequal. Its implementation appears to be driving private decisions. The nation’s
schools are rated.
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FIGURES
FIGURE 1. School ratings for 14 U.S. states that use similar scales.
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Sources: The Departments of Education for the following states utilizing a similar 5-pt scale: Alabama, Arkansas, Arizona, Florida, Indiana, Louisiana,
Mississippi, New Mexico, North Carolina, South Carolina, Ohio, Texas, Utah, Wisconsin. Notes: N=10,369

FIGURE 2. Metropolitan-level Black-White segregation (D) by region.
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Sources: The Departments of Education for the following states utilizing a similar 5-pt scale: Alabama, Arkansas, Arizona, Florida, Indiana, Louisiana,
Mississippi, New Mexico, North Carolina, South Carolina, Ohio, Texas, Utah, Wisconsin. Census TIGER/Line Shape Files at the State Level. Figure created
using spmap package in STATA 15.1. Notes: N=10,369. Indices based on demographic data available for students in grades Pre-K through 6 when demographic
enrollment > 5. Districts include schools>1. Metropolis includes districts>1 and demographic enrollment>100.

FIGURE 3. Metropolitan-level Latinx-White segregation (D) by region.
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Sources: The Departments of Education for the following states utilizing a similar 5-pt scale: Alabama, Arkansas, Arizona, Florida, Indiana, Louisiana,
Mississippi, New Mexico, North Carolina, South Carolina, Ohio, Texas, Utah, Wisconsin. Census TIGER/Line Shape Files at the State Level. Figure created
using spmap package in STATA 15.1. Notes: N=10,369. Indices based on demographic data available for students in grades Pre-K through 6 when demographic
enrollment > 5. Districts include schools>1. Metropolis includes districts>1 and demographic enrollment>100.

FIGURE 4. District-level Black-White segregation (D): By school rating and percent Black student population.
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Sources: The Departments of Education for the following states utilizing a similar 5-pt scale: Alabama, Arkansas, Arizona, Florida, Indiana, Louisiana,
Mississippi, New Mexico, North Carolina, South Carolina, Ohio, Texas, Utah, Wisconsin. Notes: N=10,369. Figure shows smoothed values from a kernelweighted local polynomial regression of Black-White segregation within school districts on percent of Black student population within schools by school rating.

FIGURE 5. Metropolitan-level Black-White segregation (D): By school rating and percent Black student population.
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Sources: The Departments of Education for the following states utilizing a similar 5-pt scale: Alabama, Arkansas, Arizona, Florida, Indiana, Louisiana,
Mississippi, New Mexico, North Carolina, South Carolina, Ohio, Texas, Utah, Wisconsin. Notes: N=10,369. Figure shows smoothed values from a kernelweighted local polynomial regression of Black-White segregation between school districts on percent of Black student population within schools by school
rating.

FIGURE 6. District-level Latinx-White segregation (D): By school rating and percent Latinx student population.
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Sources: The Departments of Education for the following states utilizing a similar 5-pt scale: Alabama, Arkansas, Arizona, Florida, Indiana, Louisiana,
Mississippi, New Mexico, North Carolina, South Carolina, Ohio, Texas, Utah, Wisconsin. Notes: N=10,369. Figure shows smoothed values from a kernelweighted local polynomial regression of Latinx-White segregation within school districts on percent of Latinx student population within schools by school rating.

FIGURE 7. Metropolitan-level Latinx-White segregation (D): By school rating and percent Latinx student population.
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Sources: The Departments of Education for the following states utilizing a similar 5-pt scale: Alabama, Arkansas, Arizona, Florida, Indiana, Louisiana,
Mississippi, New Mexico, North Carolina, South Carolina, Ohio, Texas, Utah, Wisconsin. Notes: N=10,369. Figure shows smoothed values from a kernelweighted local polynomial regression of Latinx-White segregation between school districts on percent of Latinx student population within schools by school
rating.

FIGURE 8. District-level Black-White segregation (D): By school rating and percent White student population.

105
Sources: The Departments of Education for the following states utilizing a similar 5-pt scale: Alabama, Arkansas, Arizona, Florida, Indiana, Louisiana,
Mississippi, New Mexico, North Carolina, South Carolina, Ohio, Texas, Utah, Wisconsin. Notes: N=10,369. Figure shows smoothed values from a kernelweighted local polynomial regression of Black-White segregation within school districts on percent of White student population within schools by school rating.

FIGURE 9. Metropolitan-level Black-White segregation (D): By school rating and percent White student population.
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Sources: The Departments of Education for the following states utilizing a similar 5-pt scale: Alabama, Arkansas, Arizona, Florida, Indiana, Louisiana,
Mississippi, New Mexico, North Carolina, South Carolina, Ohio, Texas, Utah, Wisconsin. Notes: N=10,369. Figure shows smoothed values from a kernelweighted local polynomial regression of Black-White segregation between school districts on percent of White student population within schools by school
rating.

FIGURE 10. Predictive Margins with 95 Percent CI. Metropolitan-level Black-White segregation (D), Black student concentration and
predicted school rating.
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Sources: The Departments of Education for the following states utilizing a similar 5-pt scale: Alabama, Arkansas, Arizona, Florida, Indiana, Louisiana,
Mississippi, New Mexico, North Carolina, South Carolina, Ohio, Texas, Utah, Wisconsin. Notes: Figure shows predicted probabilities of school rating for
varying levels of between-district Black-White segregation and percentage categories of Black student population within schools. Categories based on cutpoints
in Table 2. % Black: Low (0-19%); Moderate (42-62%); High (83-100%). Seg (D): Low (0); High (70).

FIGURE 11. Predictive Margins with 95 Percent CI. Metropolitan-level Latinx-White segregation (D), Latinx student concentration
and predicted school rating.
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Sources: The Departments of Education for the following states utilizing a similar 5-pt scale: Alabama, Arkansas, Arizona, Florida, Indiana, Louisiana,
Mississippi, New Mexico, North Carolina, South Carolina, Ohio, Texas, Utah, Wisconsin. Notes: Figure shows predicted probabilities of school rating for
varying levels of between-district Latinx-White segregation and percentage categories of Latinx student population within schools. Categories based on cutpoints
in Table 2. % Latinx: Low (0-5%); Moderate (30-55%); High (81-100%). Seg (D): Low (0); High (50).

FIGURE 12. Predictive Margins with 95 Percent CI. Metropolitan-level Black-White segregation (D), Black student concentration and
A rating.
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Sources: The Departments of Education for the following states utilizing a similar 5-pt scale: Alabama, Arkansas, Arizona, Florida, Indiana, Louisiana,
Mississippi, New Mexico, North Carolina, South Carolina, Ohio, Texas, Utah, Wisconsin. Notes: Figure shows the predicted probability of a school receiving an
A rating for varying levels of between-district Black-White segregation and percentage categories of Black student population within schools.

FIGURE 13. Predictive Margins with 95 Percent CI. Metropolitan-level Black-White segregation (D), Black student concentration and
F rating.
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Sources: The Departments of Education for the following states utilizing a similar 5-pt scale: Alabama, Arkansas, Arizona, Florida, Indiana, Louisiana,
Mississippi, New Mexico, North Carolina, South Carolina, Ohio, Texas, Utah, Wisconsin. Notes: Figure shows the predicted probability of a school receiving an
F rating for varying levels of between-district Black-White segregation and percentage categories of Black student population within schools.

FIGURE 14. Predictive Margins with 95 Percent CI. Metropolitan-level Latinx-White segregation (D), Latinx student concentration
and A rating.
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Sources: The Departments of Education for the following states utilizing a similar 5-pt scale: Alabama, Arkansas, Arizona, Florida, Indiana, Louisiana,
Mississippi, New Mexico, North Carolina, South Carolina, Ohio, Texas, Utah, Wisconsin. Notes: Figure shows the predicted probability of a school receiving an
A rating for varying levels of between-district Latinx -White segregation and percentage categories of Latinx student population within schools.

FIGURE 15. Predictive Margins with 95 Percent CI. Metropolitan-level Latinx-White segregation (D), Latinx student concentration
and F rating.
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Sources: The Departments of Education for the following states utilizing a similar 5-pt scale: Alabama, Arkansas, Arizona, Florida, Indiana, Louisiana,
Mississippi, New Mexico, North Carolina, South Carolina, Ohio, Texas, Utah, Wisconsin. Notes: Figure shows the predicted probability of a school receiving an
F rating for varying levels of between-district Latinx -White segregation and percentage categories of Latinx student population within schools.

FIGURE 16. Unweighted distribution of parents’ exposure to a school rating in the experiment.
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Sources: Original data collected on Qualtrics via Amazon Mechanical Turk Panel. Notes: N=414

FIGURE 17. Unweighted distributions of perceptions of school quality: By exposure to school rating.
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Sources: Original data collected on Qualtrics via Amazon Mechanical Turk Panel. Notes: N=414. Confidence intervals (95 percent).

FIGURE 18. Unweighted distributions of likelihood to enroll: By exposure to school rating.
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Sources: Original data collected on Qualtrics via Amazon Mechanical Turk Panel. Notes: N=414. Confidence intervals (95 percent).

FIGURE 19. Predictive Margins with 95 Percent CI. Parents’ perceptions of the quality of the hypothetical school: By exposure to
school rating.
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Sources: Original data collected on Qualtrics via Amazon Mechanical Turk Panel. Notes: N=414. Confidence intervals (95 percent).

FIGURE 20. Predictive Margins with 95 Percent CI. Parents’ likelihood to enroll in hypothetical school: By exposure to school rating.
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Sources: Original data collected on Qualtrics via Amazon Mechanical Turk Panel. Notes: N=414. Confidence intervals (95 percent).

TABLES
TABLE 1. Metropolitan-level Black-White and Latinx-White segregation (D) by region.
Schools Districts
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14 State Total
Black-White (D)
Latinx-White (D)

10,369

8 Southern States
Black-White (D)
Latinx-White (D)

7,607

3 Western States
Black-White (D)
Latinx-White (D)

842

3 Midwestern States
Black-White (D)
Latinx-White (D)

1,920

885

504

89

292

MSAs

Total metro
segregation

[min,max]

Within
districts

[min,max]

Between
districts

[min,max]

56.3
50.8

[32.5, 63.4]
[35.4, 54.8]

36.8
33.2

[0.0, 70.4]
[0.1, 72.2]

36.3
30.7

[0, 72.4]
[0, 54.5]

55.7
51.0

[43.2, 63.0]
[40.7, 54.3]

40.1
35.4

[0.0, 70.4]
[0.0, 72.2]

31.4
27.8

[0, 72.2]
[0, 54.5]

47.2
51.2

[32.5, 51.7]
[35.4, 54.8]

29.3
32.2

[0.3, 61.7]
[0.4, 57.9]

36.9
37.7

[14.1, 45.3]
[10.9, 46.6]

62.8
50.0

[62.3, 63.4]
[47.4, 52.6]

27.2
24.6

[0.2, 64.6]
[0.2, 64.2]

55.5
39.4

[0, 72.3]
[0, 52.4]
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77

6

29

Source: National Center for Education Statistics CCD public school data 2016-2017, 2018-2019 school years in: Alabama, Arkansas, Arizona, Florida, Indiana,
Louisiana, Mississippi, New Mexico, North Carolina, South Carolina, Ohio, Texas, Utah, Wisconsin. Notes: Segregation calculated using Dissimilarity indices
(D). For a list of Southern states and a complete list of segregation indices by MSAs and see Appendix D. Indices based on demographic data available for
students in grades Pre-K through 6 when demographic enrollment > 5. Districts include schools>1. Metropolis includes districts>1 and demographic
enrollment>100.

TABLE 2. Descriptive statistics for all categorical demographic variables included in the analysis: Overall and by school rating.

VARIABLES
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Mean/Prop

St. Dev.

All
Schools

A

B

C

D

F

Percent Latinx
Constructed Categories
04.2730.1355.9981.85-

32.01

26.65

32.01

28.05

33.18

34.12

30.64

32.11

-

-

10.08
51.57
19.66
12.64
6.06

8.35
57.36
19.43
9.54
5.34

9.37
46.90
21.75
14.39
7.60

9.76
44.71
21.37
17.12
7.04

12.26
46.93
19.30
14.47
7.04

16.22
58.22
19.33
13.78
8.67

Percent Black
Constructed Categories
019.8140.9662.1183.27-

18.72

20.40

18.72

16.15

17.98

19.34

22.32

23.03

-

-

64.78
19.67
8.89
4.84
1.82

73.96
15.41
6.01
3.43
1.19

69.34
19.25
6.14
3.85
1.42

66.83
19.48
7.47
4.29
1.93

62.31
17.89
10.75
6.13
2.91

59.56
18.89
11.56
7.78
2.22

Source: National Center for Education Statistics CCD public school data 2016-2017, 2018-2019 school years in: Alabama, Arkansas, Arizona, Florida, Indiana,
Louisiana, Mississippi, New Mexico, North Carolina, South Carolina, Ohio, Texas, Utah, Wisconsin. Notes: Categories based on SD of continuous measures of
Latinx and Black students. Indices based on demographic data available for students in grades Pre-K through 6 when demographic enrollment > 5. Districts
include schools>1. Metropolis includes districts>1 and demographic enrollment>100.

TABLE 3. Descriptive statistics for all variables included in the analysis.
VARIABLES
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Mean/Prop

St. Dev.

A

B

C

D

F

School level
Percent Black
Percent Latinx
Percent White
Percent FRL
Charter
Letter Rating
South
Midwest
West
Total Population

20.3
30.1
41.2
52.9
7.4
87.23
79.7
16.3
4.0
531.8

21.0
25.9
27.2
30.3
226.4

17.1
27.4
44.9
45.1
32.5
91.60
21.1
16.7
19.6
562.7

19.4
31.5
40.8
53.5
28.9
89.42
31.1
32.1
29.9
528.7

21.0
31.4
40.1
57.1
27.6
84.27
32.6
27.0
34.2
531.5

29.7
26.5
35.5
57.8
8.4
81.61
10.6
16.6
13.7
498.8

31.3
26.7
34.9
54.1
2.5
84.44
4.5
7.7
3.7
473.9

District and Metropolis level
B-W Metro Seg. (D)
L-W Metro Seg. (D)
B-W District Seg. (D)
L-W District Seg. (D)
B-W Exposure
L-W Exposure
District Poverty
Property Tax Rev.
Prior Mandate
Recent Mandate

36.2
30.6
37.0
33.3
8.0
7.9
812.0
253.7
3.5
4.6

19.2
16.0
16.8
15.7
10.7
10.6
88.3
407.3
-

33.7
30.0
37.2
32.6
7.7
7.4
801.4
329.5
18.7
28.0

37.8
32.2
36.9
33.4
8.0
7.9
811.7
249.8
32.0
35.0

34.7
29.4
37.9
33.8
7.6
7.5
819.2
253.8
35.0
20.4

37.1
29.3
37.8
34.6
7.0
7.1
814.2
186.1
10.5
10.7

41.1
32.3
37.3
34.2
7.3
7.6
805.0
183.2
3.7
6.0

Source: National Center for Education Statistics CCD public school data 2016-2017, 2018-2019 school years in: Alabama, Arkansas, Arizona, Florida, Indiana,
Louisiana, Mississippi, New Mexico, North Carolina, South Carolina, Ohio, Texas, Utah, Wisconsin. Notes: Charter status, prior/ recent mandates and region
variables are dichotomous. Letter rating is a dichotomous indicator of states that use A-F relative to those in the data that use another 1-5 rating system. District
poverty is an income-to-poverty ratio and tax revenue is shown in thousands. Indices based on demographic data available for students in grades Pre-K through 6
when demographic enrollment > 5. Districts include schools>1. Metropolis includes districts>1 and demographic enrollment>100.

TABLE 4. Regional categorization of 14 states by region included in the analysis.

South
Alabama
Arkansas
Florida
Louisiana
Mississippi
North Carolina
South Carolina
Texas

Midwest
Indiana
Ohio
Wisconsin

West
Arizona
New Mexico
Utah

Source: Adjusted to include states in the analysis developed by Orfield and Monfort (1992). Cited in Clotfelter 2004; Logan et al. 2008.
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TABLE 5. Multi-level ordered logistic regression results for District-level Black-White Segregation (D).
VARIABLES
B-W Within (D)
20-41 percent Black
42-62 percent Black
63-82 percent Black
83-100 percent Black
B-W Within (D) * 20-41 percent Black
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B-W Within (D) * 42-62 percent Black
B-W Within (D) * 63-82 percent Black
B-W Within (D) * 83-100 percent Black
School-level variables
Percent Latinx (School)
Percent Poverty (FRL)
Charter
Letter Rating
South

B-W Within (D),
Model 1

B-W Within (D),
Model 2

0.00
(0.00)
-0.19
(0.15)
-0.54*
(0.25)
-0.32
(0.38)
-1.21*
(0.60)
-0.00
(0.00)
0.00
(0.01)
-0.00
(0.01)
0.01
(0.01)

0.00
(0.00)
-0.10
(0.16)
-0.59*
(0.26)
-0.44
(0.39)
-1.37*
(0.61)
-0.00
(0.00)
0.00
(0.01)
-0.01
(0.01)
0.01
(0.01)

-0.01***
(0.00)
-0.01***
(0.00)
0.30***
(0.08)
0.25*
(0.12)
-0.14
(0.13)

-0.01***
(0.00)
-0.01***
(0.00)
0.31***
(0.09)
0.29*
(0.12)
-0.05
(0.14)

Midwest
District-level variables
District Poverty (IPR)
Percent White (District)
Recent Mandate (1990-2003)
Prior Mandate (1980-1989)

-0.97***
(0.15)

-1.00***
(0.16)

0.00*
(0.00)
-0.00
(0.00)
1.19***
(0.16)
-0.10
(0.30)

0.00
(0.00)
-0.00
(0.00)
1.25***
(0.16)
-0.09
(0.30)
0.11*
(0.04)
-2.81***
(0.49)
-1.42**
(0.49)
0.31
(0.49)
1.92***
(0.49)
0.56***
(0.06)
9,138
759

Property Taxes
cut1
cut2
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cut3
cut4
var(_cons[district])
Observations
Number of groups

-3.93***
(0.23)
-2.45***
(0.23)
-0.71**
(0.23)
0.92***
(0.23)
0.61***
(0.06)
10,369
854

Source: National Center for Education Statistics CCD public school data 2016-2017, 2018-2019 school years in: Alabama, Arkansas, Arizona, Florida, Indiana,
Louisiana, Mississippi, New Mexico, North Carolina, South Carolina, Ohio, Texas, Utah, Wisconsin. Notes: Percent Black thresholds are categorical based on
Table 2. Charter status, rating, prior/ recent mandates and region variables are dichotomous. District poverty is an income-to-poverty ratio and tax revenue is
shown in thousands. Property taxes are transformed into the natural log. based on demographic data available for students in grades Pre-K through 6 when
demographic enrollment > 5. Districts include schools>1. Metropolis includes districts>1 and demographic enrollment>100. Standard errors in parentheses ***
p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.

TABLE 6. Multi-level ordered logistic regression results for District-level Latinx-White Segregation (D).
VARIABLES
L-W Within (D)
5-29 percent Latinx
30-55 percent Latinx
56-80 percent Latinx
81-100 percent Latinx
L-W Within (D) * 5-29 percent Latinx
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L-W Within (D) * 30-55 percent Latinx
L-W Within (D) * 56-80 percent Latinx
L-W Within (D) * 81-100 percent Latinx
School-level variables
Percent Black (School)
Percent Poverty (FRL)
Charter
Letter Rating
South

L-W Within (D)
Model 1

L-W Within (D)
Model 2

0.00
(0.01)
-0.02
(0.15)
-0.37
(0.21)
-0.77**
(0.26)
-0.55
(0.34)
-0.00
(0.00)
0.00
(0.01)
0.00
(0.01)
-0.00
(0.01)

0.00
(0.01)
-0.02
(0.15)
-0.33
(0.22)
-0.83**
(0.26)
-0.66
(0.34)
-0.00
(0.00)
-0.00
(0.01)
0.00
(0.01)
-0.01
(0.01)

-0.01***
(0.00)
-0.01***
(0.00)
0.29***
(0.08)
0.24*
(0.12)
-0.08

-0.01***
(0.00)
-0.01***
(0.00)
0.32***
(0.09)
0.28*
(0.12)
0.03

Midwest
District-level variables
District Poverty (IPR)
Recent Mandate (1990-2003)
Prior Mandate (1980-1989)
Percent White (District)
Property Taxes
cut1
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cut2
cut3
cut4
var(_cons[district])
Observations
Number of groups

(0.13)
-0.90***
(0.16)

(0.14)
-0.89***
(0.16)

0.00*
(0.00)
1.18***
(0.16)
-0.04
(0.30)
-0.00
(0.00)
-

0.00
(0.00)
1.22***
(0.16)
-0.07
(0.30)
-0.00
(0.00)
0.09*
(0.04)
-2.89***
(0.51)
-1.50**
(0.51)
0.23
(0.51)
1.84***
(0.51)
0.55***
(0.06)
9,138
759

-3.94***
(0.30)
-2.46***
(0.29)
-0.71*
(0.29)
0.91**
(0.29)
0.60***
(0.06)
10,369
854

Source: National Center for Education Statistics CCD public school data 2016-2017, 2018-2019 school years in: Alabama, Arkansas, Arizona, Florida, Indiana,
Louisiana, Mississippi, New Mexico, North Carolina, South Carolina, Ohio, Texas, Utah, Wisconsin. Notes Percent Latinx thresholds are categorical based on
Table 2. Charter status, rating, prior/ recent mandates and region variables are dichotomous. District poverty is an income-to-poverty ratio and tax revenue is
shown in thousands. Property taxes are transformed into the natural log. Indices based on demographic data available for students in grades Pre-K through 6
when demographic enrollment > 5. Districts include schools>1. Metropolis includes districts>1 and demographic enrollment>100. Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.

TABLE 7. Multi-level ordered logistic regression results for Metropolitan-level Black-White Segregation (D).
B-W Between (D),
B-W Between (D),
VARIABLES
Model 1
Model 2
B-W Between (D)
20-41 percent Black
42-62 percent Black
63-82 percent Black
83-100 percent Black
B-W Between (D) * 20-41 percent Black
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B-W Between (D) * 42-62 percent Black
B-W Between (D) * 63-82 percent Black
B-W Between (D) * 83-100 percent Black
School-level variables
Percent Latinx (School)
Percent Poverty (FRL)
Charter
Letter Rating
South

0.00
(0.00)
0.05
(0.11)
0.09
(0.16)
0.07
(0.20)
0.27
(0.30)
-0.01*
(0.00)
-0.01***
(0.00)
-0.02***
(0.00)
-0.03***
(0.01)

-0.00
(0.00)
0.01
(0.12)
-0.07
(0.17)
-0.06
(0.21)
0.30
(0.33)
-0.01*
(0.00)
-0.01**
(0.00)
-0.02***
(0.00)
-0.03***
(0.01)

-0.01***
(0.00)
-0.01***
(0.00)
0.30***
(0.08)
-0.06
(0.22)
-0.62*
(0.25)

-0.01***
(0.00)
-0.01***
(0.00)
0.31***
(0.09)
0.12
(0.22)
-0.60*
(0.26)

Midwest
District-level variables
District Poverty (IPR)
Recent Mandate (1990-2003)
Prior Mandate (1980-1989)
Property Taxes
Metropolitan-level variables
Percent White (Metro)
cut1

127

cut2
cut3
cut4
var(_cons[msa])
var(_cons[msa>district])
Observations
Number of groups

0.00**
(0.00)

0.00
(0.00)

1.12***
(0.23)
0.20
(0.29)
-0.01*
(0.00)
-

1.18***
(0.23)
0.19
(0.29)
-0.01
(0.00)
0.13**
(0.04)

0.26
(0.15)
-4.18***
(0.36)
-2.70***
(0.36)
-0.95**
(0.36)
0.67
(0.36)
0.11**
(0.04)
0.44***
(0.06)
10,369
112

0.36*
(0.16)
-2.55***
(0.62)
-1.16
(0.62)
0.57
(0.62)
2.19***
(0.62)
0.12**
(0.04)
0.43***
(0.06)
9,138
102

Source: National Center for Education Statistics CCD public school data 2016-2017, 2018-2019 school years in: Alabama, Arkansas, Arizona, Florida, Indiana,
Louisiana, Mississippi, New Mexico, North Carolina, South Carolina, Ohio, Texas, Utah, Wisconsin. Notes: Percent Black thresholds are categorical based on
Table 2. Charter status, rating, prior/ recent mandates and region variables are dichotomous. District poverty is an income-to-poverty ratio and tax revenue is
shown in thousands. Property taxes are transformed into the natural log. Indices based on demographic data available for students in grades Pre-K through 6
when demographic enrollment > 5. Districts include schools>1. Metropolis includes districts>1 and demographic enrollment>100. Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.

TABLE 8. Multi-level ordered logistic regression results for Metropolitan-level Latinx-White Segregation (D).
L-W Between (D),
L-W Between (D),
VARIABLES

Model 1

Model 2

L-W Between (D)

0.00
(0.01)
-0.18
(0.18)
0.01
(0.21)
-0.43
(0.25)
-1.06***
(0.30)
0.00
(0.01)
-0.01*
(0.01)
-0.01
(0.01)
0.01
(0.01)

-0.00
(0.01)
-0.18
(0.19)
-0.23
(0.22)
-0.59*
(0.25)
-1.24***
(0.31)
0.00
(0.01)
-0.01
(0.01)
-0.01
(0.01)
0.01
(0.01)

-0.01***
(0.00)
-0.01***
(0.00)
0.29***
(0.08)
0.20
(0.15)
0.05
(0.22)

-0.01***
(0.00)
-0.01***
(0.00)
0.30***
(0.09)
0.29
(0.16)
0.22
(0.23)

5-29 percent Latinx
30-55 percent Latinx
56-80 percent Latinx
81-100 percent Latinx
L-W Between (D) * 5-29 percent Latinx
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L-W Between (D) * 30-55 percent Latinx
L-W Between (D) * 56-80 percent Latinx
L-W Between (D) * 81-100 percent Latinx
School-level variables
Percent Black (School)
Percent Poverty (FRL)
Charter
Letter Rating
South

Midwest
District-level variables
District Poverty (IPR)
Recent Mandate (1990-2003)
Prior Mandate (1980-1989)

-0.62*
(0.25)

-0.59*
(0.26)

0.00**
(0.00)
1.12***
(0.23)
0.14
(0.29)

0.00
(0.00)
1.19***
(0.24)
0.12
(0.29)
0.13**
(0.04)

-0.01
(0.00)
-3.96***
(0.42)
-2.48***
(0.42)
-0.74
(0.42)
0.89*
(0.42)
0.12**
(0.04)
0.44***
(0.05)
10,369
112

-0.00
(0.01)
-2.43***
(0.65)
-1.05
(0.65)
0.68
(0.65)
2.30***
(0.65)
0.13**
(0.04)
0.42***
(0.05)
9,138
102

Property Taxes
Metropolitan-level variables
Percent White (Metro)
cut1
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cut2
cut3
cut4
var(_cons[msa])
var(_cons[msa>district])
Observations
Number of groups

Source: National Center for Education Statistics CCD public school data 2016-2017, 2018-2019 school years in: Alabama, Arkansas, Arizona, Florida, Indiana,
Louisiana, Mississippi, New Mexico, North Carolina, South Carolina, Ohio, Texas, Utah, Wisconsin. Notes: Percent Latinx thresholds are categorical based on
Table 2. Charter status, rating, prior/ recent mandates and region variables are dichotomous. District poverty is an income-to-poverty ratio and tax revenue is
shown in thousands. Property taxes are transformed into the natural log. Indices based on demographic data available for students in grades Pre-K through 6
when demographic enrollment > 5. Districts include schools>1. Metropolis includes districts>1 and demographic enrollment>100. Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.

TABLE 9. Average marginal effects associated with categorical comparisons of schools’ Black student composition : By
Metropolitan-level Black-White segregation.
VARIABLES

A

B

C

D

F

.225

.307

.302

.114

.053

-.034
-.071
-.083
-.089

-.015
-.039
-.049
-.067

.019
.036
.040
.034

.019
.043
.053
.066

.012
.030
.039
.057

40.96- vs. 19.8162.11- vs. 19.8183.27- vs. 19.81-

-.036
-.048
-.055

-.023
-.034
-.052

.017
.021
.015

.024
.034
.047

.018
.027
.001

62.11- vs. 40.9683.27- vs. 40.96-

…
…

…
-.028

…
…

…
…

…
…

83.27- vs. 62.11-

…

…

…

…

…

.200

.325

.292

.121

.062

-.054
-.101
-.124
-.145

-.026
-.066
-.094
-.124

.030
.050
.054
.052

.029
.065
.087
.110

.021
.053
.077
.108

-.047
-.070
-.091

-.040
-.067
-.098

.020
.024
.022

.036
.058
.080

.032
.056
.087

All Metropolitan Regions
Average Predictions
Pr (y | base)
19.81- vs. 040.96- vs. 062.11- vs. 083.27- vs. 0-
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Metropolitan Regions with Medium to High
Levels of B-W Between (D) Segregation: >30
Average Predictions
Pr (y | base)
19.81- vs. 040.96- vs. 062.11- vs. 083.27- vs. 040.96- vs. 19.8162.11- vs. 19.8183.27- vs. 19.81-

Schools Districts
9,138

6,616

761

659

MSAs
102

60

62.11- vs. 40.9683.27- vs. 40.96-

…
-.044

…
-.057

…
…

…
.044

…
.055

83.27- vs. 62.11-

…

…

…

…

…

.275

.263

.331

.096

.035

…
…
…

…
…
…

…
…
…

…
…
…

…
…
…

40.96- vs. 19.8162.11- vs. 19.8183.27- vs. 19.81-

…
…
…

…
…
…

…
…
…

…
…
…

…
…
…

62.11- vs. 40.9683.27- vs. 40.96-

…
…

…
…

…
…

…
…

…
…

83.27- vs. 62.11-

…

…

…

…

…

Metropolitan Regions with Low Levels of
B-W Between (D) Segregation: ≤30
Average Predictions
Pr (y | base)
19.81- vs. 040.96- vs. 062.11- vs. 083.27- vs. 0-

2,522

102

42
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Source: National Center for Education Statistics CCD public school data 2016-2017, 2018-2019 school years in: Alabama, Arkansas, Arizona, Florida, Indiana,
Louisiana, Mississippi, New Mexico, North Carolina, South Carolina, Ohio, Texas, Utah, Wisconsin. Notes: Only significant coefficients are shown (p<0.05).
Based on continuous measures of Black students and 1 SD increase. Indices based on demographic data available for students in grades Pre-K through 6 when
demographic enrollment > 5. Districts include schools>1. Metropolis includes districts>1 and demographic enrollment>100.

TABLE 10. Average marginal effects associated with categorical comparisons of schools’ Latinx student composition : By
metropolitan-level Latinx-White segregation.
VARIABLES

A

B

C

D

F

.224

.308

.303

.113

.053

…
-.078
-.114
-.126

…
-.027
-.047
-.055

…
.044
.063
.068

…
.037
.059
.068

…
.023
.039
.045

30.13- vs. 4.2755.99- vs. 4.2781.85- vs. 4.27-

-.057
-.093
-.105

-.023
-.043
-.051

.032
.050
.056

.29
.051
.059

.018
.034
.041

55.99- vs. 30.1381.85- vs. 30.13-

-.036
-.048

-.020
-.029

.018
.024

.022
.031

.016
.022

81.85- vs. 55.99-

…

…

…

…

…

.207

.325

.289

.119

.061

…
-.087
-.116
-.104

…
-.031
-.058
.048

…
.048
.059
.055

…
.041
.064
.055

…
.028
.051
.042

-.062
-.091
-.079

-.026
-.053
-.043

.034
.045
.041

.032
.054
.045

.022
.044
.036

All Metropolitan Regions
Average Predictions
Pr (y | base)
4.27- vs. 030.13- vs. 055.99- vs. 081.85- vs. 0-
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Metropolitan Regions with Medium to High
Levels of L-W Between (D) Segregation: >30
Average Predictions
Pr (y | base)
4.27- vs. 030.13- vs. 055.99- vs. 081.85- vs. 030.13- vs. 4.2755.99- vs. 4.2781.85- vs. 4.27-

Schools Districts
9,138

5,706

761

548

MSAs
102

41

55.99- vs. 30.1381.85- vs. 30.13-

-.029
…

-.027
…

…
…

.023
…

.022
…

81.85- vs. 55.99-

…

…

…

…

…

.255

.280

.321

.103

.042

…
…
…
-.108

…
…
…
-.042

…
…
…
.062

…
…
…
.056

…
…
…
.032

30.13- vs. 4.2755.99- vs. 4.2781.85- vs. 4.27-

…
…
-.102

…
…
-.043

…
…
.058

…
…
.055

…
…
.032

55.99- vs. 30.1381.85- vs. 30.13-

…
-.076

…
-.035

…
.042

…
.044

…
.025

81.85- vs. 55.99-

-.063

-.031

.034

.038

.048

Metropolitan Regions with Low Levels of
L-W Between (D) Segregation: ≤30
Average Predictions
Pr (y | base)
4.27- vs. 030.13- vs. 055.99- vs. 081.85- vs. 0-

3,432

213

61
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Source: National Center for Education Statistics CCD public school data 2016-2017, 2018-2019 school years in: Alabama, Arkansas, Arizona, Florida, Indiana,
Louisiana, Mississippi, New Mexico, North Carolina, South Carolina, Ohio, Texas, Utah, Wisconsin. Notes: Only significant coefficients are shown (p<0.05).
Based on continuous measures of Latinx students and 1 SD increase. Indices based on demographic data available for students in grades Pre-K through 6 when
demographic enrollment > 5. Districts include schools>1. Metropolis includes districts>1 and demographic enrollment>100.

TABLE 11. Descriptive statistics for all parents included in the experiment.
VARIABLES
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Sociodemographic Characteristics
Political Views (extremely liberal
to extremely conservative)
Education (less than high school
to graduate school)
Age
Female
Race/ethnicity
White
Black
Latinx
Asian
Number of Children
1 or 2
3 or more
Type of School Children Attends/ed
Public
Private
Charter
Voucher
Other*
Region*
South
Northeast
Midwest
West

Mean/Prop

St. Dev./Std. Err.

Min.

Max

3.18

1.43

1

6

3.92

1.01

1

6

34.83
.38

8.78
.02

18
0

73
1

.66
.23
.05
.06

.03
.02
.01
.01

0
0
0
0

1
1
1
1

.79
.21

.02
.02

0
0

1
1

.63
.27
.05
.03
.01

.02
.02
.01
.01
.01

0
0
0
0
0

1
1
1
1
1

.35
.19
.15
.21

.02
.19
.02
.01

0
0
0
0

1
1
1
1

Sources: Original data collected on Qualtrics via Amazon Mechanical Turk Panel. Notes: Referent for female is male. 6 respondents indicated that they
homeschooled their child. 40 respondents did not provide state location. N=414.

TABLE 12. Ordinary least squares regression results from original survey experiment for perceptions of school quality.
VARIABLES

B Rating
C Rating
D Rating
F Rating
Female
Political Views
Education
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Northeast
Midwest
West
US-broadly
Age
Black
Latinx
Asian

Quality 1

Quality 2

-0.296
(0.223)
-1.029***
(0.221)
-1.686***
(0.219)
-1.587***
(0.233)

-0.336
(0.228)
-1.013***
(0.228)
-1.706***
(0.224)
-1.630***
(0.238)
0.016
(0.155)
0.055
(0.053)
-0.076
(0.074)
-0.022
(0.208)
-0.230
(0.225)
-0.212
(0.203)
-0.278
(0.281)
0.006
(0.009)
-0.123
(0.185)
-0.243
(0.331)
0.162
(0.328)

3 or more children
Private School
Charter
Voucher
Other
Constant
Observations
R-squared

4.143***
(0.158)
421
0.180

-0.012
(0.187)
0.201
(0.174)
-0.398
(0.335)
0.207
(0.446)
-1.327*
(0.607)
4.192***
(0.479)
413
0.211

Sources: Original data collected on Qualtrics via Amazon Mechanical Turk Panel. Notes. Referents are A Rating, Male, South, White, 1-2 children
and Public School. N=414. Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.
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TABLE 13. Ordinary least squares regression results from original survey experiment for enrollment decisions.
VARIABLES

B Rating
C Rating
D Rating
F Rating
Female
Political Views
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Education
Northeast
Midwest
West
US-broadly
Age
Black
Latinx
Asian

Enroll 1

Enroll 2

0.118
(0.240)
-0.933***
(0.238)
-1.070***
(0.235)
-1.076***
(0.249)

0.138
(0.237)
-0.895***
(0.237)
-1.147***
(0.232)
-1.059***
(0.245)
-0.422**
(0.161)
-0.106
(0.056)
0.042
(0.077)
-0.003
(0.215)
-0.330
(0.233)
-0.242
(0.211)
0.158
(0.291)
0.002
(0.009)
0.342
(0.191)
-0.024
(0.349)
-0.160
(0.340)

3 or more children
Private School
Charter
Voucher
Other
Constant
Observations
R-squared

4.048***
(0.170)
419
0.107

-0.151
(0.194)
0.188
(0.181)
0.751*
(0.353)
1.074*
(0.462)
-1.395*
(0.628)
4.248***
(0.496)
411
0.198

Sources: Original data collected on Qualtrics via Amazon Mechanical Turk Panel. Notes: Referents are A Rating, Male, South, White, 1-2 children and Public
School. N=414. Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.
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A NATION RATED?
APPENDICES
APPENDIX A. Key Supreme Court and congressional decisions concerning segregation.
Plessy v Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896): The Supreme Court concluded that racial segregation did not
constitute discrimination under the Fourteenth Amendment, so long as the separate facilities were
equal. The doctrine of “separate but equal,” meant that the federal government sanctioned
segregation.
Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (“Brown I”): The Supreme Court
unanimously concluded that state-imposed segregated schools were “inherently unequal” and
mush be abolished. The ruling stuck down the “separate but equal” doctrine.
Brown II, 349 U.S. 294 (1955): The Supreme Court attempted to define how and when desegregation
would be achieved. The Court ruled that desegregation should occur with “all deliberate speed.”
The Civil Rights Act of 1991 (Pub. L. 102-166) (CRA): The act embodied two key aspects pertaining to
education and segregation. First, it authorized the Attorney General to initiate class action law
suits against districts failing to comply with Brown. Second, it provided the Secretary of
Education to withhold federal funding if districts excluded on the basis of race.
Green v. County School Board of New Kent County, 391 U.S. 430 (1968): The Supreme Court ruled that
schools must dismantle segregated dual (or segregated) systems “root and branch” and that
desegregation must be achieved with respect to facilities, staff, faculty, extracurricular activities
and transportation. These factors became the standard by which to determine whether school
districts achieved “unitary status” or fully integrated schools.
Alexander v. Holmes County [Mississippi] Board of Education, 396 U.S. 19 (1969): The Supreme Court
unanimously declared that desegregated systems must be achieved “at once” and “…operate now
and hereafter only unitary schools.”
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Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1 (1971): The Supreme Court ruled that
desegregation must be achieved in each of a district’s schools to the greatest possible extent and
approved bussing as a means to do so.
Keyes v. Denver School District No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973): This was the first ruling to extend school
segregation orders beyond de jure states – in the North and West where no explicit statutes
required segregation. The Supreme Court rules that districts were responsible for policies that
resulted in segregation in the school system, including constructing schools in racially isolated
neighborhood and gerrymandering catchment zones. If intentional segregation was found on the
part of the school board in a portion of the district, then the entire district was presumed to be
illegally segregated. This was the first ruling which also recognized Latinxs’ right to
desegregation.
Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974): The Supreme Court blocked efforts for interdistrict, citysuburban desegregation as a means to integrate racially isolated urban schools. The Court
prohibited such remedies unless the plaintiffs could demonstrate that the suburbs or state took
specific actions to contribute to the segregation of the city.
Milliken v. Bradley II, 433 U.S. 267 (1977): The Supreme Court ruled that a court could order a state to
pay for educational programs to repair the harms caused by segregation.
Riddick v. School Board of the City of Norfolk, Virginia, 784 F.2d 521 (4th Cir. 1986): The first federal
court ruling that permitted a school district, once declared unitary, to dismantle its desegregation
plan and return to local government control.
Board of Education of Oklahoma v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237 (1991): The Supreme Court ruled that a
school district, once declared unitary, released the district from its obligations to maintain
desegregation.
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Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467 (1992): The Supreme Court ruled that school districts could be partially
released from their desegregation obligations even if integration had not been achieved in all the
specific areas determined in Green v. County School Board of New Kent County.
Missouri v. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. 2038 (1995): The Supreme Court ruled that Milliken II equalization
remedies should be limited in time and extent and that districts need not show any actual
correction of the educational harms of segregation.
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003): The Supreme Court ruled that within Higher Education the use
of an applicant's race as one factor in an admissions policy of a public educational institution does
not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Instead, the Court declared
that, if narrowly tailored, it promotes a diverse student body and can be used as a holistic process
to evaluate applicants along with other factors.
Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007): The Supreme
Court ruled that the district’s goal of preventing racial imbalance did not meet the standards for a
constitutionally legitimate use of race. Instead, the Court declared that voluntary race-conscious
student assignments to schools violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Source: Adjusted from Orfield and Eaton 1996: xxi; summaries of key opinions and decisions.
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APPENDIX B. Accountability and reporting current systems across the United States.
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States
Alabama

Rating system
A-F

Minimum factors in elementary and middle school ratings
Student Achievement, Achievement Gap, Student Growth

Alaska
Arizona

Index
A-F

Arkansas
California

A-F
Index

Student Achievement, Attendance/Chronic Absenteeism, School Growth/Progress,
Student Achievement, English Language Proficiency/Progress + multiple measures of
school quality
Student Achievement, English Language Proficiency/Progress, Student Growth
Student Achievement, Attendance/Chronic Absenteeism, Dropout/Reenrollment Rates

Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
D.C.
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho

Accreditation
1-5
Descriptive
Not in policy
A-F
Index
Not in policy
Not in policy

Illinois
Indiana
Iowa

Descriptive
A-F
Accreditation

Kansas

Accreditation

Kentucky
Louisiana

Other
A-F

Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi

Not in policy
Index
1-5
Not in policy
Not in policy
A-F

Student Achievement, Test Participation, Attendance/Chronic Absenteeism + 12
quality measures.
Student Achievement, School Climate, English Proficiency/Progress
Student Achievement, Achievement Gap, Dropout/Reenrollment Rates + dropout
accumulation
Student Achievement, Readiness
Student Achievement, School Climate + 3 school quality indicators
Student Achievement, Student Growth
Student Achievement, Achievement Gap, Growth + enrichment experiences
Student Achievement, Student Growth, Achievement Gap, Attendance

Missouri

Accreditation

Student Achievement, Student Growth, Achievement Gap, Readiness, Attendance

Montana

Accreditation

Student Achievement, Science Achievement Growth

Student Achievement, Student Growth, Achievement Gap, Literacy/Reading (3/4 th)
Student Achievement
Student Achievement, Attendance/Chronic Absenteeism
Student Achievement, Student Growth, Acceleration Readiness, Achievement Gap
Student Achievement, Student Growth, Achievement Gap
Student Achievement, Dropout/Reenrollment Rates, Attendance/Chronic Absenteeism
Student Achievement, Achievement Gaps, English Proficiency, Literacy, Readiness,
Student/Parent Engagement
Student Achievement, Student Growth, Readiness, Achievement Gap
Student Achievement, Achievement Gap, Student Growth
Student Achievement

Statute and regulation citations
Ala.Code 1975 § 16-6C-2; Alabama
Administrative Code 290-4-1.03
4 AAC 06.812
A.R.S. § 15-241
A.C.A. § 6-15-2105, -2108
West's Ann.Cal.Educ.Code § 52052,
52052.1
C.R.S.A. § 22-11-204, 207
C.G.S.A. § 10-223e
14 Del.C. § 154; 14 Del. Admin. Code 103
West's F.S.A. § 1008.34
Ga. Code Ann., § 20-14-33
HRS § 302A-1004
IDAPA 08.02.03.112
105 ILCS 5/2-3.25a
IC 20-31-8-3; 511 IAC 6.2-10-3 - 6.2-10-6
I.C.A. § 256.7; Iowa Admin. Code 28112.8(256)
K.A.R. 91-31-32
KRS § 158.6455
La. Admin Code. tit. 28, Pt XI, § 301, §
405, 409, & 413, § 1101
20-A M.R.S.A. § 6214
MD Code, Education, § 7-203
603 CMR 2.02-2.06
M.C.L.A. 380.1280.
M.S.A. § 120B.11, 120B.35
Miss. Code Ann. § 37-17-6; Miss. Admin.
Code 7-1-10:I-2, 7-1-10:II-7
5 Mo. Code of State Regulations 20100.105
Mont.Admin.R. 10.55.601-607
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Nebraska

Tiers of support

Student Achievement, Student Growth

Nevada
New Hamp.
New Jersey
New Mexico

Not in policy
Not in policy
Tiers of support
A-F

New York

Tiers of support

Student Achievement, Student Growth
Input based and performance based system
Student Achievement, Student Growth
Student Achievement, Achievement Gap, Attendance, School Climate, School
Growth, Student/Parent Engagement
Student Achievement

N. Carolina
North Dakota

A-F
Not in policy

Student Achievement, English Proficiency, Science Growth, Student Growth
-

Ohio

A-F

Student Achievement, Achievement Gap, Literacy/Reading, Student Growth

Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island

A-F
1-5
Not in policy
Not in policy

Student Achievement, Student Growth, English Proficiency, Absenteeism
Student Achievement, Growth, Test Participation, Achievement Gap
Student Achievement, Attendance
Student Achievement

S. Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas

Descriptive
Descriptive
Tiers of support
Descriptive

Student Achievement, English Proficiency, Student Growth
Student Achievement, Growth, Attendance
Student Achievement, Student Growth + other
Student Achievement, Achievement Gap, Growth

Utah
Vermont

A-F
Not in policy

Student Achievement, Achievement Gap, Growth
Student Achievement, Test Participation

Virginia

Accreditation

Student Achievement

Washington
West Virginia

Tiers of support
A-F

Student Achievement
Student Achievement, Achievement Gap, Growth, Attendance, Literacy/Reading
(3/4th) + at-risk reduction
Wisconsin
1-5 stars
Student Achievement, Achievement Gap, Growth, Attendance
Wyoming
Descriptive
Student Achievement, Achievement Gap, Growth, English Proficiency
Source: Adjusted from the Education Commission of the States 2018 (http://ecs.force.com/mbdata/mbQuest6S?rep=SA171)

Neb.Rev.St. § 79-760.06; Neb. Admin. R.
& Regs. Tit. 92, Ch. 10, § 010 & Appendix
G
N.R.S. 385A.720, 385A.600, 385A.670
N.H. Rev. Stat. § 193-E:3-b - E:3-d
N.J.A.C. 6A:33–2.1
N. M. S. A. 1978, § 22-2E-4; N.M. Admin.
Code 6.19.8
McKinney's Education Law § 211-a, 211-f;
8 NYCRR 100.18(i)-(j), 100.19
N.C.G.S.A. § 115C-83.15-.16;
NDCC, 15.1-02-17; Accreditation system:
NDCC, 15.1-06-06
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3302.03; Ohio
Admin. Code 3301-28-9, 3301-28-10
70 Okl.St.Ann. § 1210.541, 1210.545
O.R.S. § 329.105, 329.115
22 Pa. Code § 403.3
Gen.Laws 1956, § 16-7.1-5; R.I. Admin.
Code 21-2-53:G-15-3
Code 1976 § 59-18-900
ARSD 24:55:03:01-:05
T. C. A. § 49-1-602
V.T.C.A., Education Code § 39.053; 19
TAC §97.1001
U.C.A. 1953 § 53A-1-1105 - 1108
16 V.S.A. § 165; Vt. Admin. Code 7-18:2500 - 2582
VA Code Ann. § 22.1-253.13:3; 8 VAC 20131-280 & -300
West's RCWA 28A.657.110, 28A.305.130
2016 WV REG TEXT 422861 (NS) Section 126.13.4, 126.13.5
W.S.A. 115.38, 115.385
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 21-2-204

APPENDIX C. Accountability and weighting for states included in the analysis.
Rating system

Alabama

A-F

Arizona

A-F

Arkansas

A-F

Florida

A-F

Indiana

A-F

Louisiana

A-F

Mississippi

A-F

New Mexico

A-F
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States

Categories by weight percentage of
contribution to overall elementary rating
achievement (40%/weighted); Growth
(50%/weighted); Absenteeism (10%).
Weights based on achievement levels (IIV: 0-1.25); Growth categories (low,
average high: 0, 1, 1.5).
Proficiency (30%); Growth (50%); ELL
(10%, if ELL pop>20) Readiness (10%)
Achievement (35%); Growth for ELP
(50%); Progress to ELP (weighted by
ELP); School quality and student success
(15%).
Sum of points for each divided by total
available: Math achievement (100);
English achievement (100); Learning gains
ELA (100) Learning gains math (100);
Learning gains lowest 25% ELA (100);
Learning gains lowest 25% math (100);
Science (100); ELP Progress (100).
Performance on English; Performance on
Math; Growth in English; Growth in Math.
Can not receive an A unless the school has
reduced achievement gaps in each student
subgroup.
Performance (75%); Student Progress
(25%).
Out of 700 points: Reading (95); Math
(95); Science (95); Growth in reading for
all students (95); Growth in math for all
students (95); Growth in reading for lowest
25% of students (95); Growth in math for
lowest 25% of students (95); English
progress (35).
Proficiency (25); Value-Added (15);
School Improvement (10); Improvement of
higher-performing students (e.g. growth,

State Source
https://www.alsde.edu/sec/acct/Resources/AL%20Technical%20Guide%20January%20
2018.pdf

https://azsbe.az.gov/sites/default/files/media/FINAL%20A-F%20Plan_1.pdf
http://dese.ade.arkansas.gov/public/userfiles/Legal/Legal-Current%20Rules/ade_334_-_Rules_Governing_the_School_Rating_System.pdf

http://www.fldoe.org/core/fileparse.php/18534/urlt/SchoolGradesCalcGuide19.pdf

https://www.doe.in.gov/sites/default/files/accountability/f-accountabilitypresentation.pdf

https://www.louisianabelieves.com/docs/default-source/teacher-leader-summit/2018teacher-leader-summit/s030--what's-new-in-louisiana's-school-and-school-systemaccountability-policies.pdf?sfvrsn=2
https://msrc.mdek12.org/downloads/MSRCUserGuide.pdf

https://aae.ped.state.nm.us/SchoolGradingLinks/1718/Technical%20Assistance%20for
%20Educators/Technical%20Guide%202018.pdf

N. Carolina

A-F

Ohio

A-F

20); Improvement of lowest-performing
students (20); Attendance (5);
Classroom/Parent Survey (5). Bonus
Points (e.g. reducing truancy, engaging
families etc. +5).
Achievement (80%); Growth (20%).

http://www.ncpublicschools.org/docs/accountability/reporting/2018/documentation/busi
ness-rules/accountability-model.pdf
http://education.ohio.gov/getattachment/Topics/Data/Report-Card-Resources/ReportCard-Guide.pdf.aspx
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Achievement (20%); Progress (20%);
Graduation Rate (15%); Gap Closing
(15%); Improving At-Risk K-3 Readers
(15%); Prepared for Success (15%).
S. Carolina
Descriptive:
Points: Achievement (40); Preparing for
https://ed.sc.gov/data/report-cards/sc-school-report-card/files/accountability-manual/
Unsatisfactory
Success (10); Progress (20); Lowest 20
to Excellent
percent progress (20); School Quality (10).
With 20+ Els: Achievement (35);
Preparing for Success (10); Progress
(17.5); Lowest 20 percent progress (17.5);
School Quality (10); ELP (10).
Texas
A-F
Achievement (30%); Growth (50%); ELP
https://tea.texas.gov/sites/default/files/Entire%202018%20Accountability%20Manual.p
(10%); Achievement STARR (10%)
df
Utah
Descriptive:
Achievement (37%); Growth (37%); EL
https://www.schools.utah.gov/file/70235d75-cf35-4e04-9d2b-34ff388968b5
Critical Needs
Progress (9%); Growth of Lowest 25
to Exemplary
percent (17%). If percent of Els<10,
weight is distributed to Achievement
(41%); Growth (41%); Growth of Lowest
(18%).
Wisconsin
1-5 stars:
Weighted average: Achievement (100);
https://dpi.wi.gov/sites/default/files/imce/accountability/pdf/Report%20Card%20Techni
Fails to meet to Growth (100) based on percent of students cal%20Guide%202016-17.pdf
Significantly
who are economically disadvantaged.
exceeds
Combined with Closing Gaps (100); Onexpectations
Track Readiness (100) and deductions.
Source: The Departments of Education for: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, Indiana, Louisiana, Mississippi, New Mexico, North Carolina, South Carolina,
Ohio, Texas, Utah, Wisconsin. Notes: States use various measures to calculate key components. Components are often the result of various weights and
measures. For instance, Ohio’s Progress component accounts for 20% of the overall rating, but this component is a result of multiple measures. The final
component is a result of All Students (55%); Gifted Students (15%); Students with Disabilities (15%) and Student’s whose performance is in the lowest 20
percent (15%). Similar methods are present across states and measures.

APPENDIX D. Metropolitan and district-level Black-White and Latinx-White segregation (D) by metropolis.
Metropolis, State
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Abilene, TX
Akron, OH
Albuquerque, NM
Alexandria, LA
Amarillo, TX
Anniston, AL
Appleton/Oshkosh/Neenah, WI
Asheville, NC
Auburn/Opelika, AL
Austin/San Marcos, TX
Baton Rouge, LA
Beaumont/Port Arthur, TX
Biloxi/Gulfport/Pascagoula, MS
Birmingham, AL
Brazoria, TX
Bryan/College Station, TX
Canton/Massillon, OH
Charleston/North Charleston, SC
Charlotte/Gastonia/Rock Hill, NC/SC
Cincinnati, OH/KY/IN
Cleveland/Lorain/Elyria, OH
Columbia, SC
Columbus, OH
Corpus Christi, TX
Dallas, TX
Dayton/Springfield, OH
Daytona Beach, FL
Decatur, AL

B-W Between Districts
28.68
56.69
14.44
0.00
30.68
35.28
21.36
25.50
26.55
33.52
66.88
72.19
29.82
52.69
17.32
30.71
46.63
10.00
37.27
72.33
69.53
44.51
56.22
35.94
48.04
47.79
2.41
46.44

L-W Between Districts
23.08
28.37
10.92
0.00
23.62
35.24
19.19
13.69
19.19
34.52
48.95
54.52
37.13
32.33
14.15
42.06
25.22
8.45
31.25
41.48
52.45
30.67
38.37
28.67
50.48
28.36
7.25
38.79

B-W Within Districts
69.64
0.27
34.59
35.01
11.82
3.63
15.92
40.67
1.96
34.60
5.36
6.35
19.84
38.65
22.14
40.92
21.19
62.21
23.59
8.19
5.56
27.94
39.03
35.45
31.87
20.70
20.70
51.07

L-W Within Districts
16.94
2.48
40.55
50.86
12.04
11.36
15.17
29.59
1.14
28.21
7.32
5.56
28.53
51.21
25.48
44.86
16.19
70.63
29.89
15.11
3.99
19.64
38.79
30.91
43.90
13.99
17.73
20.11

Metropolis, State (cont.)
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Dothan, AL
El Paso, TX
Elkhart/Goshen, IN
Fayetteville, NC
Fayetteville/Springdale/Rogers, AR
Florence, AL
Florence, SC
Fort Lauderdale, FL
Fort Myers/Cape Coral, FL
Fort Pierce/Port St. Lucie, FL
Fort Walton Beach, FL
Fort Wayne, IN
Fort Worth/Arlington, TX
Gainesville, FL
Galveston/Texas City, TX
Gary, IN
Goldsboro, NC
Green Bay, WI
Greensboro/Winston-Salem/High Point, NC
Greenville, NC
Greenville, SC
Greenville/Spartanburg/Anderson, SC
Hamilton/Middletown, OH
Hickory/Morganton/Lenoir, NC
Houma, LA
Houston, TX
Huntsville, AL
Indianapolis, IN

B-W Between Districts
40.25
9.74
32.90
1.75
25.64
41.04
10.47
0.00
0.00
37.71
0.00
43.36
51.46
1.38
54.01
68.88
8.10
40.72
33.81
8.96
14.22
32.63
24.37
27.07
10.22
44.94
34.83
64.81

L-W Between Districts
24.77
27.55
19.42
1.13
46.56
38.69
16.46
0.00
0.00
14.29
0.00
37.70
41.16
1.92
33.65
43.73
9.81
45.43
23.07
4.50
13.00
22.10
20.23
16.23
6.91
40.33
34.24
52.31

B-W Within Districts
51.66
26.34
3.44
42.03
32.60
5.58
13.75
57.98
55.16
33.39
35.96
64.61
5.56
38.92
38.57
3.74
45.34
32.73
53.78
36.73
25.73
11.61
23.81
24.14
39.29
64.74
60.83
32.43

L-W Within Districts
25.56
37.11
4.89
28.03
29.09
14.15
17.02
32.43
32.20
19.33
21.11
46.03
5.17
20.09
13.05
3.18
43.62
17.42
51.75
38.07
30.46
11.36
22.17
16.27
40.16
68.29
60.17
44.23

Metropolis, State (cont.)
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Jackson, MS
Jacksonville, FL
Jacksonville, NC
Janesville/Beloit, WI
Kenosha, WI
Killeen/Temple, TX
Kokomo, IN
Lafayette, IN
Lafayette, LA
Lake Charles, LA
Lakeland/Winter Haven, FL
Lima, OH
Little Rock/North Little Rock, AR
Longview/Marshall, TX
Lubbock, TX
Madison, WI
Mansfield, OH
Melbourne/Titusville/Palm Bay, FL
Miami, FL
Milwaukee/Waukesha, WI
Mobile, AL
Monroe, LA
Montgomery, AL
Muncie, IN
Myrtle Beach, SC
Naples, FL
New Orleans, LA
Ocala, FL
Odessa/Midland, TX

B-W Between Districts
39.64
38.00
0.00
53.47
20.70
36.71
40.80
33.12
11.61
19.96
0.00
51.48
54.05
46.83
42.46
42.17
57.80
0.00
0.00
66.55
32.10
16.70
56.65
45.56
0.00
0.00
44.14
0.00
8.51

L-W Between Districts
26.44
19.49
0.00
37.08
19.00
19.71
21.36
26.80
22.96
4.93
0.00
32.02
34.36
41.27
27.62
38.47
20.16
0.00
0.00
48.94
11.83
4.20
52.98
29.65
0.00
0.00
48.87
0.00
16.13

B-W Within Districts
12.27
48.07
36.26
19.88
47.05
16.97
21.88
22.96
39.38
47.53
29.55
17.44
58.51
8.80
51.08
7.28
5.31
41.79
70.36
19.84
59.57
61.39
57.80
12.02
39.72
57.02
57.92
35.01
34.43

L-W Within Districts
34.39
29.30
20.99
15.98
36.76
20.84
10.17
12.24
40.44
30.39
30.59
9.77
67.70
1.65
41.38
11.95
14.35
26.30
49.93
12.54
25.73
37.30
59.59
14.17
31.25
50.66
44.59
25.91
27.29

Metropolis, State (cont.)
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Orlando, FL
Panama City, FL
Pensacola, FL
Phoenix/Mesa, AZ
Pine Bluff, AR
Provo/Orem, UT
Punta Gorda, FL
Racine, WI
Raleigh/Durham/Chapel Hill, NC
Rocky Mount, NC
Salt Lake City/Ogden, UT
San Angelo, TX
San Antonio, TX
Sarasota/Bradenton, FL
Sheboygan, WI
Sherman/Denison, TX
Shreveport/Bossier City, LA
South Bend, IN
Sumter, SC
Tallahassee, FL
Tampa/St. Petersburg/Clearwater
Terre Haute, IN
Texarkana, TX/AR
Toledo, OH
Tucson, AZ
Tuscaloosa, AL
Tyler, TX
Victoria, TX
Waco, TX

B-W Between Districts
15.72
7.17
38.89
45.31
64.39
14.13
0.00
30.94
42.61
17.53
36.14
5.41
32.54
14.68
26.47
32.14
26.32
54.34
0.00
11.26
21.55
0.00
0.00
57.87
35.13
30.03
39.79
1.74
62.43

L-W Between Districts
16.12
42.70
10.42
46.57
28.61
24.31
0.00
27.21
25.52
6.40
37.17
0.07
30.59
21.02
24.38
35.23
9.29
46.36
0.00
33.47
28.01
0.00
0.00
28.89
34.41
1.18
42.07
4.85
53.48

B-W Within Districts
34.53
45.61
46.03
20.39
29.08
13.83
21.58
42.52
48.53
42.51
13.66
23.11
21.91
48.22
25.18
13.85
27.45
42.15
31.79
64.01
30.67
36.74
18.56
20.01
36.34
58.16
44.67
34.48
33.26

L-W Within Districts
19.73
39.89
29.59
20.10
22.41
31.52
15.61
41.29
44.74
37.29
26.53
24.51
57.60
31.21
29.23
29.31
20.26
19.25
32.38
39.74
23.06
17.94
7.19
16.31
40.47
52.96
65.24
33.52
30.57

Metropolis, State (cont.)
Wausau, WI
West Palm Beach/Boca Raton, FL
Wichita Falls, TX
Wilmington, NC
Youngstown/Warren, OH
Yuma, AZ

B-W Between Districts
9.03
0.47
16.94
12.45
63.89
17.55

L-W Between Districts
10.39
0.37
16.14
6.03
41.89
21.95

B-W Within Districts
21.57
59.36
39.77
56.88
1.58
33.25

L-W Within Districts
34.95
48.80
33.89
40.57
5.20
15.86

Source: National Center for Education Statistics CCD public school data 2016-2017, 2018-2019 school years in: Alabama, Arkansas, Arizona, Florida, Indiana,
Louisiana, Mississippi, New Mexico, North Carolina, South Carolina, Ohio, Texas, Utah, Wisconsin. Notes: Segregation calculated using Dissimilarity indices
(D). Notes: . Indices based on demographic data available for students in grades Pre-K through 6 when demographic enrollment > 5. Districts include schools>1.
Metropolis includes districts>1 and demographic enrollment>100. MSAs with levels (D) that exceed 60 are highlighted, indicating that nearly 40 percent of one
student demographic (e.g. whites) would have to relocate to balance the domain (e.g. district or school).
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APPENDIX E. Cross-tabulations of data for all schools: By fixed covariates using at(spec) option for metropolitan Black-White

segregation.
Percent Black
Constructed
Categories

151

0-

Total School-level
data for All levels
of
B-W Between (D)
6,994

Total School-level
data if
B-W Between (D) =
0
414

Total School-level
data if
B-W Between (D)
<30
1,926

Total School-level
data if
B-W Between (D)
>50
675

Total School-level
data if
B-W Between (D)
>70
98

19.81-

2,124

202

685

147

25

40.96-

960

86

347

103

19

62.11-

522

48

182

94

16

83.27- 100

196

24

74

35

7

Source: National Center for Education Statistics CCD public school data 2016-2017, 2018-2019 school years in: Alabama, Arkansas, Arizona, Florida, Indiana,
Louisiana, Mississippi, New Mexico, North Carolina, South Carolina, Ohio, Texas, Utah, Wisconsin. Notes: Percent Black thresholds are categorical based on
Table 2. Indices based on demographic data available for students in grades Pre-K through 6 when demographic enrollment > 5. Districts include schools>1.
Metropolis includes districts>1 and demographic enrollment>100.

APPENDIX F. Cross-tabulations of data for schools with an F rating: By fixed covariates using at(spec) option for metropolitan Black-

White segregation.
Percent Black
Constructed
Categories

Total School-level
data if
B-W Between (D)
=0
5

Total School-level
data if
B-W Between (D)
<30
75

Total School-level
data if
B-W Between (D)
>50
103

Total School-level
data if
B-W Between (D)
>70
14

19.81-

-

8

30

36

3

40.96-

-

3

23

23

1

62.11-

-

1

4

25

2

83.27- 100

-

1

2

10

3

152

0-

Total School-level
data for All levels
of
B-W Between (D)
-

Source: National Center for Education Statistics CCD public school data 2016-2017, 2018-2019 school years in: Alabama, Arkansas, Arizona, Florida, Indiana,
Louisiana, Mississippi, New Mexico, North Carolina, South Carolina, Ohio, Texas, Utah, Wisconsin. Notes: Percent Black thresholds are categorical based on
Table 2. Indices based on demographic data available for students in grades Pre-K through 6 when demographic enrollment > 5. Districts include schools>1.
Metropolis includes districts>1 and demographic enrollment>100.

APPENDIX G. Cross-tabulations of data for schools with an A rating: By fixed covariates using at(spec) option for metropolitan

Black-White segregation.
Percent Black
Constructed
Categories

Total School-level
data if
B-W Between (D) =
0
141

Total School-level
data if
B-W Between (D)
<30
449

Total School-level
data if
B-W Between (D)
>50
255

Total School-level
data if
B-W Between (D)
>70
12

19.81-

-

62

158

65

1

40.96-

-

27

71

31

1

62.11-

-

20

48

19

2

83.27- 100

-

9

23

0

0

153

0-

Total School-level
data for All levels
of
B-W Between (D)
-

Source: National Center for Education Statistics CCD public school data 2016-2017, 2018-2019 school years in: Alabama, Arkansas, Arizona, Florida, Indiana,
Louisiana, Mississippi, New Mexico, North Carolina, South Carolina, Ohio, Texas, Utah, Wisconsin. Notes: Percent Black thresholds are categorical based on
Table 2.Indices based on demographic data available for students in grades Pre-K through 6 when demographic enrollment > 5. Districts include schools>1.
Metropolis includes districts>1 and demographic enrollment>100.

.

APPENDIX H. Cross-tabulations of data for all schools: By fixed covariates using at(spec) option for metropolitan Latinx-White

segregation.

Percent Latinx
Constructed
Categories
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0-

Total School-level
data for All levels
of
L-W Between (D)
1,088

Total School-level
data if
L-W Between (D) =
0
40

Total School-level
data if
L-W Between (D)
<30
568

Total School-level
data if
L-W Between (D)
>40
268

Total School-level
data if
L-W Between (D)
>50
124

4.27-

5,567

349

2,467

1,894

743

30.13-

2,122

221

807

930

288

55.99-

1,365

88

391

678

201

81.85- 100

654

76

214

292

70

Source: National Center for Education Statistics CCD public school data 2016-2017, 2018-2019 school years in: Alabama, Arkansas, Arizona, Florida, Indiana,
Louisiana, Mississippi, New Mexico, North Carolina, South Carolina, Ohio, Texas, Utah, Wisconsin. Notes: Percent Latinx thresholds are categorical based on
Table 2. Indices based on demographic data available for students in grades Pre-K through 6 when demographic enrollment > 5. Districts include schools>1.
Metropolis includes districts>1 and demographic enrollment>100.

APPENDIX I. Cross-tabulations of data for schools with an F rating: By fixed covariates using at(spec) option for metropolitan Latinx-

White segregation.
Percent Latinx
Constructed
Categories

Total School-level
data if
L-W Between (D) =
0
5

Total School-level
data if
L-W Between (D)
<30
56

Total School-level
data if
L-W Between (D)
>40
26

Total School-level
data if
L-W Between (D)
>50
11

4.27-

-

8

80

99

42

30.13-

-

4

29

56

18

55.99-

-

1

19

30

12

81.85- 100

-

0

15

11

0

155

0-

Total School-level
data for All levels
of
L-W Between (D)
-

Source: National Center for Education Statistics CCD public school data 2016-2017, 2018-2019 school years in: Alabama, Arkansas, Arizona, Florida, Indiana,
Louisiana, Mississippi, New Mexico, North Carolina, South Carolina, Ohio, Texas, Utah, Wisconsin. Notes: Percent Latinx thresholds are categorical based on
Table 2. Indices based on demographic data available for students in grades Pre-K through 6 when demographic enrollment > 5. Districts include schools>1.
Metropolis includes districts>1 and demographic enrollment>100.

APPENDIX J. Cross-tabulations of data for schools with an A rating: By fixed covariates using at(spec) option for metropolitan

Latinx-White segregation.
Percent Latinx
Constructed
Categories

Total School-level
data if
L-W Between (D) =
0
8

Total School-level
data if
L-W Between (D)
<30
92

Total School-level
data if
L-W Between (D)
>40
44

Total School-level
data if
L-W Between (D)
>50
22

4.27-

-

107

505

546

245

30.13-

-

84

194

141

38

55.99-

-

35

90

84

13

81.85- 100

-

25

54

43

7

156

0-

Total School-level
data for All levels
of
L-W Between (D)
-

Source: National Center for Education Statistics CCD public school data 2016-2017, 2018-2019 school years in: Alabama, Arkansas, Arizona, Florida, Indiana,
Louisiana, Mississippi, New Mexico, North Carolina, South Carolina, Ohio, Texas, Utah, Wisconsin. Notes: Percent Latinx thresholds are categorical based on
Table 2. Indices based on demographic data available for students in grades Pre-K through 6 when demographic enrollment > 5. Districts include schools>1.
Metropolis includes districts>1 and demographic enrollment>100.

APPENDIX K. Additional Cut Points: Predictive Margins with 95 Percent CI. Metropolitan-level Black-White segregation (D), Black student
concentration and predicted school rating.
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Sources: The Departments of Education for the following states utilizing a similar 5-pt scale: Alabama, Arkansas, Arizona, Florida, Indiana, Louisiana,
Mississippi, New Mexico, North Carolina, South Carolina, Ohio, Texas, Utah, Wisconsin. Notes:. Appendix shows predicted probabilities of school rating for
varying levels of between-district Black-White segregation and percentage categories of Black student population within schools.

APPENDIX L. Additional Cut Points: Predictive Margins with 95 Percent CI. Metropolitan-level Black-White segregation (D), Black student
concentration and predicted school rating (Bar).
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Sources: The Departments of Education for the following states utilizing a similar 5-pt scale: Alabama, Arkansas, Arizona, Florida, Indiana, Louisiana,
Mississippi, New Mexico, North Carolina, South Carolina, Ohio, Texas, Utah, Wisconsin. Notes:. Appendix shows predicted probabilities of school rating for
varying levels of between-district Black-White segregation and percentage categories of Black student population within schools.

APPENDIX M. Additional Cut Points: Predictive Margins with 95 Percent CI. Metropolitan-level Latinx-White segregation (D), Latinx student
concentration and predicted school rating.
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Sources: The Departments of Education for the following states utilizing a similar 5-pt scale: Alabama, Arkansas, Arizona, Florida, Indiana, Louisiana,
Mississippi, New Mexico, North Carolina, South Carolina, Ohio, Texas, Utah, Wisconsin. Notes:. Appendix shows predicted probabilities of school rating for
varying levels of between-district Latinx-White segregation and percentage categories of Latinx student population within schools.

APPENDIX N. Additional Cut Points: Predictive Margins with 95 Percent CI. Metropolitan-level Latinx-White segregation (D), Latinx student
concentration and predicted school rating (Bar).
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Sources: The Departments of Education for the following states utilizing a similar 5-pt scale: Alabama, Arkansas, Arizona, Florida, Indiana, Louisiana,
Mississippi, New Mexico, North Carolina, South Carolina, Ohio, Texas, Utah, Wisconsin. Notes:. Appendix shows predicted probabilities of school rating for
varying levels of between-district Latinx-White segregation and percentage categories of Latinx student population within schools.

APPENDIX O. Predictive Margins from golotit2 output: Metropolitan-level Black-White segregation (D), Black student concentration and
predicted school rating (Bar).
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Sources: The Departments of Education for the following states utilizing a similar 5-pt scale: Alabama, Arkansas, Arizona, Florida, Indiana, Louisiana,
Mississippi, New Mexico, North Carolina, South Carolina, Ohio, Texas, Utah, Wisconsin. Notes: Appendix shows predicted probabilities of school rating for
varying levels of between-district Black-White segregation and percentage categories of Black student population within schools. Produced from gologit2
command with all covariates included in Model 2, Table 7 with robust clusters at the metropolitan-level.

APPENDIX P. Predictive Margins from golotit2 output: Metropolitan-level Latinx-White segregation (D), Latinx student concentration and
predicted school rating (Bar).
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Sources: The Departments of Education for the following states utilizing a similar 5-pt scale: Alabama, Arkansas, Arizona, Florida, Indiana, Louisiana,
Mississippi, New Mexico, North Carolina, South Carolina, Ohio, Texas, Utah, Wisconsin. Notes: Appendix shows predicted probabilities of school rating for
varying levels of between-district Latinx-White segregation and percentage categories of Latinx student population within schools. Produced from gologit2
command with all covariates included in Model 2, Table 8 with robust clusters at the metropolitan-level.

APPENDIX Q. Average marginal effects associated with a one standard deviation increase in percent Black: By metropolitan-level
Black-White segregation.
VARIABLES
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Schools

Districts

MSAs

All Metropolitan Regions
Average Predictions
Pr (y | base)
Percent Black
+SD
p-value

9,138

761

102

Metropolitan Regions with Medium to High
Levels of B-W Between (D) Segregation:
>30
Average Predictions
Pr (y | base)
Percent Black
+SD
p-value

6,616

Metropolitan Regions with Low Levels of
B-W Between (D) Segregation: ≤30
Average Predictions
Pr (y | base)
Percent Black
+SD
p-value

2,522

659

102

A

B

C

D

F

.226

.306

.300

.114

.054

-.036
.000

-.019
.000

.018
.000

.021
.000

.015
.000

.201

.324

.291

.121

.062

-.052
.000

-.032
.000

.026
.000

.033
.000

.026
.000

.277

.262

.330

.096

.035

-.005
.651

-.001
.653

.003
.651

.002
.651

.001
.652

60

42

Source: National Center for Education Statistics CCD public school data 2016-2017, 2018-2019 school years in: Alabama, Arkansas, Arizona, Florida, Indiana,
Louisiana, Mississippi, New Mexico, North Carolina, South Carolina, Ohio, Texas, Utah, Wisconsin. Notes: Based on continuous measures of Black students
and 1 SD increase. Indices based on demographic data available for students in grades Pre-K through 6 when demographic enrollment > 5. Districts include
schools>1. Metropolis includes districts>1 and demographic enrollment>100.

APPENDIX R. Average marginal effects associated with a one standard deviation increase in percent Latinx: By metropolitan-level
Latinx-White segregation.
VARIABLES
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Schools

Districts

MSAs

All Metropolitan Regions
Average Predictions
Pr (y | base)
Percent Latinx
+SD
p-value

9,138

761

102

Metropolitan Regions with Medium to High
Levels of L-W Between (D) Segregation:
>30
Average Predictions
Pr (y | base)
Percent Latinx
+SD
p-value

5,706

Metropolitan Regions with Low Levels of
L-W Between (D) Segregation: ≤30
Average Predictions
Pr (y | base)
Percent Latinx
+SD
p-value

3,432

548

213

A

B

C

D

F

.226

.308

.301

.113

.053

-.054
.000

-.027
.000

.029
.000

.031
.000

.022
.000

.209

.324

.287

.119

.061

-.051
.000

-.031
.000

.024
.000

.032
.000

.027
.000

.254

.280

.321

.102

.042

-.031
.006

-.011
.024

.019
.004

.015
.012

.008
.018

41

61

Source: National Center for Education Statistics CCD public school data 2016-2017, 2018-2019 school years in: Alabama, Arkansas, Arizona, Florida, Indiana,
Louisiana, Mississippi, New Mexico, North Carolina, South Carolina, Ohio, Texas, Utah, Wisconsin. Notes: Based on continuous measures of Latinx students
and 1 SD increase. Indices based on demographic data available for students in grades Pre-K through 6 when demographic enrollment > 5. Districts include
schools>1. Metropolis includes districts>1 and demographic enrollment>100.

APPENDIX S. Multi-level ordered logistic regression results for district-level Black-White and Latinx-White segregation (D) without
financial control variables.

VARIABLES
B-W Within (D)
20-41 percent Black
42-62 percent Black
63-82 percent Black
83-100 percent Black
B-W Within (D) * 20-41 percent Black
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B-W Within (D) * 42-62 percent Black
B-W Within (D) * 63-82 percent Black
B-W Within (D) * 83-100 percent Black

B-W Within (D)

L-W Within (D)

0.01
(0.00)
-0.30*
(0.15)
-0.73**
(0.25)
-0.57
(0.38)
-1.38*
(0.60)
-0.00
(0.00)
0.00
(0.01)
-0.01
(0.01)
0.01
(0.01)

0.01
(0.00)
-0.06
(0.15)
-0.55**
(0.21)
-1.10***
(0.25)
-1.06**
(0.33)
-0.00

L-W Within (D)
5-29 percent Latinx
30-55 percent Latinx
56-80 percent Latinx
81-100 percent Latinx
L-W Within (D) * 5-29 percent Latinx

-

-

(0.00)
-0.00
(0.01)
0.00
(0.01)
-0.00
(0.01)

Percent Latinx (School)

-0.02***
(0.00)

-

Percent Black (School)

-

-0.02***
(0.00)

0.35***
(0.08)
0.36**
(0.12)
-0.20
(0.13)
-0.95***
(0.16)

0.35***
(0.08)
0.34**
(0.12)
-0.09
(0.13)
-0.81***
(0.16)

1.07***
(0.16)
0.00
(0.31)
-0.01*
(0.00)
-3.85***
(0.24)

1.06***
(0.16)
0.09
(0.31)
-0.01*
(0.00)
-3.80***
(0.30)

L-W Within (D) * 30-55 percent Latinx
L-W Within (D) * 56-80 percent Latinx
L-W Within (D) * 81-100 percent Latinx
School-level variables

Charter
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Letter Rating
South
Midwest

District-level variables
Recent Mandate (1990-2003)
Prior Mandate (1980-1989)
Percent White (District)
cut1

cut2
cut3
cut4
var(_cons[district])
Observations
Number of groups

-2.37***
(0.23)
-0.62**
(0.23)
1.00***
(0.23)
0.65***
(0.06)
10,369
854

-2.32***
(0.30)
-0.57
(0.30)
1.05***
(0.30)
0.63***
(0.06)
10,369
854

Source: National Center for Education Statistics CCD public school data 2016-2017, 2018-2019 school years in: Alabama, Arkansas, Arizona, Florida, Indiana,
Louisiana, Mississippi, New Mexico, North Carolina, South Carolina, Ohio, Texas, Utah, Wisconsin. Notes: Percent Black and Latinx thresholds are categorical
based on Table 2. Charter status, rating, prior/ recent mandates and region variables are dichotomous. Based on demographic data available for students in grades
Pre-K through 6 when demographic enrollment > 5. Districts include schools>1. Metropolis includes districts>1 and demographic enrollment>100. Standard
errors in parentheses *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.
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APPENDIX T. Multi-level ordered logistic regression results for metropolitan-level Black-White and Latinx-White segregation (D)

without financial control variables.
VARIABLES
B-W Between (D)
20-41 percent Black
42-62 percent Black
63-82 percent Black
83-100 percent Black
B-W Between (D) * 20-41 percent Black
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B-W Between (D) * 42-62 percent Black
B-W Between (D) * 63-82 percent Black
B-W Between (D) * 83-100 percent Black
L-W Between (D)
5-29 percent Latinx
30-55 percent Latinx
56-80 percent Latinx
81-100 percent Latinx
L-W Between (D) * 5-29 percent Latinx

B-W Between (D)

L-W Between (D)

-0.00
(0.00)
-0.10
(0.11)
-0.23
(0.15)
-0.38*
(0.19)
-0.26
(0.29)
-0.01*
(0.00)
-0.01*
(0.00)
-0.01**
(0.00)
-0.02**
(0.01)
-

0.00
(0.01)
-0.20
(0.18)
-0.10
(0.21)
-0.66**
(0.24)
-1.37***
(0.30)
0.00

L-W Between (D) * 30-55 percent Latinx

-

(0.01)
-0.02*
(0.01)

L-W Between (D) * 56-80 percent Latinx

-

-0.01

-

(0.01)

-

0.00

-

(0.01)

-0.02***

-

(0.00)

-

-

-0.01***

-

(0.00)

0.35***

0.34***

(0.08)

(0.08)

Letter Rating

0.37*
(0.16)

0.28
(0.16)

South

-0.17

-0.01

(0.22)

(0.23)

-0.58*

-0.59*

(0.26)

(0.26)

0.98***

1.02***

(0.23)

(0.24)

0.42

0.38

(0.29)

(0.29)

L-W Between (D) * 81-100 percent Latinx
School-level variables
Percent Latinx (School)
Percent Black (School)
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Charter

Midwest
District-level variables
Recent Mandate (1990-2003)
Prior Mandate (1980-1989)

Metropolitan-level variables
Percent White (Metro)

-0.02***

-0.01**

(0.00)

(0.00)

-4.46***

-4.10***

(0.36)

(0.42)

-2.98***

-2.62***

(0.35)

(0.41)

-1.23***

-0.88*

(0.35)

(0.41)

0.39

0.74

(0.35)

(0.41)

var(_cons[msa])

0.12**

0.13**

var(_cons[msa>district])

(0.04)
0.48***

(0.04)
0.47***

(0.06)

(0.06)

10,369

10,369

112

112

cut1
cut2
cut3
cut4

170

Observations
Number of groups

Source: National Center for Education Statistics CCD public school data 2016-2017, 2018-2019 school years in: Alabama, Arkansas, Arizona, Florida, Indiana,
Louisiana, Mississippi, New Mexico, North Carolina, South Carolina, Ohio, Texas, Utah, Wisconsin. Notes: Percent Black and Latinx thresholds are categorical
based on Table 2. Charter status, rating, prior/ recent mandates and region variables are dichotomous. Based on demographic data available for students in grades
Pre-K through 6 when demographic enrollment > 5. Districts include schools>1. Metropolis includes districts>1 and demographic enrollment>100. Standard
errors in parentheses *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.

APPENDIX U. Sensitivity analyses: Multi-level ordered logistic regression results for metropolitan-level Black-White segregation (D)
with additional restrictive inclusion criteria.

VARIABLES
B-W Between (D)
20-41 percent Black
42-62 percent Black
63-82 percent Black
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83-100 percent Black
B-W Between (D) * 20-41 percent Black
B-W Between (D) * 42-62 percent Black
B-W Between (D) * 63-82 percent Black
B-W Between (D) * 83-100 percent Black

Metropolitan Black Metropolitan Black Metropolitan Black Metropolitan Black
Student Population Student Population Student Population Student Population
>=500
>=1,000
>=5,000
>=10,000
-0.00
(0.00)
0.00
(0.12)
-0.08
(0.17)
-0.06
(0.21)
0.29
(0.33)
-0.01*
(0.00)
-0.01**
(0.00)
-0.02***
(0.00)
-0.03***
(0.01)

-0.00
(0.00)
-0.00
(0.12)
-0.08
(0.17)
-0.07
(0.21)
0.29
(0.33)
-0.01*
(0.00)
-0.01**
(0.00)
-0.02***
(0.00)
-0.03***
(0.01)

0.00
(0.00)
-0.10
(0.14)
-0.16
(0.19)
-0.08
(0.23)
0.23
(0.35)
-0.01
(0.00)
-0.01*
(0.00)
-0.02**
(0.00)
-0.03***
(0.01)

0.01
(0.01)
-0.22
(0.17)
-0.19
(0.22)
0.07
(0.25)
-0.27
(0.38)
-0.00
(0.00)
-0.01*
(0.00)
-0.02***
(0.01)
-0.02*
(0.01)

-0.01***
(0.00)
-0.01***
(0.00)

-0.01***
(0.00)
-0.01***
(0.00)

-0.01***
(0.00)
-0.01***
(0.00)

-0.01***
(0.00)
-0.01***
(0.00)

School-level variables
Percent Latinx (School)
Percent Poverty (FRL)

Charter
Letter Rating
South
Midwest

0.30***
(0.09)
0.36*
(0.16)
0.10
(0.24)
-0.68*
(0.28)

0.30***
(0.09)
0.37*
(0.16)
0.12
(0.23)
-0.65*
(0.27)

0.29**
(0.10)
0.34
(0.20)
-0.58
(0.31)
-1.49***
(0.36)

0.29**
(0.11)
0.17
(0.23)
-0.65*
(0.31)
-1.60***
(0.39)

0.00
(0.00)
1.24***
(0.24)
0.18
(0.29)
0.15***
(0.04)

0.00
(0.00)
1.11***
(0.24)
0.20
(0.29)
0.14**
(0.04)

0.00
(0.00)
1.29***
(0.26)
0.00
(0.32)
0.16**
(0.05)

0.00
(0.00)
1.31***
(0.35)
0.12
(0.35)
0.20***
(0.05)

-0.00
(0.01)

-0.01
(0.01)

-0.01
(0.01)

-0.01
(0.01)

-2.36***
(0.64)
-0.98
(0.64)
0.76
(0.64)
2.37***
(0.64)

-2.58***
(0.64)
-1.20
(0.64)
0.54
(0.64)
2.16***
(0.64)

-2.85***
(0.77)
-1.44
(0.77)
0.31
(0.77)
1.90*
(0.77)

-2.58**
(0.84)
-1.19
(0.84)
0.59
(0.84)
2.22**
(0.84)

District-level variables
District Poverty (IPR)
Recent Mandate (1990-2003)
Prior Mandate (1980-1989)
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Property Taxes

Metropolitan-level variables
Percent White (Metro)

cut1
cut2
cut3
cut4

var(_cons[msa])
var(_cons[msa>district])
Observations
Number of groups

0.12**
(0.04)
0.43***
(0.06)
9,035
96

0.10**
(0.04)
0.43***
(0.06)
8,904
89

0.06
(0.03)
0.43***
(0.06)
7,085
45

0.06
(0.04)
0.40***
(0.07)
5,972
27

Source: National Center for Education Statistics CCD public school data 2016-2017, 2018-2019 school years in: Alabama, Arkansas, Arizona, Florida, Indiana,
Louisiana, Mississippi, New Mexico, North Carolina, South Carolina, Ohio, Texas, Utah, Wisconsin. Notes: Percent Black and Latinx thresholds are categorical
based on Table 2. Charter status, rating, prior/ recent mandates and region variables are dichotomous. Based on demographic data available for students in grades
Pre-K through 6 when demographic enrollment > 5. Districts include schools>1. Metropolis includes districts>1 and demographic enrollment>100. Models
progressively restrict inclusion criteria at the metro-level from >=500 Black students in the metro to >=5,000 Black students in the mero. Standard errors in
parentheses *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.
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APPENDIX V. Adjusted differences in linear predictions by exposure group.
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lincom

p

Perceptions of quality
A-B
A-C
A-D
A-F
B-C
B-D
B-F
C-D
C-F
D-F

.336
1.013
1.706
1.630
.677
1.369
1.294
.693
.617
-.076

<.001
<.001
<.001
.003
<.001
<.001
.002
.011
-

Likelihood of enrollment
A-B
A-C
A-D
A-F
B-C
B-D
B-F
C-D
C-F
D-F

-.138
.895
1.147
1.059
1.033
1.285
1.197
.252
.164
-.088

<.001
<.001
<.001
<.001
<.001
<.001
-

Sources: Original data collected on Qualtrics via Amazon Mechanical Turk Panel. Notes: N=414. Notes: Based on the regression models contained in Table 12
and Table 13 with control variables held at the means. Linear predictions shown in Figure 19 and Figure 20. Lincom is the difference in these linear predictions
by exposure group; p is the p-value from tests of difference between predictions and delta-method standard errors. Only significant coefficients are shown
(p<0.05).

APPENDIX W. Institutional review board consent.

University of Wisconsin – Milwaukee
Consent to Participate in Research
Researchers: Marcus L. Britton, Ph.D.; Michael A. Miner, M.A., Ph.D. Candidate; Department of
Sociology. We’re inviting you to participate in a research study. Participation is completely voluntary. If
you agree to participate, you can always change your mind and withdraw. There are no negative
consequences, whatever you decide.
What is the purpose of this study?: We want to understand parental perceptions and attitudes toward
school ratings.
What will I do?: This survey will ask you questions about your perception of school ratings and your
attitudes toward enrolling your child in a similar school. This will take approximately 5-10 minutes of
your time.
Risks:
• Some questions may be very personal or upsetting. You can skip any questions you don’t want to
answer, or stop the survey entirely.
• Online data being hacked or intercepted: This is a risk you experience any time you provide
information online. We’re using a secure system to collect this data, but we can’t completely
eliminate this risk.
• Amazon could link your worker ID (and associated personal information) with your survey
responses. Make sure you have read Amazon’s MTurk participant and privacy agreements to
understand how your personal information may be used or disclosed.
• Breach of confidentiality: There is a chance your data could be seen by someone who shouldn’t
have access to it. We’re minimizing this risk in the following ways:
o All identifying information is removed and replaced with a study ID.
o We’ll store all electronic data on a password-protected, encrypted computer.
Possible benefits: There are no benefits to you other than to further research. Larger benefits include
helping researchers understand how parents evaluate school ratings.
Estimated number of participants: 385 parents
How long will it take? 5-10 minutes
Costs: None.
Compensation: You will receive $0.60 for completing the survey.
Future research: De-identified data (all identifying information removed) may be shared with other
researchers. You won’t be told specific details about these future research studies.
Where will data be stored? On the researchers’ computers.
How long will it be kept? : De-identified data will be kept for up to 5 years.
Who can see my data?
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•
•
•
•

We (the researchers) will have access to your responses and de-identified demographic
information. This is so we can analyze the data and conduct the study.
The Institutional Review Board (IRB) at UWM, the Office for Human Research Protections
(OHRP), or other federal agencies may review all the study data. This is to ensure we’re
following laws and ethical guidelines.
We may share our findings in publications or presentations. If we do, the results will be aggregate
(grouped) data, with no individual results.
Amazon: Because they own the MTurk internal software, and to issue payment, Amazon will
have access to your MTurk worker ID. There is a possibility Amazon could link your worker ID
(and associated personal information) with your survey responses.

Contact information:
For questions about the research, complaints, or problems please contact:
Michael A. Miner, minerm@uwm.edu
For questions about your rights as a research participant, complaints, or problems: Contact the
UWM IRB (Institutional Review Board; provides ethics oversight) at 414-229-3173 / irbinfo@uwm.edu.
Please print or save this screen if you want to be able to access the information later.
IRB #: 20.146
IRB Approval Date: January 10, 2020
Agreement to Participate
If you meet the eligibility criteria below and would like to participate in this study, click the button below
to begin the survey. Remember, your participation is completely voluntary, and you’re free to withdraw at
any time.
• I am at least 18 years old
• I am a parent of a child/children between the ages of 0 and 21 years old.
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APPENDIX X. Institutional review board approval letter (exempt).
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APPENDIX Y. Experimental survey experiment.

[Insert consent form and IRB approval]
[Programming Note: Set UWM header in Qualtrics]
[Programming Note: Restrict to one question per page and no duplicates]
Question 1.
Are you a parent? [Please select one].
Radio buttons 1-2; 1=Yes; 2=No
[Programming Note: If 2 is selected, skip to End of Survey]
Question 2.
How many children do you have?
Radio buttons 1-6; 1=1; 2=2…6=More than 5
[Programming Note: Randomize choice options]
[Programming Note: Fix last option]
Question 3.
What type of school will you or did/do you send your children to?
Radio buttons 1-5 and open; 1=Voucher; 2=Charter; 3=Private; 4=Public; 5=Other[open]
[Programming Note: Randomize choice options]
[Programming Note: Fix last option]
Question 4.
Which of the following best describes your race or ethnicity?
Radio buttons 1-5 and open; 1=Black or African American; 2=Latino/a/x; 3=White; 4=Asian;
5=Other[open]
[Programming Note: Randomize choice options]
[Programming Note: Fix last option]
Question 5.
Which gender do you identify with? [Please select one].
Radio buttons 1-3 and open; 1=Male; 2=Female; 3=Other [open]
[Programming Note: Randomize choice options]
[Programming Note: Fix last option]
Question 6.
How old are you?
Open response
[Programming Note: Fix character minimum to 2]
[Programming Note: Fix character maximum to 2]
Question 7.
Which state in the United States do you live in? [Please use the two-letter abbreviation].
Open response
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[Programming Note: Fix character minimum to 2]
[Programming Note: Fix character maximum to 2]
Question 8.
What is your highest level of education? [Please select one].
Radio buttons 1-6; 1=Less than a high school degree; 2=A high school degree; 3= Two-year
college degree; 4= Four-year college degree; 5=Graduate degree 6=Doctoral degree
Question 9.
We hear a lot of talk these days about liberals and conservatives. Below is a seven-point scale of
political views that people might hold. Where would you place yourself on this scale?
Radio buttons 1-7; 1=Extremely Liberal 6=Extremely Conservative

Introduction to School Data. Schools are required to provide the public with annual
information on how well they are serving their students. Like how students receive report cards
to evaluate their performance in subject areas, schools are evaluated on different areas and the
information is issued in a school report card. School report cards are available to the public
which allows people to judge how well schools are performing.
Imagine you are asked to evaluate your satisfaction with measures used on a school’s report card.
On the following screens, you will be asked to view school report card data for elementary
schools.
School. Below are report card data for Cedar Elementary School. The performance of Cedar
Elementary has been measured by the school’s performance index scores and are listed for each
area. The overall rating is a weighted combination of these measures. The overall rating scale is
A-F. With the provided data, please answer the following questions.
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Cedar Elementary School

Overall School Rating

(A-F)

School and District Measures
Performance Metrics
Student Achievement on Standardized Tests
Adequate Yearly Progress in achievement on
(e.g. amount of students that are proficient or reading and language exams
higher)
Growth in Student Achievement Over Time
Adequate Yearly Progress in growth on
(e.g. annual gains on exams)
reading and language exams from year to year
Closing Achievement Gaps With Other
Adequate Yearly Progress in performance on
Students (e.g. whites achievement scores
narrowing these gaps in achievement
compared to minority group achievement
scores; students’ scores that receive free/
reduced lunch compared to those that do not).
On-Track to Graduation (e.g. graduation
Adequate Yearly Progress in student success
rates; attendance at other schools)
in achieving milestones
[Programming Note: Order of School and District Measures Should Be Randomized]
[Programming Note: Overall School Rating Should Fixed In First Position]
[Programming Note: Overall School Rating Should Have Performance Varying A-F Randomly]

Question 10.
Imagine the IDEAL overall school rating for you and your household. How well do you think
Cedar Elementary compared with your ideal?
Radio buttons 1-7; 1=Extremely far from my ideal; 7=Extremely close to my ideal
Question 11.
Imagine Cedar Elementary was your local neighborhood school. If cost were not an issue, how
likely do you think you and your household would be to decide to enroll your child in Cedar
Elementary School versus an Alternative School (such as a private school, voucher or
charter)?Radio buttons 1-7; 1=Extremely likely to enroll in Cedar Elementary; 7= Extremely
likely to enroll in Alternative School
Here is your ID
[${e://Field/Create%20New%20Field%20or%20Choose%20From%20Dropdown...}]
Copy this value to paste into MTurk. When you have copied this ID, please click the 'Next'
button to submit your survey.
[Programming Note: Set random embedded data to generate unique code 100-5000]
We thank you for your time spent taking this survey.
Your response has been recorded.
[end]
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APPENDIX Z. Curriculum vitae.

Curriculum Vitae

Michael A.
Ph.D. Candidate · Distinguished Fellow · Department of Sociology
University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee

Bolton Hall 718, 3210 N. Maryland Ave, Milwaukee, WI 53211
minerm@uwm.edu |

/minerm/

Education__________________________________________________________________
2020

Doctor of Philosophy
Sociology, University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee

2017

Master of Arts
Sociology, University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee

2015

Bachelor of Arts
Sociology and Psychology, St. Joseph’s College, Brooklyn

Professional Experience__________________________________________________
Facebook, Menlo Park, CA and New York, NY
Instagram, Menlo Park, CA and New York, NY
2020-current
Summer 2019
Summer 2018

Research Scientist
Research Scientist, PhD-Intern
Research Scientist, PhD-Intern

2019-2020

St. Joseph’s College, Brooklyn, Brooklyn, NY
Visiting Research Scholar

2019-2020
2017-2019
2015-2020

University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee, Milwaukee, WI
Distinguished Predoctoral Fellow
Predoctoral Fellow
Graduate Teaching Assistant and Research Assistant

Areas of Specialization____________________________________________________
Sociology of Education, Segregation/Integration and Policy, Public Trust, Science, Knowledge and
Technology, Medical Sociology, Social Inequality, Quantitative Methodology
Refereed Publications_____________________________________________________
Minor Revision

Miner, Michael A. “Caught in Limbo: Mapping the Experiences of FirstGeneration Students in Graduate School” at Sociological Perspectives

*Honorable Mention, Educational Problems Division Paper Award, Society for the Study of
Social Problems, 2019*
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2019

Miner, Michael A. “Physicians, Nurse Practitioners, and the Shortage of
Primary Care Providers: Professional Autonomy in the Public Discourse”
Sociological Imagination 55(1):1-21.

*First place, Barbara J. Johnston Paper Award, Midwest Sociological Society, 2018*
2019

Miner, Michael A. “Unpacking the Monolith: Intersecting Gender and
Citizenship Status in STEM Graduate Education” International Journal of Sociology
and Social Policy 39(9/10): 661-679.

Under Review

Miner, Michael A. “Unmet Promises: Diminishing Confidence in Education
Among College Educated Adults from 1973-2018”

Under Review

Miner, Michael A. and Marcus L. Britton “Repackaging Inequality? School
Segregation and School Accountability Ratings in Metropolitan Milwaukee”

Under Review

Gauchat, Gordon and Michael A. Miner. “Vaccination and Polarization: A
Cultural Authority Model of Science Controversy”
“Residential Segregation and Very Preterm Birth among Non-Hispanic Black
Women: The Role of Maternal Immigrant Status” (with Marcus L. Britton, in
preparation)
“The Cultural Authority of Social Science: A Study of Public Perceptions on
Inequality.” (with Gordon Gauchat, in preparation)
“An Experiment on Parents: How School Ratings Influence Parent’s Perceptions
of School Quality and Impact Their Enrollment Decisions.” (with Natasha
Quadlin, in preparation)
“A Nation Rated, a Nation Divided: Understanding the Association of School
Ratings and School Segregation at the Metropolitan Level.” (with Marcus L.
Britton, in preparation).

Research and Technical Reports
2019

Miner, Michael A. “Perceptions of Performance and Reliability: A
Longitudinal Framework of People Using Instagram.” Prepared for Instagram
and Facebook Inc.

2019

Miner, Michael A. “Assessing Global Access: Perceptions of Performance
and Reliability on Instagram Lite.” Prepared for Instagram and Facebook Inc.

2019

Miner, Michael A. “Foundation Research: A Systemic Review of
Performance and Reliability.” Prepared for Instagram and Facebook Inc.
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2018

Miner, Michael A. “Multinational Results: The Impact of Inappropriate Ad
Content on Trust in Instagram around the World.” Prepared for Instagram and
Facebook Inc.

2018

Miner, Michael A. “Perceptions of Transparency, Trust and Personal
Control on Instagram.” Prepared for Instagram and Facebook Inc.

2018

Miner, Michael A. “Understanding Views of and Reactions to
Inappropriate and Trust-Violating Content on Instagram.” Prepared for
Instagram and Facebook Inc.

Invited Talks___________________________________________________________
2020

Miner, Michael A. “From Academia to Industry: Being a Sociologist in Tech”
Midwest Sociological Society Omaha, NE. 

2020

Miner, Michael A. Panelist. “"Speedgeeking": Sustaining a Career in Industry
with a Degree in Sociology” Midwest Sociological Society Omaha, NE. 

2020

Miner, Michael A. Panelist. “Understanding and Unpacking the Peer-Review
Process in Academic Publishing” Department of Sociology University of Wisconsin,
Milwaukee.

2019

Miner, Michael A. Panelist. “Leveraging Graduate Study to Launch a
Professional Career:” Department of Sociology University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee.

Presentations at professional meetings _____________________________
2020

Miner, Michael A. “Shifting Rhetoric, Broken Promises, and 45-years of
Diminishing Confidence in the Institution of Education” Society for the Study of
Social Problems, San Francisco, CA

2020

Miner, Michael A. and Marcus L. Britton. “A Nation Rated? School
Segregation and the Unequal Distribution of a School Resource in Metropolitan
Public Schools” Sociology of Education Association, Monterey Bay, CA

2019

Miner, Michael A. “Declining Trust in Education Among College Educated
Adults: 1974-2016” American Sociological Association, New York, NY

2019

Miner, Michael A. “Being First: How Social Capital Intersects with the
Socialization Processes of First-Generation Students in Graduate School” Society
for the Study of Social Problems, New York, NY

2019

Miner, Michael A. “A Conceptual Matrix of the Experiences of FirstGeneration Students in Graduate School” Midwest Sociological Society, Chicago, IL
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2018

Miner, Michael A. and Marcus L. Britton. “Repackaging Inequality: Obscuring
School Performance through Accountability Rankings” Society for the Study of
Social Problems, Philadelphia, PA

2018

Gauchat, Gordon and Michael A. Miner. “The Credibility of Cultural
Authorities on Vaccination Policy: A Relational Approach” American Sociological
Association, Philadelphia, PA

2018

Miner, Michael A. “A Health Policy Issue is a Social Problem Too: Who
Should Have Professional Autonomy?” Society for the Study of Social Problems,
Philadelphia, PA

2018

Miner, Michael A. “Disaggregating the Monolithic Category: Citizenship and
Choice of Academic Discipline Among STEM Graduate Students” Midwest
Sociological Society, Minneapolis, MN

2017

Miner, Michael A. “Separate and Unequal: Predicting School Accountability
Ratings” American Sociological Association, Montreal, ON

2017

Miner, Michael A. “Separate and Unequal: What Do School Accountability
Labels Actually Measure in America’s Most Segregated City?” Society for the Study
of Social Problems, Montreal, ON

2017

Miner, Michael A. “Public Perceptions of Professional Autonomy in Primary
Care Medicine,” Sociology Colloquium, Milwaukee, WI

2017

Miner, Michael A. “Physicians, Nurse Practitioners, and the Shortage in
Primary Care Medicine: A Contestation of Credentials and Experience Midwest
Sociological Society, Milwaukee, WI

2016

Miner, Michael A. “Higher Education: A Discussion of Structural Inequalities”
Society for the Study of Social Problems, Seattle, WA

2016

Miner, Michael A. “Issues in Education: Exploring the Experiences of LowIncome College Students” Eastern Sociological Society, Boston, MA

2015

Miner, Michael A. “Educational Inequalities: An Examination of Individual
Triumphs Over Structural Barriers” Research Symposium, Brooklyn, NY

2015

Miner, Michael A. “Enhancing Narcissism through Social Media Use: The
Introduction of the Cellular Phone” Research Symposium, Brooklyn, NY
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Local Media Attention__________________________________________________
2019

Sociology@UWM Newsletter, “Faculty and Student Accomplishments”
(https://uwm.edu/sociology/wpcontent/uploads/sites/151/2019/06/Sociology-Newsletter-2019.pdf)

2018

Sociology@UWM Newsletter, “Faculty and Student Accomplishments”
(https://uwm.edu/sociology/wpcontent/uploads/sites/151/2018/05/Sociology-Newsletter-2018.pdf)

2018

SJCNY Magazine, “Michael Miner ‘15 Gets Experience in Research Science
From Social Media Giant” (https://oncampus.sjcny.edu/facebook-internshipopens-doors-for-sjc-brooklyn-alum/)

Grants, Fellowships and Accolades__________________________________

External Grants
2020

Midwest Sociological Society, Scholarship Development Committee “A Nation
Rated? School Ratings, School Quality and Enrollment Decisions: Evidence
from a Survey Experiment.”

Fellowships and Scholarships
2019
2018
2017
2017
2015
2013
2011-2015
2011-2015
2011

Distinguished Graduate Student Fellowship, (UWM)
Advanced Opportunity Program Fellowship, (UWM)
Advanced Opportunity Program Fellowship, (UWM)
Chancellor’s Graduate Student Fellowship, (UWM)
Chancellor’s Graduate Student Fellowship, (UWM))
American Red Cross Scholarship, (New York Cares)
Clark Foundation Scholarship (SJC)
St. Joseph’s Scholastic Scholarship (SJC)
Chief Schenevus Scholarship (SJC)

Paper Awards
2019
2018

Honorable Mention, Educational Division Paper Award, (SSSP)
First Place, Barbara J. Johnston Student Paper Award, (MSS)

Internal and Travel Grants
2020
2019
2019
2018
2018
2018
2017

Graduate Student Travel Award, Sociology of Education Association (SEA)
Student Forum Travel Award, American Sociological Association (ASA)
Graduate Student Sociology Association, Student Association (UWM)
Travel Grant, Midwest Sociological Society (MSS)
Graduate Student Travel Grant, The Graduate School, (UWM)
Graduate Student Sociology Association, Student Association (UWM)
Graduate Student Travel Grant, The Graduate School, (UWM)
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2017
2016
2016
2015
2015

Graduate Student Travel Grant, Department of Sociology, (UWM)
Graduate Student Travel Grant, The Graduate School, (UWM)
Graduate Student Travel Grant, Department of Sociology, (UWM)
Graduate Student Travel Grant, The Graduate School, (UWM)
Graduate Student Travel Grant, Department of Sociology, (UWM)

Honorable Recognition
2015
2014, 2015
2014, 2015

Social Sciences, Departmental Honors, (SJC)
Sigma Iota Chi Honors, (SJC)
Dean’s Academic List, (SJC)

Research Experience_________________________________________________

Research Internships

Summer 2019 Facebook, New York, New York
Research Scientist, Ph.D.-Intern, Instagram: Infrastructure Foundation Research
Team
Summer 2018 Facebook, Menlo Park, California
Research Scientist, Ph.D.-Intern, Instagram: Trust and Transparency Research
Team

Graduate Research Assistant
2017-2020

Department of Sociology, University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee
Graduate Research Assistant

2017-2018

National Center for Distance Education and Technological Advancements
Graduate Research Assistant

Teaching Experience__________________________________________________

Graduate Teaching Assistant and Lab Instructor
2017
2016-2017
2016-2017
2015-2016

Introduction to Sociology (Principal Instructor: Tim O’Brien)
Teaching Assistant
Department of Academic Services
Supplemental Instructor
Statistics (Principal Instructor: Aki Roberts)
Lab Instructor and Teaching Assistant
Introduction to Sociology (Principal Instructor: Jennifer Jordan)
Teaching Assistant
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Software and Methodology__________________________________________
Statistical Methods and Analyses
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), Logit/Probit, Ordered Logit/Probit, Structural
Equation Models (CFA, Path, SR, MIMC, LGM), Time-Series Analysis,
Multilevel Models, Mixed/Fixed Effects, Categorical Data Analysis,
Multinomial, Predicted Probabilities, Negative Binomial, Poisson, Graphical
Plots and Predictions and Model Diagnostics, Experimental Methods, Machine
Learning and Predictive Analytics
Other Research Design Competencies:
Coding, Content Analyses, Online Discussion Forums, Intercoderreliability,
Focus Groups, Semi-Structured Interviewing, Unstructured Interviewing,
Ethnographic and Participant Observation
Platforms and
Data:

Amazon MTurk, GfK Surveys, TESS Surveys, State Report Cards (Education),
Common Core Data (CCD), National Center for Education Statistics (NCES),
Census, American Community Survey (ACS and CPS), STEM Graduate
Students, General Social Survey (GSS), Birth Data Files

Software:

Stata, SPSS, Stattransfer, NVivo, Atlas.ti, Qualtrics, Microsoft Office, Google
and Adobe Applications, (Novice: MPlus, SQL, R, Python and Tableau)
Operation Systems: Windows, Apple

Academic Membership _____________________________________________________
American Sociological Association; Sociology of Education Association;
Eastern Sociological Society; Society for the Study of Social Problems, Midwest
Sociological Society, American Education Research Association
Service To Profession____________________________________________________

Manuscript Reviewer
Family Medicine, Sociological Inquiry, Sociological Forum, Sociological
Perspectives, International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy, Social
Problems, Sociological Focus, Journal of Higher Education Outreach and
Engagement

Professional
2019-present
2019-2022
2019-2022
2020
2020-2022
2020

Advisory Board Member and Associate Editor: Social Problems
Student Director: Midwest Sociological Society
Board of Directors, Member: Midwest Sociological Society
Organizer: “How Technology is Transforming Education.”
Society for the Study of Social Problems, San Francisco, CA
Chair: Student Issues Committee,
Midwest Sociological Society, Omaha, NE
3MT Judge: Midwest Sociological Society 

187

2019-2022
2019-2022
2019-2022
2019
2018
2018
2017
2017

Committee Member: Student Issues Committee,
Midwest Sociological Society, Chicago, IL
Committee Member: Annual Meeting Committee,
Midwest Sociological Society, Chicago, IL
Committee Member: Membership Committee,
Midwest Sociological Society, Chicago, IL
Organizer and Discussant: “Public Perceptions of Trust and
Inequality.” Society for the Study of Social Problems, New York, NY
Organizer and Presider: “Inter-organizational Issues in Education
and Policy.” Society for the Study of Social Problems, Philadelphia, PA
Committee Member: Michael Harrington Award Committee,
Society for the Study of Social Problems, Philadelphia, PA
Discussant and Presider: “Educated in Whiteness: Narratives of
Reproduction and Resistance” Society for the Study of Social Problems,
Montreal, ON
Presider: “Health Care Practice and Patients’ Experience” Midwest Sociological
Society, Milwaukee, WI

University
2017-2019
2018, 2019
2017-2020
2016-2017

President: Graduate Student Sociology Association (UWM)
Judge: Undergraduate Research Symposium(UWM)
Graduate Student Representative: Sociology(UWM)
Treasurer and Founding Member: Graduate Student Sociology Association
(UWM)
 Unable to deliver, conference canceled due to SARS-CoV-2 (COVID-19).
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